| Dear Yeshiva Family:
In this week's Parshah, we encounter the Aseres HaDibros (the Ten Commandments), which culminate in the prohibition of coveting. The Pasuk (5:18) states, "And you shall not covet (Lo Sachmod) your fellow's wife, and you shall not desire (Lo Tisaveh) your fellow's house, his field, his slave, his maidservant, his ox, his donkey, or anything that belongs to your fellow." This prohibition, which comes at the end of the Ten Commandments, addresses the issue of improper longing for what belongs to others.
At first glance, there seems to be a discrepancy in the language used here: "Lo Sachmod" (you shall not covet) and "Lo Tisaveh" (you shall not desire). Rashi, in his commentary on this verse, explains that these two terms actually refer to the same prohibition. Both expressions represent one unified commandment, and the difference in wording is simply a matter of different ways to express the same underlying prohibition. The Sifsei Chachamim further clarifies that Rashi's interpretation aligns with the verse in Parshas Yisro (20:14), where the Aseres HaDibros are first mentioned. In that context, the Torah uses the expression "Lo Sachmod" (do not covet) for all the items listed—wife, house, field, etc. According to Rashi, despite the different terms used in our verse, there is essentially no difference between them. Both are simply various expressions of the same prohibition.
However, the Rambam (Maimonides), in his Sefer HaMitzvos (Mitzvah 266), offers a different explanation. He maintains that Lo Sachmod and Lo Tisaveh represent two separate prohibitions. According to the Rambam, the prohibition of Lo Tisaveh refers to an internal desire—the mere longing or wanting something in your heart, to the point that one begins to plan how to acquire the item[1]. This prohibition is about harboring the desire to own something that belongs to someone else, even if you don't act on it.
On the other hand, Lo Sachmod addresses the more severe act of coveting, which goes beyond internal desire. This prohibition applies when a person's desire leads them to act on it, such as by trying to manipulate or coerce another person into giving up their possessions—essentially forcing them to relinquish ownership.
In fact, the Rambam (in Gezeila 1:9) writes that, in order to violate the prohibition of Lo Sachmod, you must convince the person to sell the item to you. This aligns with what we are explaining in the Rambam's view: for the desire to be considered a transgression, it must culminate in an actual act of purchase. However, what is somewhat perplexing is the Rambam also states that you do not receive malkus (lashes) for this violation because Lo Sachmod is classified as a lav shein bo ma'aseh—a prohibition that does not require a concrete physical act.
The Raavad challenges this point. He asks, how can the Rambam say that no malkus is given because no act is required, when the act of convincing the person to sell the item clearly involves action? If you actually buy the item, isn't that considered a ma'aseh (act)? The Raavad himself explains that no malkus is given because the item must ultimately be returned to its original owner. This is similar to the prohibition of Gezeilah (theft), where there is no malkus if the stolen item is returned. In this case, the act of purchasing the item doesn't warrant malkus if it is later returned, so the usual punishment is not applied. Despite the Raavad's challenge, it is clear that he agrees with the Rambam's fundamental distinction between the two prohibitions of Lo Sachmod and Lo Tisaveh. Both the Rambam and the Raavad agree that one prohibition involves the eventual purchase of the item, while the other focuses solely on internal desire without any subsequent action. In defense of the Rambam's approach, the Steipler, in his Birchas Peretz (Parshas Yisro), provides a deeper understanding. He explains that, according to the Rambam, both prohibitions refer to the longing in one's heart, but the violation of Lo Sachmod stems from a strong desire that leads to a physical action (such as convincing someone to sell the item). In contrast, Lo Tisaveh refers to a lesser desire that does not culminate in any outward action. Thus, Lo Sachmod involves a desire so intense that it prompts an action, but the act itself is not the violation; it merely reflects the strength of the desire. On the other hand, Lo Tisaveh is limited to internal longing without any external manifestation. The Raavad, however, holds that the key difference between the two prohibitions is the final act of purchasing the item. For him, Lo Sachmod is violated when the purchase is completed, while Lo Tisaveh remains at the level of internal desire alone. Despite this difference, both the Rambam and the Raavad agree on one important point: in order to violate the prohibition, the item must be taken from the original owner.
