| Dear Yeshiva Family:
In this week's Parshah, the Torah outlines various types of korbanos (sacrificial offerings) brought as atonement for sins. For example, there is the korban chatas, brought by someone who unintentionally violated a commandment that, had it been done intentionally, would have been punishable by kares—spiritual excision. In contrast, the Torah also describes a korban olah (Vayikra 1:4), and Rashi—citing the Midrash—explains that the olah serves a very different purpose. It is brought to atone for neglected positive mitzvos. For example, if a person failed to put on tefillin or did not shake the lulav on Sukkos, he would bring a korban olah.
There are different categories of commandments in the Torah: - Positive commandments (mitzvos aseh)—actions a person is obligated to perform.
- Negative commandments (mitzvos lo sa'aseh)—prohibitions one must avoid. Among the negative commandments, some carry the punishment of malkos (lashes), and others are more severe, warranting kares or even the death penalty when transgressed intentionally.
The Midrash explains that we learn the function of the korban olah through process of elimination. The chatas already covers unintentional violations of severe sins. Malkos, lashes, is given for intentional violations of many negative commandments. So, what's left for the olah to atone for? It must be intended for the failure to fulfill positive mitzvos—a category that otherwise has no formal mechanism for atonement.
However, the Ramban challenges this interpretation. Why must we assume that the olah is exclusively for someone who failed to perform a positive commandment? Why not suggest that it atones for someone who violated a minor negative commandment (lav)—one that does not carry the penalty of death or excision—but did so unintentionally? This would parallel the function of the chatas, which atones for major sins committed by accident. That should be the first and most logical step we revert to—before assigning the olah to atone for the failure to perform a positive commandment, which seems to be a lower level of infraction.
A Massive Chiddush from the Ramban The Ramban responds with a tremendous and surprising chiddush (novel insight). He explains that when it comes to various categories of sin, the Torah has already specified what kind of punishment each one deserves—and whether that punishment applies when the act is committed intentionally or unintentionally.
In the case of capital offenses—sins punishable by death through the courts or excision (kares)—the Torah clearly outlines that one who transgresses intentionally receives the death penalty, and one who sins unintentionally brings a korban chatas (sin offering). Likewise, for violations punishable by death at the hands of Heaven or by lashes, the Torah clearly describes the punishment when done intentionally, but notably does not prescribe any consequence when done accidentally.
Based on this, the Sages (in the Medrash) understood a remarkable principle: Why would the Torah outline both intentional and unintentional punishments in some cases, but only the intentional punishment in others? It must be that when the Torah is silent about the punishment for unintentional transgressions, it means there is no obligation for atonement at all in such cases.
In the Ramban's words: "All the punishment the Torah intended to assign has already been stated."
As a result, one who accidentally violates a negative commandment that carries lashes or death at the hands of Heaven is not required to bring a korban or perform any formal act of atonement—because the Torah does not assign one. There is simply no "sin-bearing" status (nosi avon) in such cases. In contrast, for positive commandments or negative commandments that are connected to a positive one (known as lav hanitak l'aseh), where no punishment is explicitly mentioned—it is inconceivable that there would be no consequence at all. Therefore, explains the Ramban, the korban olah must come to atone for those.
In other words, according to this understanding, for certain Torah-level prohibitions that are violated unintentionally, there is no requirement or obligation to do teshuvah because there was no sin committed, since it was unintentional!! This startling approach appears to be shared by other major authorities. The Ran in Sanhedrin (84b) implies a similar view, as does Rashi in Beitzah (4b), according to the responsa Dovev Meisharim (Vol. 3, siman 140).
Two interesting implications based on this Ramban There are two notable halachic implications that may emerge from this opinion of the Ramban. - Reciting a Beracha Achrona on Non-Kosher Food Eaten Accidentally
The Rambam rules (Hilchos Berachos 1:19) that if someone accidentally eats non-kosher food, he does not recite a beracha achrona (the blessing after eating). The logic behind this is that since the act of eating was forbidden, even though it was unintentional, he does not derive enough halachically legitimate enjoyment to warrant a blessing afterward.
