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Dear Yeshiva Family:
"And the earth became corrupt before Hashem, and the earth was filled with 'Chamas'—robbery" (Bereishis 6:11).
In this week's parshah, Hashem observed the sins of the generation and determined that the generation deserved annihilation, leading to the destruction brought by the Mabul, the flood. While they committed many sins, Rashi (6:13) explains that the final blow, the sin that sealed their fate, was thievery.
The Medrash (31:5) sheds light on this by describing a common practice in that generation. A person would bring a basket of vegetables to the market, and everyone would steal just one item, worth far less than a perutah (the smallest unit of currency, below which legal claims could not be pursued). Although each theft was individually insignificant, together they caused significant harm. The Medrash explains that because each theft was less than a perutah they thought they couldn't be prosecuted, but Hashem responded to their trickery by bringing the Mabul.
The halacha, as taught in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 57a, 59a), states that although there is a minimum value for a Jew to be liable for theft, for non-Jews, there is no minimum. Therefore, stealing even less than a perutah is prohibited for non-Jews by the same prohibition as stealing more than a perutah. So, why would the people who lived at that time go out of their way to steal only small, insignificant amounts? It seems they were trying to "outsmart" the system, but stealing even small amounts did not shield them from culpability[1].
Another important question arises: Why does the Torah use the word Chamas instead of the more common term Gezel for theft? The Medrash explains that Chamas refers to stealing less than a perutah, while Gezel applies to stealing more than a perutah. However, this seems inconsistent with the Gemara, which says that non-Jews are liable for Gezel even if they steal less than a perutah. Additionally, the Gemara in Bava Kamma (62a) distinguishes between Gezel and Chamas, explaining that Chamas refers to a case where a person pays for an item against the will of the owner[2]—essentially, robbery with payment. How can we reconcile these differing explanations?
To address these questions, we can refer to a discussion in the Machaneh Ephraim. He presents a fundamental question: When someone steals less than a perutah, is it not considered theft because the owner forgives the loss of such a trivial amount, or because the value is too insignificant to be considered theft by legal standards? The Machaneh Ephraim concludes, based on the Rambam, that it is the latter: stealing less than a perutah falls outside the legal definition of theft since it lacks significant value.
However, the Minchas Chinuch (130) suggests that this is a matter of debate between the Rambam and the Sefer HaChinuch. While the Rambam holds that for stealing less than a perutah is a technical legal exemption (like other minimum measures in halacha, such as a kezayis (an olive-sized measure) for food or forty se'ah for a mikvah), the Sefer HaChinuch suggests that the exemption exists because people generally forgive small amounts, such as when the amount lost is less than a perutah.
This difference in approach leads to practical ramifications. If the exemption is based on forgiveness, then if the owner is a minor (who is not halachically old enough to forgive), or if the owner explicitly refuses to forgive, or if the owner is unaware of the theft and therefore cannot forgive, the thief could still be liable for stealing less than a perutah. However, if the exemption is based on a legal definition, then in all cases, stealing less than a perutah would not be considered theft.
Nonetheless, some Acharonim question[3] the Minchas Chinuch's approach in explaining the Sefer HaChinuch, pointing out that he also mentions (mitzvah 229) that stealing less than a perutah violates the prohibition of chatzi shiur (performing part of a sin). Just as one is forbidden to eat less than a kezayis of forbidden food, so too, it is forbidden to steal less than a perutah. This would only make sense if the exemption were a legal technicality, rather than based on forgiveness.
To clarify the position of the Sefer HaChinuch, these Achronim contend that the Sefer HaChinuch agrees to the Machaneh Efraim; the prohibition against theft does not apply to amounts less than a perutah due to a specific legal ruling—a din—that establishes a threshold for this prohibition. However, this threshold differs from other legal measures because it is grounded in the understanding that most people would readily forgive the loss of such a minimal amount. As a result, this assumption has been formalized into law, setting the threshold at this value.