The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (SMaG - Lavin 158) asks a critical question: According to the Rambam, who holds that the two prohibitions—Lo Sachmod (do not covet) and Lo Tisaveh (do not desire)—are separate, why does the Torah specifically use Lo Sachmod when it comes to desiring a neighbor's wife, but switch to Lo Tisaveh for all other possessions? Is it possible that desiring a neighbor's wife is treated differently from other possessions, to the extent that one can violate Lo Sachmod but not Lo Tisaveh in this case[2]? It seems paradoxical that what might be considered the most severe transgression—the desire for someone else's wife—results in only one prohibition (aveirah), rather than two.
Another question arises from the Rambam's explanation in Gezeila 1:9, where he writes that the prohibition of Lo Sachmod refers to a desire that ultimately culminates in an act. Yet, the Rambam specifically excludes a wife from the list of items in which Lo Sachmod applies. Many commentators wonder why the Rambam excludes a neighbor's wife from the list of things you can covet, even though she is expressly mentioned in the Torah. To complicate matters further, the Rambam does include a wife in the list of things that one can violate Lo Tisaveh with in Halacha 10, something not mentioned in the Torah!
Another question raised by the Acharonim[3] is how the prohibition of Lo Sachmod applies in the case of a wife. As we explained earlier, in order to violate this prohibition, one must coerce another person into selling an item, which requires the item to pass directly from the original owner's possession to the person desiring it. This would mean that the item must be physically transferred. However, when it comes to a wife, this presents a challenge. How can one violate Lo Sachmod if the object of desire (the wife) cannot be directly transferred to the one coveting her? Even if someone convinces the husband to divorce his wife, this is still not a direct transfer of ownership, as we would have with material possessions.
In fact, according to the Rambam, as explained by the Steipler, this question does not pose a problem. The Rambam holds that the aveirah is the coveting itself, not the physical transfer of the object. Once the desire becomes so intense that it leads to an action—such as forcing someone to divorce their wife—the act of coveting has already been fulfilled. Therefore, even though the wife is not directly transferred, the internal act of coveting and the subsequent action (the divorce) are sufficient to constitute the violation.
However, according to the Raavad, the aveirah is specifically tied to the final ma'aseh (act)—the actual physical taking of the item. Since a wife cannot be directly transferred in the same way as material possessions, how can Lo Sachmod apply in this case. According to him, without the direct act of "taking" the wife, there would be no violation of the prohibition.
The Sefer Ohalei Yaakov offers an absolutely brilliant approach to these questions. He suggests that the differentiation the Rambam makes between plain desire and desire that leads to action applies only to coveting material possessions. The Rambam had explained that if a person desires something in their heart, they violate Lo Tisaveh (the prohibition of desire), and if they take action to forcefully obtain it from the owner, they violate Lo Sachmod (coveting). This, according to the Rambam, applies specifically to coveting material possessions.
However, in the case of a married woman, the moment someone desires her in their heart, they already violate Lo Sachmod, and certainly Lo Tisaveh as well. The Rambam's reasoning is that desiring a married woman is immediately a violation of Lo Sachmod, because the very thought of desiring her is already tantamount to an action as it contradicts her sanctity as being "set apart" for her husband. A marriage, by its nature, establishes a unique and exclusive bond between husband and wife. As the Gemara in Kiddushin (2b) explains, the term Mekudeshes (betrothed) refers to a woman who is designated as belonging to her husband and forbidden to all others. Therefore, when someone desires her—even in thought—it already violates the Torah's instruction, as it undermines the sanctity of her marriage. Merely desiring her, even on the level of a "Lo Tisaveh" automatically catapults on to a level of "Lo Sachmod"!
