| Dear Yeshiva Family:
Self Defense in the Parshah
In this week's parshah, the Torah instructs us: "Antagonize the Midianites and smite them, for they antagonized you through their conspiracies which they conspired against you regarding the matter of Peor…" (Bamidbar 25:17–18).
From this passuk, the Midrash Tanchuma (Siman 3) derives a foundational principle: If someone comes to kill you, you must rise first and kill him. The Midrash focuses on the phrase "for they antagonized you" — which is written in the present tense, as if the threat is ongoing. This unusual wording teaches that the command to wage war against Midian was not only about revenge for a past offense, but rather about protecting ourselves from a present and active danger. The Midrash thus reveals that this was an act of self-defense — because the Midianites were still plotting against the Jewish people and that such defense is permissible.
What's fascinating to note is that this same principle — "if someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first" — appears explicitly in the sugya we discussed last week: ba ba-machteres (Sanhedrin 72a), where the Torah permits killing a thief who is tunneling into a home. The Gemara explains that we judge the burglar al shem sofo — based not on his current action (mere theft), but on what he is likely to do if confronted. Since we assume the homeowner will defend his property, we further assume the thief is prepared to kill if necessary, and therefore, he may be killed preemptively.
Rashi (ibid.) writes that ba ba-machteres itself is the source of the broader rule that one may kill in self-defense. The Meiri, however, disagrees and writes that the source is actually our Medrash — the command to attack the Midianites: "Tzror es haMidyanim" (Antagonize the Midianites), since there is an ongoing threat to life, it is a mitzvah to act in self-defense.
This raises two important questions. First, why does the Meiri reject the straightforward source of ba ba-machteres? What compels him to find a different basis for this halachah? Second, the Meiri's language implies that this allowance applies specifically to the baal habayis — the homeowner himself. Why should this heter be limited to the individual under attack and not extend to bystanders?
How to Understand Ba Ba'Machteres
To answer this, we must first appreciate that ba ba-machteres is not a straightforward case of rodef (a pursuer who poses immediate danger to life). In reality, the homeowner is not currently in danger. The Torah allows lethal force not because the threat has materialized, but because we anticipate that it will. We presume that if the homeowner tries to defend his property, the intruder will escalate and be willing to kill — and based on that assumption, we allow preemptive action.
This anticipatory nature is the chiddush (novelty) of ba ba-machteres. The Torah treats the situation as if the entire sequence has already played out — the thief broke in, the homeowner resisted, and the intruder resorted to deadly force — even though none of that has actually happened yet. We operate on a projection of danger, not on a present reality. To bring this out more sharply: I would argue that a homeowner who survives a ba ba-machteres situation would not recite Birchas HaGomel — the blessing said by someone who emerges safely from a life-threatening ordeal. After all, halachically, he was never actually in danger. The Torah allows us to treat the case as dangerous, but not because it truly was.
This leads us to a critical question: What does it really mean when the Torah permits us to act "as if" the deed has already happened? What kind of halachic category is this? This very issue may explain a passage in the Gemara — and it may help explain the Meiri's need to find a different source for the general rule of self-defense.
Killing the Thief On Shabbos
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 72b) analyzes several nuances in the pasuk of ba ba-machteres to extract deeper halachic meaning. One key phrase states: "ein lo damim" — "he has no blood," meaning the intruder may be killed with impunity. However, the word damim is written in the plural form. The Gemara sees this as significant, and learns from it that there are two cases in which one is permitted to kill the thief. What are these two cases? The Gemara explains: not only may one kill him on a weekday, but even on Shabbos. But this raises a strong question. Why would we need a special pasuk to permit this on Shabbos? If this is a simple case of self-defense, then of course one may override Shabbos — saving a life (pikuach nefesh) always does. Why would I have thought otherwise?
I would like to explain what I think is the simple explanation of the Gemara: it may be that the Torah's logic in ba ba-machteres is not what we normally think of as rodef (a person actively trying to kill). Rather, perhaps we treat the intruder as if the entire sequence has already played out: he broke in, was confronted, killed the homeowner, and is now deserving of the death penalty. In that case, the Torah would be saying that the thief is killed not as a rodef, but as a rotzeach — a full-fledged murderer receiving his punishment early.
If that were true, though, the halachah would be very different. Beis Din is not allowed to carry out capital punishment on Shabbos. So if the killing of the thief is framed as punishment — not self-defense — it would be forbidden on Shabbos. That's why the Gemara emphasizes the plural form of damim. It teaches us that the thief may be killed even on Shabbos, proving that this is not a case of punishment for murder already committed, but of preventing a murder that is likely to happen. In other words, the thief is not treated as a rotzeach whose fate is sealed, but as a rodef — someone about to kill, who must be stopped.
Someone Else Killing the Thief
The Gemara continues with another critical step. It notes the word "vehukkah" — "and he is struck" — in the pasuk of ba ba-machteres, and derives from this that the permission to kill the intruder is not limited to the homeowner. Anyone who witnesses the attempted break-in is also allowed to intervene and kill the thief. But this itself needs explanation. Once we've already established that the intruder is halachically considered a rodef — a would-be murderer — then why do we need a special verse to tell us that bystanders may act? Shouldn't it be obvious that anyone can stop a rodef?
