Fw: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva

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From: "Rabbi Moshe Revah" <htcnews-htc.edu@shared1.ccsend.com>

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Sent: Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 4:02 PM

Subject: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva

Parshas Yisro

Dear Yeshiva Family: The Giving of the Torah: A Nation is Formed This week's parshah marks one of the most defining moments in Jewish history—the giving of the Torah on Har Sinai, when we became not just a people but a nation—Klal Yisrael. It was at this moment that we received the 613 mitzvos, the divine framework that would shape our destiny and our mission in the world. In contrast, a non-Jew is obligated to observe only the 7 mitzvos of Bnei Noach. One of the fundamental principles regarding mitzvah observance is that a Jew only becomes obligated in the 613 mitzvos at the age of 13. Until that point, even if a child is extraordinarily intelligent and capable, he is still not halachically accountable for his actions. This is because the Torah itself does not attribute responsibility to him until he reaches the age of maturity. Shiurim and the Unique Responsibility of Klal Yisrael The Chasam Sofer (Shu"t Y.D. 317) explains that this age-based threshold falls under the category of shiurim (Torah-prescribed measurements). Just as halacha defines minimum quantities for prohibitions—such as the required volume for a violation of eating non-kosher food or the minimal amount of work to be considered a transgression on Shabbos—so too, the Torah set a defined age for personal responsibility in mitzvah observance. The Chasam Sofer further states, based on a Rambam (Melachim 10:9) that the concept of shiurim was given only to Klal Yisrael, which leads to a fascinating conclusion: a non-Jew, who is not included in the framework of shiurim, is held accountable for his actions as soon as he reaches a level of intellectual maturity. This raises an intriguing discussion among the Acharonim (later commentaries): Could a Jewish child, despite not yet being formally obligated in the 613 mitzvos, still bear responsibility for transgressing the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach? On the one hand, he is exempt on a Torah level until he becomes a bar mitzvah. However, from a logical perspective, he possesses the same intelligence and awareness as a non-Jew, who is held accountable for those same mitzvos. If responsibility for these 7 mitzvos is based purely on cognitive awareness rather than formal halachic status, then why should a Jewish child be treated differently? The Principle of "Mi Ika Midi" The Gemara in Sanhedrin (59a) introduces the principle of "Mi ika midi"—is it conceivable that something should be forbidden to a non-Jew but permitted to a Jew? The very notion of being chosen as Hashem's nation was not to grant us greater leniencies but to elevate us in holiness and responsibility. If a non-Jew is held to a high standard of moral accountability, it would seem counterintuitive for a Jewish child to be exempt from those same basic obligations simply due to his status[1]. In fact, aside from this case of a child under 13, there are really two other intriguing instances discussed among the Poskim[2] regarding individuals who, under normal circumstances, are not held fully accountable for mitzvah observance—but when it comes to the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach, they may still bear responsibility. Two Other Categories of Obligation 1. A Blind Person A fascinating case relates to a halacha discussed in Bava Kama (87a): a blind person is not obligated in mitzvos. There is, however, a debate among the Rishonim as to whether this exemption applies only to positive commandments or extends even to negative prohibitions. The Minchas Chinuch (2:25, 26:13) points out that even if we assume a blind person is exempt from mitzvos altogether—including negative commandments—he would still be obligated to observe the 7 Noahide laws. The logic is simple: since even a non-Jew, regardless of any physical limitation, is required to keep these laws, a Jew who is blind should be no different. His Jewish status does not exempt him from these fundamental moral and ethical laws. 2. A Deaf-Mute A third instance concerns a deaf-mute who is nonetheless intelligent and fully capable of understanding right and wrong. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:34) rules that although a deaf-mute is traditionally considered exempt from mitzvos—based on classic halachic categorization—he is still bound by the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach. This means that while he may not be obligated to keep mitzvos such as shaatnez, he is still required to adhere to the universal moral code dictated by the Torah. The Unique Obligation of Klal Yisrael It would seem that there are seven fundamental mitzvos that all of humanity must abide by, forming the moral foundation of civilization. Klal Yisrael, as Hashem's Chosen Nation, was then given an additional 606 mitzvos, elevating our role and responsibility in the world. A Difficulty from the Rambam However, all of this presents a significant difficulty in light of the Rambam's statement in Mishnayos (Chullin, end of Perek Gid Hanasheh). The Rambam explains that the reason we observe any