Fw: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva

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From: "Rabbi Moshe Revah" <htcnews-htc.edu@shared1.ccsend.com>

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Sent: Thu, Mar 20, 2025 at 6:22 PM

Subject: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva

Parshas Vayakhel

Dear Yeshiva Family: In this week's Parshah, the Torah reviews the donations and vessels used for the Mishkan. However, before delving into these details, it begins with two pesukim about Shabbos: "For six days, work may be done, but the seventh day shall be holy for you, a day of complete rest for Hashem; whoever performs work on it shall be put to death. You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings on the Shabbos day." Chazal derive from various sources that there are 39 melachos, categories of forbidden activities on Shabbos. Yet, of all these melachos, the Torah explicitly mentions only one: the prohibition against kindling fire. The Gemara (Shabbos 70a) questions why this particular melacha was singled out and presents two explanations: To clarify that violating even a single melacha constitutes a Shabbos transgression. One might have assumed that desecrating Shabbos requires performing all 39 forbidden melachos. The Torah specifies fire to teach that even a single violation is significant. According to R' Yosi, the melacha of kindling fire is fundamentally different from the others. Unlike the remaining 38 melachos, which carry the punishment of sekilah (capital punishment) when violated intentionally with witnesses and proper warning, lighting a fire is considered a lesser transgression. Instead of being a capital offense, it incurs malkus (lashes), similar to other prohibitions in the Torah[1]. A Chiddush from the Rambam on the size of the flame Generally, in every aveirah (prohibited act), there is a minimum shiur (measurement) that one must perform in order to be held liable. For example, in the prohibition of cooking on Shabbos, one is only culpable if the food being cooked reaches at least the size of a fig (k'grogeres). Similarly, regarding prohibitions related to eating forbidden foods, liability is incurred only if one consumes at least the size of an olive (k'zayis). Of course, violating these prohibitions in any amount is still forbidden. However, when it comes to punishment—whether lashes (malkus) or, in some cases, a Korban Chatas—the Torah establishes a minimum shiur necessary for liability. Curiously, the Rambam states that when it comes to the prohibition of kindling a fire on Shabbos, there is no minimum shiur—even lighting the smallest flame incurs liability (Hilchos Shabbos 12:1). This raises an important question: Why is this melacha different from all other prohibited activities on Shabbos, which each require a minimum measurement to trigger full culpability? Explanation #1 from the Sho'el U'Meishiv The Sho'el U'Meishiv (Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, 1810–1875, Responsa Sho'el U'Meishiv 5:28) explains that it is an established principle that the 39 melachos of Shabbos are derived from the activities performed in the Mishkan. This means that although we know there are 39 categories of forbidden work on Shabbos, we do not inherently know what they are. Rather, the Torah teaches that the melachos necessary for the construction and functioning of the Mishkan are the very ones prohibited on Shabbos. This connection is built from our Parshah: The Torah first introduces the laws of Shabbos in general terms, and immediately afterward, it begins discussing the construction of the Mishkan. The juxtaposition of these two topics teaches that the types of labor essential to the Mishkan's construction define the prohibited activities of Shabbos. One such melacha is kindling a fire. Fire was required in the Mishkan for various purposes, including heating water to boil the dyes used for coloring the curtains. Since any amount of fire could contribute to the boiling process—warming the water to some degree—there was no specific minimum amount required for liability. However, this explanation is difficult to understand. Even if fire was essential in the Mishkan, we would still expect the Torah to establish a minimum threshold, just as it does for other melachos. For example, the prohibition against carrying wood on Shabbos applies only if one carries at least the amount necessary to cook a chicken egg (Shabbos 73b). Why, then, does the melacha of fire itself not have a similar standard—such as a minimum amount of heat required to boil a small quantity of dye[2]? A Qualification on the explanation The Sho'el U'Meishiv takes his explanation a step further, noting that his reasoning applies only if the melacha of lighting a fire falls under the general category of forbidden work on Shabbos, as per the first opinion mentioned above. In that case, it is part of the overarching set of melachos and is therefore derived from the Mishkan. However, if we follow the second opinion—that kindling fire is an independent category, distinct from the other 38 melachos—then it would not be included in the general derivation from the Mishkan. As a result, it should require a minimum shiur, just like all other prohibitions in the Torah. Thus, the connection to the Mishkan in this case actually presents a stringency (chumrah) rather than a leniency. Instead of requiring a minimum amount to be considered a violation, as is the rule with most prohibitions, lighting even the smallest flame is sufficient to incur liability. A method of upholding the explanation This idea does not appear to be fully accepted, as seen in a fascinating discussion regarding electrical fires on Shabbos. The Sefer Machzeh Avraham (41) quotes the Maharsham (Responsa Maharsham 2:247), who argues that since electrical fires were not used in the Mishkan, one would not be liable for them on Shabbos nowadays. The Machzeh Avraham strongly disagrees. He explains that since our Parshah presents the melacha of lighting a fire in its own independent pasuk, there is no necessity to derive its parameters from the Mishkan. Therefore, even electrical fires—which were obviously absent from the Mishkan—would still be prohibited. This position seemingly aligns with the Sho'el U'Meishiv, who argued that fire's independent pasuk means that it does not require a direct link to the Mishkan for defining its parameters. However, the Machzeh Avraham takes this even further. He proves that despite fire being stated separately, it still retains a connection to the Mishkan. This