However, based on the Ramban's approach, this may not be the case. According to the Ramban, if a person eats something forbidden unintentionally, and the Torah has not assigned any punishment or atonement for that act, then it is not truly considered a sin. In such a case, the person may very well be allowed—if not obligated—to recite a beracha achrona, since the eating was not viewed by the Torah as a sinful act. This view seems to align with the ruling of the Taz (O.C. 196:1), who holds that one who consumes non-kosher food unintentionally should recite a beracha achrona. His reasoning parallels the Ramban's: when there is no culpability assigned by the Torah for an accidental violation, the act is not treated as inherently sinful.
2.Causing Another Person to Sin A second implication relates to the prohibition of "lifnei iver"—the Torah commandment not to place a stumbling block before the blind (Vayikra 19:14), which Chazal interpret as a prohibition against causing another Jew to sin.
Let's say one person gives another something forbidden—such as non-kosher food—and the second person unknowingly eats it. Normally, the one who provided the item might be liable for violating lifnei iver, for having enabled or facilitated a transgression.
However, according to the Ramban, if the second person committed the act unintentionally and no punishment or atonement is required, then it is not halachically considered a sin at all. If that's the case, then the first person would also not be liable under lifnei iver—because, fundamentally, he did not cause anyone to sin in the eyes of halacha.
This is a striking and somewhat counterintuitive result: an action that would normally be seen as causing another to violate the Torah may, under the Ramban's approach, carry no halachic liability, simply because no actual transgression occurred in the eyes of the Torah.
A question on the Ramban A powerful question on the Ramban's approach is raised by Rav Meir Arik, in his glosses on the Ramban.
He points to a Gemara in Kerisus (25b) which discusses the purpose of the se'ir hamishtale'ach—the goat sent off the cliff on Yom Kippur. The Gemara explains that this goat atones for sins that do not have their own specific korban.
Rashi there clarifies that this includes cases such as one who accidentally ate neveilah or tereifah—forbidden meats—where the act was unintentional and no separate sin offering (korban chatas) is brought.
But this seems to contradict the Ramban. According to the Ramban, when the Torah specifies no punishment or atonement for a given sin when done unintentionally, it implies no atonement is required at all. The person is not considered to have sinned in a way that demands spiritual repair. Yet here, the Gemara and Rashi clearly say that such a person does require atonement—and that this is accomplished by the goat of Yom Kippur.
If so, asks Rav Meir Arik, how can the Ramban claim that no atonement is necessary for unintentional violations like this—when the Gemara itself includes them among the sins that need atonement through the Yom Kippur goat?
A possible resolution It may be that, according to the Ramban, an aveirah (sin) is indeed taking place when someone unintentionally violates a prohibition. The act still creates a spiritual stain, and it still lowers the person's spiritual level—there is a loss of madreigah (spiritual standing), even if the Torah does not hold the person legally accountable in the same way. In other words, the person is not charged for the sin, and is therefore not required to bring a korban or receive punishment—but the spiritual impact of the transgression still exists. There is damage, just not liability.
If this is correct, it would explain why such unintentional sins are still included in the atonement of the se'ir hamishtale'ach on Yom Kippur. The person needs spiritual cleansing, even if he is not halachically "responsible" in the technical sense.
Yet, this would also potentially erase our implications we created before. Perhaps one would still be obligated to warn a friend before allowing them to sin unintentionally. While it may be true that the person committing the act is not held accountable, the damage to the soul is real—and if you stand by silently, you are complicit in that spiritual harm.
And although, strictly speaking, you may not be in violation of the prohibition of "lifnei iver" (placing a stumbling block before the blind), you may be guilty of something even worse—damaging your friend's soul, knowingly facilitating their spiritual decline.
This reframing gives us a deeper understanding of both the Gemara in Kerisus and the Ramban's view. The Ramban may not be saying that no sin occurs, only that the Torah does not demand legal restitution in such cases. But that doesn't mean the act is spiritually harmless—and thus, the goat of Yom Kippur is still necessary to cleanse even these "non-liable" sins[1].
Kavod Habriyos A fascinating halachic discussion emerges from a Gemara in Berachos 19b, which deals with the tension between halachic obligation and human dignity (kavod ha-beriyos). The Gemara rules that if one sees another Jew wearing kilayim—a forbidden mixture of wool and linen—he may forcibly remove the garment, even in public, despite the humiliation it may cause. This is codified by the Rambam, who holds that the seriousness of the prohibition overrides the concern for personal embarrassment.
