| Dear Yeshiva Family:
Continuing the Foundations: Can We Even Begin the Search?
In our ongoing exploration of the possibility that the Murex trunculus is the long-lost source of techeiles, we continue this week with what might be called the "pre-discussion"—addressing whether the search for the chilazon is even halachically and conceptually viable in the first place.
Last week, we examined the Sifri and other maamarei Chazal which, on a pashut level, seem to suggest that techeiles has been divinely concealed "l'asid lavo", for the distant future. As noted, while one might entertain alternate interpretations, the straightforward reading does imply that the search was over before it began. That said, we are not dismissing the possibility that these sources can be reinterpreted—if the evidence for the Murex trunculus as the chilazon becomes truly overwhelming. This week, we turn our attention to three additional preliminary hurdles—all attributed (directly or indirectly) to the Beis HaLevi—which question the legitimacy of reintroducing techeiles today. These hurdles revolve around a central theme: mesorah—the tradition through which we transmit and preserve the performance of mitzvos. Before we even discuss the identity of the chilazon, we must ask: can techeiles be reinstated without an unbroken mesorah?
Mesorah in this week's Parshah
This topic is deeply relevant to this week's parsha—Parshas Korach—because Korach's rebellion was, in essence, a rejection of the very concept of mesorah (transmitted tradition).
In an essay on mesorah found in Nefesh HaRav, which we will quote later in this article, Rav Hershel Schachter quotes Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, who explained that this was the core of Korach's sin. Chazal say that Korach argued a house full of sefarim should not require a mezuzah, and that a tallis entirely dyed with techeiles should not require the single thread of techeiles. At first glance, these seem like superficial, even foolish arguments. Why would someone be punished so severely for a misunderstanding of halacha? Rav Soloveitchik explains that these were not naive halachic errors. Korach's true claim was philosophical: he argued that since the entire nation had heard the Aseres HaDibros at Har Sinai, they were all equally holy and spiritually autonomous. If every Jew had direct access to Hashem's word, why should anyone be subordinate to Moshe Rabbeinu? In his view, mesorah—the connection between teacher and student, Rav and talmid—was no longer necessary.
Korach's parable about a tallis of all techeiles or a house full of sefarim was a metaphor. If the entire garment is techeiles, why add one more string? If the whole house is filled with Torah, why add a mezuzah? His argument was that the people themselves, in their inherent holiness and learning, had no further need for Moshe or his leadership. But this, Rav Soloveitchik insists, is a mistake. The Jewish people were indeed holy—but only because of Moshe Rabbeinu's mesirus nefesh on their behalf. It was through his teaching, guidance, and tefillos that the nation reached their elevated status. Holiness doesn't rest on the people or the object alone—it comes through the conduit of mesorah. Only because of that single mezuzah, or that single thread of techeiles, representing the presence of a living, guiding Torah authority, does holiness descend on the house or the tallis.
To reject the necessity of that transmission is not just a mistake—it's a form of apikorsus, heresy. As the Rambam says in Hilchos Teshuvah, denying the validity of the Torah's interpretation and those who transmit it is equivalent to denying the Torah itself.
A Mesorah against the M.T.
Our first challenge lies in the realm of mesorah—not the absence of a tradition identifying this species as the chilazon, but rather the presence of a strong mesorah against it. It is famously quoted in the name of the Beis HaLevi (as cited in Sefer Ein Techeiles, p. 7a), in response to the techeiles of the Radziner Rebbe, that one cannot simply propose that the chilazon is a creature commonly found today. The fact that this species passed through the hands of generations of Gedolei Yisrael—without a single authoritative figure identifying it as the chilazon—is, in itself, a strong indication that they did not consider it to be the authentic source of techeiles.
Pro responds and defends: The Beis HaLevi's objection would not necessarily apply to the Murex trunculus hypothesis. His point assumes that the creature in question was fully identifiable and usable in its time, yet ignored by generations of Gedolim. But in the case of the M.T., the critical dyeing process—the transformation of its secretion from purple to the halachically valid sky-blue—was unknown until it was accidentally rediscovered in 1983. Without knowledge of this key chemical reaction, even if the Murex was observed by earlier generations, they had no way to recognize its potential as the true chilazon. As such, it cannot be said that the Gedolim of previous eras "rejected" the M.T.—they were simply unaware of what it could produce.
Anti responds: It is true that the key factor which turns the Murex trunculus dye from purple to blue is exposure to sunlight. For much of the modern era, dye testing was conducted indoors, in laboratory settings, without natural sunlight—so the critical role of UV light remained unnoticed until the early 1980s. In that sense, proponents are correct in saying that the Beis HaLevi's argument may not apply to the Gedolim of the past century, who never had the opportunity to see the dye's true potential.