is evident from the halachic principle of "Davar She'eino Miskavein"—the rule that if a person unintentionally performs a prohibited melacha on Shabbos, it is permitted unless it is an inevitable outcome (psik reisha). This rule is explicitly derived from the juxtaposition of the laws of Shabbos and the Mishkan, implying that the melacha of fire remains within the Mishkan rubric. The Machzeh Avraham concludes that even if the prohibition of fire is technically excluded from the first pasuk—which establishes the general connection between Shabbos and the Mishkan—it is still the subject of the second pasuk that discusses fire explicitly. Since this pasuk is also juxtaposed to the Mishkan, it would also follow the general rules learned form the Mishkan. What is particularly relevant to our topic is that while the fundamental definition of the melacha does not need to be derived from the Mishkan, the general principles governing melacha—such as required intent—still apply. If so, it is possible that since fire is juxtaposed to the Mishkan, the stringency (chumrah) regarding the quantity of fire needed is also included. This would explain why one is liable for lighting even the smallest flame, reinforcing the idea that this melacha has no minimum shiur according to all opinions. A Second Possible Explanation, based on the definition of the Melacha of lighting a fire Another possible source for the Rambam's chiddush—that the melacha of kindling fire has no minimum shiur—can be found in a debate between the Avnei Nezer (O.C. 238) and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (495:2). They dispute how to define the essence of the prohibition of fire on Shabbos: The Avnei Nezer holds that the melacha of fire is defined as "burning up an object"—meaning that liability is incurred when a tangible substance, such as fuel, is consumed by fire. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav maintains that the melacha is the act of kindling—that is, the very process of igniting a flame, regardless of whether anything substantial is burned. The Rogatchover Gaon (Tzofnas Paneach 675) further develops this distinction. He explains that if the melacha of fire is defined as burning and consuming material, it would make sense that a minimum amount of fuel should be required—just as other melachos require a threshold for liability. However, if the melacha is defined as the mere act of lighting a flame, then it follows logically that no minimum shiur is necessary—even the smallest spark would be sufficient to violate the prohibition, for even the smallest spark ignited a flame, and that is the prohibition! A Novel explanation that is Super Geshmak! To explain further why it makes sense that there is no minimum shiur for fire, perhaps we can draw upon a well-known Nimukei Yosef in Bava Kamma (22a). The Nimukei Yosef discusses the halachic status of fire as a form of damage (hezek). The Gemara introduces the principle of "Eisho Mishum Chitzav"—that when a person sets a fire, any damage it causes is attributed directly to him, as if he had personally inflicted the harm, similar to shooting an arrow. This means that fire is not merely an independent destructive force—it is legally considered an extension of the one who kindled it. The Nimukei Yosef raises a fascinating question: If this is the case, how is it ever permissible to light a fire right before Shabbos? If the fire continues to burn into Shabbos and causes destruction, wouldn't it be considered as though the person had actively lit the fire on Shabbos itself, in violation of the melacha? He answers with a novel idea: We consider all the potential effects of the fire as if they occurred at the moment of ignition. In other words, halachically, the entire destructive power of the fire is viewed as having been set into motion at the very first second. Once the fire is lit, whatever happens later is seen as an extension of that original act. Applying This to Shabbos: Why Fire Has No Shiur Based on this concept, we can understand why the melacha of lighting a fire has no minimum shiur. Fire, by its very nature, is not a static act but an expanding force. Unlike other melachos, where the Torah defines liability based on an actionable quantity (such as cooking a specific amount or carrying a usable portion), fire is inherently limitless. The moment one kindles even a tiny spark, it already contains the potential to expand indefinitely. This means that from a halachic perspective, every small flame is conceptually equivalent to a massive fire, since it could—under the right conditions—spread to ignite an entire forest. The Torah generally requires a minimum shiur to determine significance and validity—for example, eating a chatzi zayis (half an olive's worth) of non-kosher food is not considered a full act of prohibition because it lacks substantiality. However, when it comes to fire, the potential inherent in each flame gives it significance far beyond its initial size.  Thus, when one lights even the smallest flame on Shabbos, he is held liable not for the immediate fire alone, but for the entire destructive power it inherently contains. In essence, every spark is a full-fledged fire, and this is why there is no shiur—because in halachic terms, its potential reach is infinite. Enjoy the vourt and have an Amazing Shabbos! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu ____________________________________________________________ [1] Actually, whether this distinction applies to the death penalty or only to the requirement of bringing a Korban Chatas is a discussion among the Acharonim. See Ohr Sameach, Sanhedrin 18:2. [2] The prohibition against carrying wood on Shabbos is measured by the amount necessary to kindle a fire sufficient to cook an egg, even though eggs were not actually cooked in the Mishkan. This is because carrying (hotza'ah) was a common activity in the Mishkan, and for Shabbos purposes, any carried item is measured based on its typical use—wood being commonly used to fuel a fire for cooking. However, when it comes to the melacha of kindling fire itself, we cannot apply the same standard of an egg, since fire in the Mishkan was not used for cooking eggs. Nevertheless, the question remains: Why is there no minimal shiur at all for fire, based on the quantity required for its actual use in the Mishkan—such as heating water for dyeing fabric? HTC  Hebrew Theological College is a member of Touro University and a partner with the Jewish United Fund in serving our community

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