Additionally, another explanation is that while such a thought may not count as an action against the husband, the thought alone about a forbidden relationship—especially one involving arayos (forbidden relations)—is considered a serious violation. This is not only because such thoughts can eventually lead to actions, but because the thought itself is intrinsically forbidden and is regarded as an act of z'nus (immorality). The Ramban discusses this at length in Vayikra 18:20, where he explains that thinking about illicit relations is equivalent to committing the act. He bases this on the verse, "For it is immorality" (Vayikra 18:20), emphasizing that such thoughts carry the severity of the sin on their own.
According to this approach, the Rambam's explanation becomes clearer. He does not mention Lo Tachmod in reference to a neighbor's wife because, the Rambam's point in Halacha 9 is that Lo Sachmod must culminate in an action. To violate this prohibition, one must engage in an active effort to acquire the object. In the case of material possessions like money or property, this would involve coercing the owner into selling. However, since, as we are now explaining, when it comes to a wife, the violation occurs the moment the desire enters one's heart, the Rambam does not need to mention this point of any further action to violate this prohibition. In this case, the violation happens with mere thought, meaning that the internal desire alone is sufficient to transgress the prohibition and that is why the Rambam leaves it out!
On the other hand, in the halacha of Lo Tisaveh, which refers to the violation of the prohibition without further action, the Rambam explains that one violates this prohibition simply by thinking about desiring someone else's wife. Of course, the person would also violate Lo Sachmod in this scenario, as it is clearly stated in the Torah and as we are explaining. In the case of a married woman, her very status as being set aside for her husband makes the desire for her, even in thought, a violation of both Lo Tachmod and Lo Tisaveh.
This distinction also explains the wording of the Torah itself. As we mentioned, the Torah uses the term Lo Tachmod in reference to a married woman, not Lo Tisaveh. This is because it is impossible to violate only Lo Tisaveh by coveting a neighbor's wife. Any mere desire, or lower-level desire, is automatically considered a higher-level violation of Lo Sachmod, since it is already viewed as a thought that is tied to an action. The very fact that one desires someone else's wife, even in thought, already brings them to the level of Lo Sachmod, as this desire inherently goes against the sanctity of her marriage. Regarding the question raised by the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (SMaG) about why desiring a wife doesn't seem to be treated as severely as it should be, the reality is actually the opposite. As soon as one desires a married woman, they are immediately violating both prohibitions. The person violates Lo Tisaveh for the internal desire (the lower-level prohibition), and Lo Sachmod for the more severe act of coveting (the higher-level prohibition). In this case, even at the level of mere thought, the desire itself is already viewed as a violation of the sanctity of her marriage—he is not merely thinking about her, but in a sense, he is already violating her by desiring her in this manner.
Now, we can also address the question according to the Raavad. We asked how, according to the Raavad, who holds that the act must culminate in a ma'aseh (action), one could violate Lo Sachmod regarding a wife. Forcing a divorce, on its own, would not violate the prohibition, and without any action, it would seem that only Lo Tisaveh (the prohibition of mere desire) applies.
The Raavad's primary concern is that Lo Sachmod requires a ma'aseh—an actual physical act of taking the item. However, in the case of a wife, we can explain that there is no need for the act of physically "taking" her, because the violation occurs at the moment of desire itself. Therefore, the Raavad and the Rambam actually disagree only when it comes to material possessions, where the ma'aseh of taking the item is required to complete the violation. But with a wife, the violation happens with the very thought of desiring her, and thus the ma'aseh does not need to be a physical act.
What an incredible vourt!
Have an Amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva mrevah2@touro.edu
[1] It is noteworthy that merely longing for an item without hatching a plan to get it may not necessarily violate the prohibition. See Rambam, Gezeila 1:10. However, as we will discuss further in this article, regarding the specific case of coveting one's wife, the prohibition may apply even if one merely longs for her, without taking any action. [2] Although the Rambam clearly states there is Lo Tisaveh by a neighbor's wife, apparently this was not in the Smag's version of the Rambam. Either way this is a good question on the Torah itself. [3] See Maharil Diskin amongst many others. Several interesting answers are offered to this question. | 
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