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A Metzorah Must Shave This week's Torah portion discusses the laws of the Metzorah — a person afflicted with a spiritual condition called Tzara'as. While often mistranslated as "leprosy," Tzara'as was not a medical disease but rather a supernatural sign of spiritual deficiency, often a punishment for moral failings such as gossip, arrogance, or other forms of improper behavior. The Torah describes how Tzara'as would appear as discolored patches on the skin, clothing, or even walls of a house.
In addition to the physical symptoms, a Metzorah becomes tamei, meaning ritually impure, and must go through a purification process to become tahor — ritually pure — again. One part of this purification process is that the Metzorah must completely shave all the hair on his body, including his head, beard, and the sidelocks of his hair known as payos.
This requirement raises a serious halachic question: How is it permitted to shave the payos and beard, given that the Torah prohibits doing so with a razor? This issue is discussed by many later halachic authorities, including the Chasam Sofer (Yoreh De'ah 140), the Avnei Nezer (Y.D. 86), and others.
One might argue that the positive commandment (aseh) to shave the Metzorah overrides the negative prohibition (lo sa'aseh) against shaving the beard — based on the general principle in Jewish law that a positive commandment can override a negative one (aseh docheh lo sa'aseh). However, the matter is not so simple.
Three Strong Questions Halachic authorities note that the main fulfillment of the mitzvah of shaving occurs when the final two hairs are removed. In theory, one could cut most of the hair using a method that doesn't violate the Torah prohibition — such as using scissors or a depilatory cream, which causes hair to fall out without cutting — and then finish the process with a razor on the remaining hair. But if so, why would it be permissible to use a razor at all? Couldn't the entire process be completed without ever violating the Torah prohibition?
A second important question is raised by the Yashresh Yaakov (Yevamos 4b): Even if we accept that the Metzorah himself is permitted to have his hair shaved — since it is part of a Torah-mandated purification process — what about the Kohen who performs the shaving? The Metzorah has a mitzvah to shave, but the Kohen merely facilitates the act and is not directly commanded to perform it. If so, he has no positive obligation to override the Torah prohibitions, and should be left with only the lav — the prohibition — against shaving someone's beard or sidelocks. Why then is it permissible for him to carry out the act?
A third question is raised by the Tosafos Gornish (Yevamos 5a). There is a principle in halacha that when one violates a prohibition in order to fulfill a mitzvah, the fulfillment and the violation must occur simultaneously. In our case, however, the Metzorah is not fully fulfilling the mitzvah of shaving until all of his hair is removed. That means that during the earlier stages of shaving — such as when he is shaving the beard or payos — the mitzvah has not yet been completed, and thus he is left with just the prohibition. How then can this be permitted?
While many halachic authorities offer answers to each of these questions individually, I would like to present a powerful and unified approach that I saw[1], based on an Ohr Sameach (in Chametz u'Matzah 6:7) and really rooted in the words of Rabbeinu Dovid (Pesachim 35a).
The Chiddush Of the Ohr Sameach The Ohr Sameach addresses a fascinating question: Why isn't it permitted to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah on the first night of Pesach using chadash grain — that is, grain that was harvested before the Korban Omer was brought and is therefore prohibited until the Korban Omer? (This grain is referred to as chadash, and until the proper time, it may not be eaten, even though it looks no different than permissible yashan grain.)
This question is actually raised in the Yerushalmi, though the Bavli does not appear to address it directly. The assumption of the Ohr Sameach is that eating chadash matzah to fulfill the mitzvah is simply not an option — and he sets out to explain why not. After all, one might have thought to apply the principle of aseh docheh lo sa'aseh — the idea that a positive mitzvah (such as eating matzah) overrides a negative prohibition (such as eating chadash).
The Ohr Sameach suggests a novel idea: one cannot fulfill a mitzvah through the use of an object that is inherently forbidden — a cheftza shel issur. Just as we would not say that one can use non-kosher food to fulfill a mitzvah, so too here, it is inappropriate to use matzah made from chadash grain, which lacks the necessary halachic "hechsher" or status of permissibility. The positive commandment upon the person does not override the inherent prohibition of the object.
However, the Ohr Sameach acknowledges that this needs further clarification, since there are several classic examples of aseh docheh lo sa'aseh where the mitzvah seems to involve a prohibited item. For example: - In the mitzvah of yibum — the commandment for a man to marry his deceased brother's widow if the brother died without children — the Torah allows him to marry someone who is normally forbidden to him (his brother's wife). If so, how can that be permitted under the principle he just stated?
- Another classic example is the mitzvah of tzitzis, where the Torah permits placing woolen techeles strings on a linen garment, even though that combination constitutes shatnez (a prohibited mixture of wool and linen). Again, we see the positive commandment overriding a negative one, even though it involves using a prohibited object.
The Ohr Sameach defends his chiddush by drawing a critical distinction: it depends on whether the mitzvah is directed at the person (gavra) or at the object (cheftza).
A Difference in the Makeup of the Mitzvah In the case of matzah, the command is on the person — "You shall eat matzah." The Torah does not specify which matzah to eat, so we cannot say that this specific matzah — if it is made from chadash grain and thus prohibited — has now become part of the mitzvah. Since there is no direct command about this particular item, it remains inherently forbidden, and the general obligation to eat matzah cannot override that status. Hashem would not command us to perform a mitzvah through something that remains halachically assur (prohibited).