mitzvah is solely because Moshe Rabbeinu commanded us at Sinai—not because of any prior historical precedent. For example: We perform bris milah not because Avraham Avinu was commanded, but because Hashem instructed Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai. We refrain from eating Gid Hanasheh not because Yaakov Avinu was commanded, but because Moshe Rabbeinu received this mitzvah at Sinai as part of the 613 commandments. The Rambam brings a proof from the Gemara, which states that Moshe was commanded all 613 mitzvos at Har Sinai. Since these mitzvos are counted among them, it follows that we observe them solely due to the new command given at Sinai, rather than their earlier historical origins. If so, this raises a profound question: If a person—for whatever reason—is not yet fully obligated in Torah mitzvos (such as a minor, a blind person, or a deaf-mute), how can we still say that he must observe the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach just like a non-Jew? According to the Rambam's framework, if someone is exempt from Torah obligation, it would seem that he is entirely absolved from mitzvah observance—so why would he still be responsible for these universal laws? If his obligation in mitzvos comes only from Sinai, then the moment we say he is not included in Torah obligation, it should follow that he is not obligated at all, even in the 7 Noahide laws! It seems from this Rambam that it is difficult to maintain that the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach remain a universal moral framework that applies to all intelligent beings. Rather, the Rambam understands that once a person is under the umbrella of Torah law, his obligations are solely defined by the Sinaitic command structure. The Famous Gemara on Hashem Offering the Torah to All Nations To answer this, we must first address a fundamental question on a famous Gemara (Avodah Zarah 2b). The Gemara relates that Hashem "went around" to all the nations and asked if they wanted the Torah before ultimately giving it to Klal Yisrael. Two Puzzling Questions This raises a significant difficulty: Weren't we already the chosen nation? It is well known that Klal Yisrael was chosen before the world was even created. The Torah refers to us as "עם סגולה"—a treasured nation, and Chazal teach that Hashem chose us from the very beginning. But if that's the case, how can it be that Hashem offered the Torah to other nations first? The way the Gemara describes it makes it seem as if we were chosen simply because we were the last option standing! Does that mean we weren't inherently special, just lucky? Why was Hashem offering them mitzvos they were already obligated in? The Gemara states that when Hashem approached each nation, they inquired, "What is written in it?"—to which Hashem responded with prohibitions such as Do not murder, Do not steal, Do not engage in immorality. But these commandments were already binding upon them under the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach! Why, then, was Hashem presenting these laws as if they were part of a new offer? The nations were already obligated to keep them! Rav Shimon Schwab's Profound Explanation Rav Shimon Schwab zatzal (Mayan Bais Hasho'eivah) offers a brilliant insight to resolve these questions. The Torah is More Than Just Rules Observing the Torah is more than just following a set of rules. For example, consider traffic laws: A red light means stop, and a green light means go. These laws are important—they ensure safe roads and prevent accidents—but they do not transform the person following them. Obeying traffic signals does not elevate one's soul; it simply ensures order in society. But the Torah is entirely different. When a person keeps Torah and mitzvos, he is not merely following societal rules—he is changing his very essence. Torah observance refines a person's inner self, sanctifies his soul, and connects him to Hashem in a transformative way. Hashem's Real Offer to the Nations This, explains Rav Schwab, was the real offer that Hashem made to the nations. Hashem was not offering them the full 613 mitzvos—those were always designated for Klal Yisrael alone. Rather, He was offering them something else: to keep their existing obligations, but in the format of Torah. The 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach were already societal laws—basic moral guidelines that maintained order in civilization. But Hashem's offer was to elevate these laws into Torah. Had they accepted, their observance of these mitzvos would have become a spiritual endeavor, transforming them rather than simply ensuring an ethical society. But they refused. They were willing to abide by the rules, but they did not want those rules to shape them into something greater. This Answers Both Questions This beautifully answers both questions: We were always the chosen nation. Hashem was not selecting a nation based on availability—He was simply extending an opportunity to others to accept a small portion of Torah in a different form. The nations were already obligated in these mitzvos—but they were being offered a different way to keep them. Instead of keeping them as mere societal rules, they had the chance to integrate them as Torah and change their spiritual essence. The Baal HaTurim's Insight – 620 Mitzvos This dual framework of mitzvos—one in the format of Torah, the other as societal law—is