Consequently, whether or not the original owner actively forgives the theft, stealing less than a perutah remains exempt from this prohibition. The rationale is that since the general population would likely overlook such insignificant amounts, this understanding has been codified as the legal threshold for the prohibition against theft. Thus, while the minimum value for theft represents a legal limit, it is the societal norm of forgiveness for small losses that defines this threshold.
Now that we've clarified how the concept of stealing applies to stealing from Jews, we can extend this understanding to non-Jews. In the case of non-Jews, the concept of legal thresholds, or shiurim, as outlined in Torah law, does not apply to non-Jews. Since we established that the minimum limit of a perutah was based on a legal threshold, this limit would not apply to non-Jews[4]. Consequently, it follows that theft is prohibited for non-Jews, even when the amount is less than a perutah.
Earlier, we asked why the non-Jews of that time were stealing less than a perutah if it is still considered Gezel for them. Since there is no legal minimum limit, even theft of a small amount is prohibited. However, we could contend that the alternative explanation provided by the Minchas Chinuch is applicable: if the value is so negligible that it is universally forgiven—such as a single vegetable—then it may not even be considered theft at all, even for non-Jews[5]. This mindset could have been what allowed them to justify their actions.
So, why were they mistaken? When an entire society engages in the act of stealing small amounts, the cumulative effect can be devastating. While each individual act of theft might not merit punishment, the collective participation in such behavior cannot be overlooked, or forgiven. It would then be transformed into a prohibited act. Had we regarded the allowance of stealing one vegetable as a question of shiurim—a legal minimum allowance—we can argue that if the amount does not exceed the threshold of the minimum shiur, it cannot ever justifiably fall under the category of sin. However, since we have established that this allowance was predicated on the assumption of forgiveness, if that forgiveness is absent, the act reverts to being classified as a sin!
We can now also explain why the Torah uses the term Chamas to describe their behavior. Even though each individual theft was minimal, when compounded by the actions of the entire generation, it became intolerable.
The concept of Chamas is significant because it captures the essence of this kind of theft. Elsewhere, the Gemara explains that Chamas refers to a case where the thief pays for the stolen item, yet the act is still considered robbery because it is done against the will of the seller. The common thread between these cases is that both involve a degree of perceived "mitigation"—either through the small value of the theft or because the items is paid for. However, in both cases, the underlying act is still corrupt. In the case of Noach's generation, the widespread practice of taking small amounts, while seemingly minor, added up to the destruction of society.
This explains what the people of Noach's time were thinking when they stole less than a perutah. They thought they could outsmart the system by limiting their theft to insignificant amounts, but as a society, they still committed a form of robbery that filled the earth with corruption. Individually, each act might not have been enough to violate the standard prohibition of Gezel, but because the entire society engaged in this behavior, the earth became filled with Chamas, and this was enough to seal their fate. This is why the Torah stresses the Earth became filled with corruption. It was only because they were doing this on a societal level that it was intolerable[6]!
Wishing you a wonderful Shabbos,
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
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[1] The Maharsha in Sanhedrin 108b seems to indicate they made a mistake and there was no real thought to outsmart the Torah. Additionally, perhaps we can say they were not trying to outsmart the din from Hashem, rather they were just trying to avoid being prosecuted by the judicial system of their times (i.e. the local police and justice system, which may have only prosecuted crimes of a minimum of a perutah), however, generally, when dealing with questions of these matters, we treat ideas the Medrash brings, even those of the Reshaim – the wicked people such as the generation of the flood or Pharoah etc. as if there is a sound basis in Halacha and we have to look to find the hole in their logic. [2] Where the owner does not agree to the sale even under duress. Here where the owner does agree this is considered a legal sale even if the agreement is coerced. (Bava Basra – 47b) [3] I saw this question, as well as the subsequent approach to resolve the Sefer HaChinuch in the sefer Toldos Noach, who quoted several other sefarim who learned the same approach. [4] See Rambam in Melachim 9:9-10. [5] R' Elyashiv in his Sefer Hearos to Kiddushin (40b) answers like this as well. [6] I saw this insight in the sefer Divrei Shaul, however, he gives a slightly different approach to our questions. | 
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