Two Dinim in Killing a Rodef
To answer this, we must turn to a yesod of many Achronim in the sugya of Rodef. The Achronim explain[1] that there are actually two distinct halachic frameworks for permitting the killing of a rodef — someone pursuing another person with intent to kill.
1. The Din of Haba Le'horgecha — Personal Self-Defense
This is the principle of "haba le'horgecha hashkem le'horgo" — "if someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first." This is a personal right of self-defense granted to the victim himself. It allows the threatened individual to protect his own life with full force, even if there are theoretically less-lethal options available. According to this view, the victim is not bound by calculations of proportionality — he may use deadly force to save himself, without restriction. But this is a subjective allowance, based on the individual's right to defend himself, and does not automatically extend to bystanders.
2. The Din of Saving the Nirdaf — Objective Rescue
A separate halachic framework applies to anyone else — to a bystander who sees someone in danger. This is the classic halachah of stopping a rodef in order to save the intended victim. But here the rules are different: the rescuer must use the minimum force necessary. If it's possible to stop the rodef by, say, wounding him rather than killing him, then that is what must be done. This is not about self-defense, but about the obligation to rescue another Jew in danger.
With this yesod, we can now understand two fascinating halachic cases that demonstrate the independent power of the self-defense framework — even when the din of rodef does not apply.
First, the case of Zimri and Pinchas. Even though Pinchas was acting lishem shamayim and with Divine approval, the halachah recognizes that Zimri could have theoretically defended himself and killed Pinchas. Why? Because from Zimri's perspective, Pinchas had no official status of rodef. Nevertheless, Zimri was still permitted to invoke the halachah of haba le'horgecha — personal self-defense — and fight back. This reinforces the idea that self-defense exists as a standalone category, separate from the obligation to stop a rodef.
A second example is regarding a Meiri discussing a pregnant woman in labor whose life is endangered by the fetus. In a situation where complications arise and it becomes clear that only one life — either the mother's or the child's — can be saved, the halachah normally rules that we do not actively intervene once the baby's head has emerged. At that point, the fetus is considered a full-fledged life, and we allow "nature" to take its course. The fetus does not have the status of a rodef, and no one is permitted to harm it. However, the Meiri writes a remarkable chidush: the mother herself is allowed to reach down and act in her own self-defense, even though the fetus is not a rodef. Again, we see that haba le'horgecha — the personal right to defend one's life — applies even when the halachic category of rodef is absent. The distinction is not merely academic; it has real and far-reaching consequences.
How this Answers our Questions
We can now return to explain both the Gemara and our original question on the Meiri. The Gemara's use of the extra word "vehukkah" is now much clearer. Without this word, we might have thought that the Torah is only granting permission to the homeowner himself — to treat the case as if he is personally under attack, and therefore apply the halachah of haba le'horgecha (self-defense). As we've emphasized, ba ba-machteres is not a typical case of self-defense; the Torah is allowing us to treat it as if it were. So perhaps that allowance is limited: maybe the Torah only permitted the victim to act, using the self-defense framework of haba le'horgecha, but did not extend the general law of rodef (pursuer), which allows others to intervene.
To counter that assumption, the Torah adds the word vehukkah — teaching us that this is not just a personal self-defense allowance, but also halachically equivalent to a case of rodef, thereby permitting others to act as well.
Now we can understand the Meiri. Once the Torah explicitly allows bystanders to intervene, one might argue that the primary framework of ba ba-machteres is not haba le'horgecha at all — perhaps it is solely based on the din of rodef. And if that were the case, then even the homeowner himself would be limited by the rules of rodef: he would only be allowed to use lethal force if no less-violent option exists. For example, if he could stop the intruder by shooting him in the leg, he would be obligated to do so.
This, then, is why the Meiri cannot cite ba ba-machteres as the definitive source for the rule of haba le'horgecha. Since the Torah clearly introduced the rodef element into the case, there is no longer proof that the Torah is endorsing the full force of self-defense — which allows killing even when wounding would suffice. One could easily argue that the entire heter is only the heter of rodef. Therefore, the Meiri must find a different source for the din of haba le'horgecha — and he turns to our parshah, Tzror es haMidyanim, where the threat is explicitly ongoing, and the permissibility to kill arises purely from self-defense, not from punishment or rescue logic.
Wow! Thank You Hashem for such sweet chiddushim!
Have an amazing Shabbos! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva Moshe.revah@htc.edu
[1] Rav Chaim Brisker (Hilchos Rotzeach 1:9), which is also cited and elaborated upon by the Brisker Rav (Chiddushei Maran Riz HaLevi, Rotzeach 1:13), Rav Shmuel Rozovsky (Zichron Shmuel §83 and Chiddushei Rebbi Shmuel, Sanhedrin 14:2), and Rav Shach (Avi Ezri, Hilchos Rotzeach 1:9). The exact parameters of the two dinim are nuanced differently by the aforementioned Acharonim. | 
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