hinted at in our very Parshah. The Sefer Toldos Noach (1:30) quotes the Baal HaTurim at the end of the Aseres HaDibros, who notes that the Aseres HaDibros contain exactly 620 letters. This corresponds to the numerical value of the word "כתר" (Keser, meaning "crown"), signifying the 'crown' – the totality of Torah. But what does this number 620 represent? The Baal HaTurim explains that it includes both the 613 mitzvos of the Torah plus the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach. This, however, seems perplexing. The 7 Noahide laws are already included within the 613 mitzvos—so why are they counted separately? Two Versions of the 7 Noahide Laws Based on our explanation, the answer is clear: There are actually two versions of the 7 Noahide laws. For Jews – These laws exist as Torah mitzvos, given at Sinai to refine and sanctify us. For Non-Jews – These same laws exist as societal moral obligations, necessary for the functioning of civilization but not inherently transformative. Both of these counts join together to represent the totality of the Torah. The Baal HaTurim's Insight: Yisro and the 613 Mitzvos This idea is reinforced by another insight from the Baal HaTurim at the beginning of Parshas Yisro. He explains that the name "יתרו" (Yisro) hints at the mitzvah count he received upon conversion. The name "יתרו" can be broken down into: י (10) – Representing the Aseres HaDibros תרו (606) – Representing the additional 606 mitzvos given to him upon becoming a Jew The Baal HaTurim states that since Yisro was already obligated in the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach, upon conversion, he received only 606 new mitzvos, bringing his total to 613. The Dual Nature of the 7 Mitzvos Bnei Noach What does this prove? That the Baal HaTurim also understands that the 613 count includes the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach. Thus, when the Baal HaTurim refers to a total of 620 mitzvos, he must have been highlighting this dual nature of the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach. One version as Torah for Jews, and one version as societal law for non-Jews.  Explaining the Rambam's Position: Pre-Sinai Mitzvos Reframed at Matan Torah With this understanding, we can now explain the Rambam's position regarding mitzvos that existed before Sinai. The Rambam insists that all mitzvos we observe today are only because they were commanded at Sinai through Moshe Rabbeinu—not because of any prior historical obligation. This means that even mitzvos like not murdering or stealing, which predated Matan Torah under the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach, were re-given at Sinai—but now in a completely different framework, in two distinct ways. The Two Aspects of These Mitzvos There were now two distinct aspects to these mitzvos: For Jews – The prohibitions of murder, theft, and immorality became part of Torah itself, meaning that observing them sanctifies the person and transforms him spiritually. For Non-Jews – These same prohibitions were also regiven, but only as societal laws, intended to maintain order and moral structure, not as a sanctifying Torah obligation. Why Those Exempt from Mitzvos Must Still Observe the 7 Mitzvos Bnei Noach This distinction will now explain why even those who are generally exempt from mitzvos—such as minors, blind individuals, or deaf-mutes—may still remain bound by the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach. Their Torah obligations may not have taken effect in full, but as intelligent human beings living in the world, they are still bound by the universal moral framework that is the second category. Originally, we understood that there were seven fundamental sins that all of humanity was required to avoid, and that Klal Yisrael was given an additional 606 mitzvos, bringing the total to 613. This led to our question: If according to the Rambam all Mitzovs were considered reissued, and certain Jews are not obligated in mitzvos due to age, blindness, or other exemptions, then how could he still be required to observe these seven laws? However, we have now demonstrated that these laws exist in two distinct formats—one as Torah obligations for Jews and one as universal societal laws that apply to all intelligent beings. Therefore, it is possible that a Jew who is exempt from Torah commandments would still remain bound by these fundamental laws in their original, pre-Sinai format. For although these laws were reaffirmed at Sinai, they were also reinstated for the nations of the world—not as Torah, but as the same universal moral code that governed the world before Matan Torah.  Have an incredible Shabbos Kodesh! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu ____________________________________________________________ [1] Yet, it is a dispute amongst the later authorities if this is the final ruling. [2] See Nachal Yitzchak (Dayanim 7:1), who analyzes three separate Gemaros that support the idea that youngsters bear responsibility for the 7 mitzvos Bnei Noach, despite their general exemption from mitzvos before the age of 13. Additionally, see Divrei Chayim (Nizkei Mamon 11) and Chelkas Yoav (O.C. 1) for further discussion on this topic. HTC  Hebrew Theological College is a member of Touro University and a partner with the Jewish United Fund in serving our community

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