In contrast, when it comes to yibum or tzitzis, the mitzvah is focused on the object itself. This woman must be married (yibum), this garment garment must have tzitzis. In those cases, the Torah is commanding a transformation of the object's status. The woman who was previously forbidden — as one's brother's wife — becomes permitted, even commanded to be married, through yibum. Similarly, the garment that would normally be prohibited due to shatnez becomes permitted because the Torah is now commanding that the tzitzis be placed on it. In these scenarios, the mitzvah is redefining the object itself, so it is no longer considered an aveirah at all.
In other words, the lomdus of aseh docheh lo sa'aseh in such cases is that the object loses its forbidden status entirely. The mitzvah doesn't merely "override" the prohibition — it cancels it, because the Torah is now telling you that this woman is no longer an ervah (forbidden relationship), or that this garment is no longer a case of prohibited shatnez. But with non-kosher food, such as chadash matzah, the Torah never says that this particular item should now be used for the mitzvah — and so it remains a prohibited cheftza, which cannot serve as the means for fulfilling a mitzvah.
Another way to frame the Ohr Sameach's idea is through the lens of conflicting commands: when the Torah gives two mitzvot that directly address the same object, we can say that the second command cancels or overrides the first. For example, in the case of yibum, the Torah first forbids a man from marrying his brother's wife. Later, in the specific case where the brother died without children, the Torah commands him to marry her. Since both the prohibition and the mitzvah refer to the same woman, the second directive cancels the first — the command to marry now takes precedence, and the relationship is no longer forbidden.
However, this dynamic only works when the mitzvah and prohibition both speak about the same cheftza — the same object or person. When it comes to chadash matzah, the situation is different. The Torah prohibits eating this specific matzah because it is made from forbidden grain. The mitzvah to eat matzah on Pesach is not referring to this item in particular, just to matzah in general. So when the Torah tells you, "Eat matzah," it is not giving permission to eat this matzah, which remains a prohibited item. The second command is not addressing the same cheftza, and so it cannot override the prohibition.
The underlying principle is this: when the mitzvah is object-focused — the garment must have tzitzit, the widow must be married — the Torah is commanding a transformation of the object's status. It is no longer considered a sin to act upon it, because the Torah now defines it as part of the mitzvah. But when the command is on the person, and the object remains unchanged in its prohibited status (such as non-kosher food), then the general rule of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh does not apply.
This concept may also shed light on the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam in Menachos 40b, who holds that it is permitted to wear techeiles (the blue-dyed wool string of tzitzis) even at night, when there is no obligation to wear tzitzis and the mitzvah is not being fulfilled. According to our understanding of the Ohr Sameach, this makes sense: once the Torah designates techeiles as part of a mitzvah-object, it is no longer seen as ordinary material — it becomes a cheftza shel mitzvah. Even when the mitzvah is not currently active, the object retains its elevated status, and using it is not considered a misuse.
Applying this Chiddush to Metzorah With this approach, we can now understand how all three halachic difficulties are resolved.
Once the Torah commands the Metzorah to shave all the hair on his body — including his beard and payos — this constitutes a direct mitzvah regarding those specific areas. The Torah is specifically commanding the removal of the beard and payos, just as it commands placing tzitzis on a garment, or marrying one's brother's widow in yibum. In the language of the Ohr Sameach, the mitzvah is object-focused — a mitzvah on the cheftza — and therefore the act of shaving these areas is no longer considered a transgression at all. The prohibition simply does not apply when the Torah itself transforms the act into a fulfillment of a command.
This then answers why a Kohen is permitted to perform the shaving, even though he personally has no obligation to fulfill the mitzvah. Since the hair is no longer defined as a forbidden object — because the mitzvah transformed its status — there is no longer any prohibition for anyone to shave it, including someone who is not personally fulfilling the mitzvah.
Furthermore, this answers the third question regarding the requirement for the mitzvah and the prohibition to occur simultaneously. In this case, since the mitzvah applies to the entire body of hair, and each act of shaving contributes to the fulfillment of that total obligation, we do not require the final hair to be cut precisely at the same moment as the prohibited one. Once the Torah has redefined the shaving as a mitzvah-act throughout, the issur of shaving a beard or payos no longer applies at any point in the process — even if the mitzvah is only fully completed at the end.
And finally, according to this approach, there is also no need to use a workaround — such as a cream or scissors — to avoid violating the prohibition. Since the Torah itself commands that even these forbidden areas be shaved, the act is elevated and transformed into a mitzvah, not a sin, and is therefore permitted in full.
May we be zocheh to an amazing Shabbos kodesh filled with the delights of Torah! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu
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[1] This explanation is quoted in the Otzar HaIyunim on the Mesivta edition of Nazir (48:1) in the name of "various Acharonim". While the idea is loosely based on the Ohr Sameach (Chametz U'Matzah 6:7), it is not entirely clear that this is his intention, and it most likely is not! It's possible the Chavatzeles HaSharon (in our Parshah) is the source being referenced there, although even his presentation of the idea differs somewhat. For this reason, I have left the attribution vague, though the explanation itself remains compelling. | 
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