The Rosh Disagrees However, the Rosh offers a different understanding. He writes that this ruling applies only when a person is removing kilayim from himself, even in public, but not when removing it from someone else. Causing public shame to another person, even for the sake of a mitzvah, is not justified in the same way.
The Gemara itself later qualifies this rule that in scenarios where the prohibition is being violated through passivity (shev ve'al ta'aseh)—meaning refraining from action, then Kavod habriyos would override the sin.
However, this doesn't resolve the case of kilayim, because Rashi explicitly states that wearing kilayim is a ma'aseh (positive action), not mere inaction. Since it's not a case of shev ve'al ta'aseh, the exemption of kavod ha-beriyos wouldn't apply.
Yet the Rosh still maintains that if someone sees another person wearing kilayim unintentionally (b'shogeg), he does not need to remove it from him—even though it's a Torah violation.
How can this be explained?
Some Achronim explain that a shogeg (unintentional sinner) is viewed differently. Since the individual is unaware of the violation, and his action lacks full halachic agency, the obligation to embarrass or forcibly correct him is weakened.
Alternatively, some suggest that even though wearing kilayim is technically an action, in this context—where the person is already wearing the garment—the continued wearing may be viewed more like inaction, akin to shev ve'al ta'aseh. In other words, since there is no new physical act being committed, it may fall into the category of cases where kavod ha-beriyos does apply.
Tosafos asks a contradiction Tosafos in Shevuos 30b cites a Gemara that requires a Torah scholar to testify in a lower court, even if doing so would be beneath his dignity. Despite the potential embarrassment, the obligation to uphold a Torah principle—namely, giving testimony—overrides personal discomfort.
Tosafos ask: How does this align with our Gemara in Berachos, which permits overriding certain mitzvos out of concern for kavod ha-beriyos (human dignity)?
They offer two important answers, each with far-reaching halachic implications: First answer: Tosafos explain that the permission to override a mitzvah due to kavod ha-beriyos applies only when the degradation is particularly severe. For example, if a person comes upon a meis mitzvah (an unattended corpse), not burying it would be a profound disgrace—because of the potential odor or risk of desecration. Similarly, if someone is wearing kilayim (a forbidden mixture of wool and linen) in public, removing the garment would cause serious humiliation. In such cases, kavod ha-beriyos may override the mitzvah.
However, when the embarrassment is minimal, the Torah obligation remains in place—even if fulfilling it requires some personal discomfort. For instance, if a Torah scholar knows relevant testimony that could help resolve a case, he is required to testify, despite the indignity of appearing in a lesser court. The level of shame is not sufficient to exempt him.
Second answer: Tosafos suggest another angle: even when the embarrassment is relatively minor, one may sometimes refrain from fulfilling a mitzvah due to kavod ha-beriyos—so long as the consequences remain limited to inaction. However, if one's inaction would directly cause another person to transgress a Torah law through a concrete action, then the exemption no longer applies. In such cases, the principle of shev ve'al ta'aseh (passivity) is overridden, and one must act.
For example: If a married woman appears before a Beit Din seeking permission to remarry, claiming her husband has died, and a Torah scholar knows the husband is still alive, he is obligated to testify—even if it causes him personal shame. His silence would lead the woman to actively commit a Torah violation (eishes ish, adultery).
Even if the woman brings a single witness and she herself is unsure, the scholar must come forward. Remaining silent would not only be inaction—it would be aiding another in transgressing the Torah.
The Shaagas Aryeh notes that these two answers of Tosafos reflect the broader dispute between the Rosh and the Rambam regarding the obligation to stop someone from violating kilayim: - According to the first answer, one is not obligated to inform someone who is wearing kilayim in public, since removing the garment would be deeply embarrassing. This aligns with the Rosh, who exempts a person from causing another public humiliation—even for the sake of a mitzvah.
- According to the second answer, one is obligated to intervene—even if it causes embarrassment—because the other person is committing a direct Torah violation, and your silence enables it. This position aligns with the Rambam, who rules that preventing a transgression overrides concerns of personal dignity, even when the embarrassment is real but not extreme.
Building on all of this, we may suggest a compelling interpretive link between the Rosh and the Ramban we've been discussing.
An explanation for the Rosh based on the Ramban Perhaps the Rosh holds like the Ramban—that an unintentional (shogeg) violation of certain mitzvos is not considered a true sin in the halachic or spiritual sense. According to the Ramban, when the Torah does not assign any punishment or requirement for atonement in the case of an unintentional sin—such as standard lavin (negative commandments) that do not carry the severity of kares or a korban chatas—then the person is not held halachically responsible for the transgression. There is no "sin-bearing" (nosi avon) status.
