| Dear Yeshiva Family:
Techeiles in Modern Times In this week's Parshah, we continue reading the conclusion of the building of the Mishkan, along with a detailed account of its vessels and the garments of the Kehunah. One of the most striking features of the Kohen's vestments was their vibrant color scheme—most notably, the presence of blue wool known as Techeiles.
This Techeiles, sourced from a sea creature called the Chilazon, is not only a required component of the Bigdei Kehunah, but also of the mitzvah of Tzitzis—where some of the strings are meant to be dyed with Techeiles.
In 1888, the Radziner Rebbe announced that he had rediscovered the Chilazon, identifying it as a species of cuttlefish. This claim reignited the conversation around the mitzvah of Techeiles and opened the door to it being worn once again. To this day, Radziner Chassidim wear blue strings dyed from this source. While most Poskim at the time did not accept the Radziner's identification, his work sparked an enduring halachic and scientific debate that continues until today—regarding both the identity of the Chilazon and the possibility of its rediscovery before the arrival of Moshiach.
In more recent years, attention has turned to a different sea creature—the Murex Trunculus, a type of snail found in the Mediterranean Sea. Archaeological evidence shows that this snail was used in ancient dyeing practices. However, for centuries, the dye it produced did not appear to match the distinct blue described in the Torah.
Then, in the 1980s, a surprising discovery was made: if the dyeing process is done in direct sunlight, the Murex dye changes to the beautiful blue color associated with Techeiles. This revelation reignited the hope that we may have finally rediscovered the true source of the mitzvah.
To this day, debate continues. Is the Murex the real Techeiles, allowing us to fulfill the mitzvah of Tzitzis in its fullest form and prepare ourselves for Moshiach and the renewal of the Bigdei Kehunah? Or is this just another mistaken lead?
This article does not intend to delve into the proofs or counterarguments regarding the identification of the Murex as Techeiles. (Baruch Hashem, I've already written six articles summarizing the various positions—available upon request.) Rather, I would like to explore one particular angle of the discussion—from a lomdishe perspective.
Why Don't we Say Safek De'Oraysah LeChumrah Back during the Radziner Rebbe's quest to restore Techeiles, the question was posed to the Beis HaLevi why he refused to wear the Rebbe's version of Techeiles. Even if it was not definitively proven to be the true Chilazon, shouldn't one be required to wear it at least out of doubt?
After all, Techeiles is a mitzvah de'oraysa, and the general rule is: ספק דאורייתא לחומרא—in cases of doubt involving Torah obligations, we err on the side of caution. Wouldn't this principle obligate someone to wear blue-dyed strings just in case it truly is the Techeiles, thereby ensuring fulfillment of the mitzvah?
The Beis HaLevi purportedly[1]answered that the rule of safek de'oraysa lechumra only applies when, upon performing the action, one can now say with certainty that the mitzvah was fulfilled.
For example: If someone is uncertain whether he already shook the Lulav, he must shake it again—because once he does, there is no longer any doubt; the mitzvah has certainly been fulfilled. In such cases, Halacha compels us to act stringently and perform the mitzvah again. However, in the case of Techeiles, even after tying the blue-dyed strings onto his Tzitzis, he still remains in doubt—it is not clear whether he has actually fulfilled the Torah's requirement of Techeiles. The safek remains unresolved even after the action is taken. Therefore, says the Beis HaLevi, the principle of safek de'oraysa lechumra would not require one to wear this version of Techeiles out of doubt.
This does not mean that one is forbidden to wear it—only that one is not obligated to do so based on the rules of safek.
Challenges to the Bais HaLevi However, many have raised challenges to the Beis HaLevi's principle from various halachic sources. One of the more notable objections comes from the laws regarding the performance of mitzvos during Bein Hashmashos—the halachically ambiguous period between sunset and the appearance of three stars, when it is uncertain whether it is still day or already night.