However, the Beis HaLevi's reasoning still carries weight regarding the previous 1,500 years of Jewish history. During that long stretch of time, had any of the Gedolim attempted to dye using the Murex, it is highly likely that the process—at least in part—would have taken place outdoors, where the sun could have naturally triggered the color change. The fact that this never happened, and that no authoritative figure throughout that entire period identified the Murex as the chilazon, strongly supports the Beis HaLevi's argument. This creates a sort of mesorah, in the form of a quiet but powerful negative tradition—against the identification of the Murex trunculus as the true source of techeiles.
Pro responds: Not necessarily. During the times of the Rishonim, it appears that the method for producing techeiles was still known—just not accessible. For example, the Ramban in Parshas Tetzaveh implies that techeiles still existed in his time but was restricted by secular law. According to this view, the loss of techeiles was not due to a lack of knowledge or identification of the chilazon, but rather due to political and legal obstacles. It was only in recent decades, when the search for techeiles was revived, that the Murex hypothesis was tested—but this time, in laboratory settings, which initially lacked the key natural factor of sunlight, masking its full potential.
Anti counters: But according to the pro position, the identity of the chilazon was never truly lost—it was always known to be a snail. If that's the case, then for nearly a thousand years, generations of Gedolim knew what it was and still never tried to extract the dye, never even experimented with it—despite their intense dedication to mitzvah fulfillment. That long-standing silence itself is a powerful statement.
Pro responds: Perhaps that silence was part of the gezeirah min hashamayim—a divine decree that techeiles should be hidden until the right time. Who says the concealment had to be supernatural or dramatic? It's entirely plausible that the scientific knowledge needed to unlock the secret was simply withheld until the proper era. The snail was there, but the understanding was not.
Pro adds: It's also possible that the earlier generations didn't attempt to investigate further because of the explicit statement in Chazal that techeiles was nignaz—hidden away. They may have assumed it was futile to search and, out of respect for the mesorah, refrained from exploring something they believed to be unavailable.
Summary of the first Mesorah point:
While this may not be a definitive refutation of the Murex trunculus theory, it remains a serious question that tempers any sense of certainty. The more compelling the evidence becomes—whether through the support of contemporary Acharonim, or through readings of ancient texts—the more this question demands attention. If the chilazon was truly identifiable all along, why was there complete silence from Gedolim across so many generations?
One can suggest that this was simply how Hashem willed it—that the scientific insight was withheld until the appropriate time—but such a response remains speculative. For every piece of circumstantial evidence that strengthens the case for the Murex, this historical silence stands as a counterpoint, detracting from the theory's overall force. Nevertheless, I do not view this as a conclusive disproof. It is a difficulty—yes—but not one that invalidates the position. It may be addressed, and perhaps outweighed, by the cumulative strength of the arguments in favor of identifying Murex trunculus as the chilazon. Still, it must be acknowledged as a factor that weakens the clarity of the picture.
A second Objection
A second major objection—also attributed to the Beis HaLevi—relates to the requirement of mesorah for any object used in the performance of a mitzvah. Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt"l (1:228), in his printed shiurim, as well as Teshuvos VeHanhagos, quotes this principle in the name of the Beis HaLevi: that one cannot determine the halachic identity of a mitzvah object—nor define the physical method of performing a mitzvah—based on reasoning or evidence alone. In such matters, a mesorah—a transmitted tradition—is indispensable.
According to this approach, even if the scientific, archaeological, and textual evidence for the Murex trunculus hypothesis were entirely convincing—even if "all the arrows point to it"—we would still be halachically barred from declaring it the chilazon, absent an unbroken tradition affirming its status. The search, in this view, is disqualified before it even begins.
(Some have viewed this argument as being mutually exclusive from the earlier point raised by the Beis HaLevi—namely, the historical silence of the Gedolim as a form of mesorah against the Murex. However, Rav Gershon Bess shlit"a, writing in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (Vol. 35), relates that both objections were raised. He heard directly from Rav Avraham Yehoshua Soloveitchik that his father, Rav Berel Soloveitchik zt"l, articulated this concern. Therefore, it must be that these objections are not contradictory or exclusive of one another, but rather are two distinct and reinforcing objections. This objection is also cited in Uvdos VeHanhagos L'Beis Brisk - Vol. 1, p. 267.)
Pro responds: The claim that a mesorah is strictly required to identify an object used in mitzvah observance is challenged by Rav Hershel Schachter shlit"a, who cites halachic precedents suggesting otherwise.
In Bava Basra 74a, the Gemara discusses a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the number of strings required for tzitzis. The Gemara recounts an incident in which an Amora encountered the preserved bodies of Jews who had died in the wilderness during the era of Moshe Rabbeinu—and they were wearing tzitzis. The Gemara comments that the Amora should have examined those garments to resolve the halachic debate. This clearly implies that physical evidence, even from archaeological or historical remnants, can be used to clarify halacha—without requiring an unbroken mesorah.