If so, we can understand the Rosh's position regarding a bystander witnessing someone else wearing kilayim in public. If the person wearing the forbidden garment is unaware—a classic case of shogeg—then according to the Ramban's logic, no sin is truly being committed. The transgressor isn't halachically accountable. This would explain why the Rosh rules that you are not obligated to publicly remove the garment. Since the person has no awareness of the violation, and there is no spiritual liability, there is no urgency to act. In fact, causing public shame in such a case would be unjustified.
The Gemara that permits tearing off kilayim in public must be referring to one's own clothing, where the person is aware of the transgression and continuing to wear it intentionally. In such a scenario, he is indeed in violation of a Torah prohibition, and halachically responsible—even if removing the garment is humiliating. Kavod ha-beriyos cannot override that. But when it comes to someone else, especially one who is unaware of the issur, it is not just a matter of choosing whether or not to intervene. According to the Rosh—based on the Ramban's framework—there may be no sin to intervene in at all. The person is wearing forbidden clothing, yes—but if he is unaware, there is no halachic guilt, and no need for public embarrassment.
And therefore, we may not need to say, as the Shaagas Aryeh suggested, that the two answers of Tosafos represent a dispute between the Rosh and the Rambam—that the first answer aligns with the Rosh and the second with the Rambam. Because the Rosh may agree even with the second answer of Tosafos—that one should prevent a fellow Jew from violating an issur—but only when the other person is doing so knowingly. In the case of shogeg, the Rosh might still maintain that there is no obligation, because no sin exists in a halachic sense to intervene against. However, it's worth noting that even this conclusion may not be so simple.
Let's return to the nuanced position of the Ramban as we originally explained it. According to the Ramban, when someone violates a Torah prohibition unintentionally (b'shogeg), there may be no legal culpability—no requirement for a korban or formal atonement—but the act is still a sin, and it still leaves a spiritual stain. The person's soul is diminished, and he is lowered in madreigah (spiritual standing), even if the Torah doesn't "charge" him for it.
If that's the case, then the entire framework we proposed in defense of the Rosh—namely, that there's no need to remove kilayim from someone who is unaware because no sin is occurring—becomes less clear.
Yes, he is not culpable, but if the act is still considered an aveirah on some level, then perhaps there is an obligation to intervene. Perhaps even in a case of shogeg, one must tear the kilayim off another person—just as one would if they were knowingly violating the Torah—because the transgression is still real, and its spiritual damage still exists. In other words, the entire discussion hinges on how we understand the nature of a shogeg: - If a shogeg means the act is not a sin at all—as per the simpler understanding of the Ramban—then there's no obligation to intervene.
- But if a shogeg is still a real aveirah, just one that the person is not held accountable for, then the obligation to protest or prevent may still apply—and the leniency attributed to the Rosh becomes far more debatable.
This returns us to the deep ambiguity of the Ramban's chiddush: is the exemption from atonement because the act is not a sin, or simply because the person is not guilty for it? The answer to that question has halachic implications not only for korbanos and teshuvah—but also for how we respond to the actions of others, and how we balance dignity, intervention, and spiritual responsibility.
I hope you enjoyed the Pilpul!!
As always feel free to email back comments or hearos!
Have an Amazing Shabbos Kodesh! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu
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[1] Though somewhat unrelated to the earlier discussion, there's a fascinating halachic insight with strong Pesach relevance that intersects with the Ramban's approach. The Gemara in Pesachim 35a discusses whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah on Pesach using tevel—produce from which terumos and ma'asros have not yet been separated. The Gemara ultimately derives from a verse that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah with tevel. But this raises a difficulty asked by Tosfos (Sukkah 30b): why do we need a verse at all? Shouldn't this automatically be invalid because it is a mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah—a mitzvah performed through a transgression? The Sefer Erech Shai explains based on the Ramban's chiddush. According to the Ramban, in cases like theft or tevel, where an unintentional transgression does not require a korban chatas, the sin is not considered a sin and would not qualify as a mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah. Therefore, the Torah must explicitly exclude such cases with a verse, since the general principle of mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah wouldn't automatically apply when the sin was unintentional. | 