A similar case is found regarding the well-known dispute between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam about the order of the parshiyos in tefillin. Some Rishonim (see Drisha, O.C. 34) record that a pair of tefillin was discovered at the burial site attributed to Yechezkel HaNavi, and that the parshiyos were arranged in accordance with Rashi's opinion. This discovery was cited as support for the halachic position of Rashi. Again, we see that archaeological findings can be used to resolve halachic uncertainties, and that a mesorah is not an absolute prerequisite when physical evidence points clearly in one direction. These sources strongly suggest that when it comes to identifying a mitzvah object—whether tzitzis, tefillin, or even techeiles—halacha can indeed rely on verifiable evidence, even if a continuous mesorah is lacking.
Anti responds: While I fully understand and appreciate the arguments brought from the cases of tzitzis and tefillin, perhaps those examples are not truly parallel to the situation of identifying the chilazon. There may be a fundamental difference between rediscovering how to do a mitzvah based on analysis and speculation, and continuing a practice based on physical artifacts that represent a prior living tradition.
In the cases of the tefillin and tzitzis found in ancient contexts, we are dealing with fully formed, ready-made mitzvah objects. These are not items reconstructed through research or theory—they are concrete manifestations of the tradition as it was practiced. One could argue that such findings do not represent a break in the mesorah, but rather a continuation of it. The item itself may serve as a physical extension of the transmission, as though the previous generation "handed it over" directly.
This leads to a broader question: what do we mean when we speak of mesorah? Must it always be a verbal or written tradition passed from father to son, rebbi to talmid? Or can mesorah also include physical models intentionally preserved or left behind by previous generations? If Chazal had established a mitzvah object in a permanent form, visible and enduring, would we not consider that object itself a living part of the mesorah?
In that light, the ancient tefillin and tzitzis may not be seen as archaeological "proofs," but as preserved links in the chain of transmission. They may function like a grandfather handing something directly to his grandson, even if the intervening generation was silent. That's very different from the case of the chilazon, where there is no mitzvah object left behind—only textual descriptions and theories trying to reconstruct what was once known. Pro continues: The Chosem Shel Zahav (p. 27) questions the very basis of this alleged rule requiring an unbroken mesorah for all objects. He notes that we rely on many widely accepted practices that lack such a tradition. For example, turkey is eaten by virtually all communities today despite the absence of a clear mesorah tracing its permissibility back to earlier generations. If the lack of mesorah alone were grounds to reject something, it would be difficult to explain the widespread acceptance of turkey as kosher.
Similarly, in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 208, the Mishnah Berurah (25) quotes the Gaon and other Achronim regarding the translation of Orez and the correct Beracha on rice. Although no mesorah exists, nevertheless it was accepted that Orez is rice. The Gaon appears to be determining the halacha based on analysis, not a direct mesorah, suggesting that this is not a hard-and-fast halachic rule.
Anti responds: Perhaps the rule applies specifically to mitzvah-related items, where tradition plays a more central role in defining the object of the mitzvah. Dietary practices or customs may follow different halachic considerations and not reflect the same threshold for mesorah.
Pro replies: Rav Hershel Schachter explicitly cites this point in the name of Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, even regarding the case of rice, showing that the concern for mesorah is applied rigidly across the board, even in areas directly related to halachic observance. This would then indicate that not all Acharonim subscribe to the idea that a lack of mesorah automatically disqualifies a practice or halachic conclusion.
Pro adds: Furthermore, it is well known that the Chazon Ish undertook an effort to re-identify the authentic species of esrog, analyzing various types and determining which ones qualified halachically. This is a clear case of a mitzvah object. yet the Chazon Ish did not rely solely on inherited tradition. Instead, he reexamined the halacha in light of the available evidence. This too shows that great poskim were prepared to reconsider longstanding assumptions when the facts called for it.
A third issue that has been raised relates to the principle that if one has a safek, an uncertainty in his performance of a mitzvah, and doing an action will not guarantee him any further clarity in that safek, then he is not obligated to take any action at all. This position suggests that if the authenticity of the techeiles is uncertain and one will not be fulfilling the mitzvah vadai, there is no requirement to pursue it. I have addressed this argument at length elsewhere (see Parshas Pekudei), but it is worth noting that prominent poskim such as Rav Shlomo Miller and Rav Asher Weiss both regard this as a real concern.
Taken together, these three positions—(1) the silence of the mesorah, (2) the need for an unbroken tradition for mitzvah objects, and (3) the halachic non-obligation in a case of safek—have led many Gedolim to conclude that the search for techeiles is effectively closed before it even begins.
Nevertheless, the proponents of the Murex trunculus theory have assembled a compelling body of evidence—scientific, archaeological, textual, and halachic—and have also cited many Gedolim who believe that the search is indeed permitted, and even encouraged, in our time. It is on the strength of this body of support that the discussion about the identity of the chilazon continues.
Have an amazing Shabbos
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva Moshe.revah@htc.edu | 
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