There are several mitzvos that are clearly meant to be performed during the day—such as Tefillin, Lulav, and Kiddush (on Yom Tov afternoon)—yet if one fails to perform them earlier, halacha advises that they still be performed during Bein Hashmashos. The Ran (Sukkah P. Lulav Vearava - 254) writes that if one missed Tefillin or Lulav, he should still fulfill them during Bein Hashmashos out of doubt, based on the principle of safek de'oraysa lechumra. Similarly, the Pri Megadim (M.Z. 271:11) rules that one must make Kiddush during Bein Hashmashos if it has not yet been recited.
At first glance, this appears to contradict the Beis HaLevi's logic. If the mitzvah may no longer apply (because it may already be night), and the individual will never know whether the mitzvah was truly fulfilled, why should halacha obligate performance in such a case?
Rav Shlomo Miller's answer Rav Shlomo Miller, in a letter addressing the debate about the Murex Trunculus and the identity of Techeiles, offers an elegant resolution. He explains that there is a fundamental distinction between the two scenarios:
- In the case of Bein Hashmashos, the obligation itself is a safek—since the time is uncertain, the mitzvah may or may not apply. Therefore, the performance, too, is a performance of safek. In this situation, safek de'oraysa lechumra obligates one to perform the mitzvah, even though it is unclear whether the time mandates it, because if the obligation does apply, the mitzvah is being fulfilled in full.
- However, in the case raised by the Beis HaLevi, where the obligation is clearly in place, but the object or act (such as the blue strings) may not fulfill the mitzvah, the performance itself is uncertain, and remains uncertain even after the fact. In such a case, the Beis HaLevi argues that safek de'oraysa lechumra does not obligate action, because even after performing the mitzvah, one has no clearer fulfillment than before.
Accordingly, these cases do not contradict the Beis HaLevi's principle. The halacha to perform mitzvos during Bein Hashmashos is a response to a safek in the obligation, whereas the Beis HaLevi's discussion concerns a safek in the fulfillment—a nuanced but significant difference.
While there are many challenges to the Beis HaLevi's position, I will leave a full treatment of those for other articles. The remainder of this piece will take a different approach:
- First, I will present a potential proof to the Beis HaLevi from a Tosafos in Pesachim (10a).
- Then, I will explain why this is not actually a proof through a deeper reading of Tosafos.
- Following that, we will bring a Maharsha on this Tosafos and explore why his position also does not serve as a support for the Beis HaLevi.
- In the process, we will address a question posed by Rav Akiva Eiger on the Maharsha—one which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been fully answered. The resolution I will offer is, I believe, a novel insight and an exciting contribution to the discussion.
Let us begin.
A support from a Gemara in Pesachim There appears to be a source supporting the Beis HaLevi's chiddush in Tosafos on Pesachim 10a. The Gemara discusses a case in which a person sees an animal bring chametz into his house. Since he now knows that chametz has entered the home, he is obligated to perform another bedikah (search) to ensure no chametz remains.
But what happens if the person would perform a new search and find nothing? The Gemara records a machlokes, a dispute, between R' Meir and the Chachamim: R' Meir maintains that we are stringent, while the Chachamim are lenient.
Tosafos asks: What does it mean to be stringent? What could R' Meir possibly want the person to do at this point? He already checked, and didn't find anything. There seems to be no clear gain in repeating the search. If one is not guaranteed to find the chametz even after a second sweep, why would halacha obligate a futile act?
At first glance, Tosafos appears to be making a halachic argument: if the outcome is uncertain, and the second bedikah may not yield any new result, there should be no requirement to act. This seems to support the Beis HaLevi's rule: when an action does not guarantee fulfillment of a mitzvah (or prevention of an aveirah), safek de'oraysa lechumra does not obligate performance.
Two Distinctions between Pesachim and the Beis HaLevi However, one could differentiate between the case of Techeiles and that of Bedikas Chametz. In the case of Techeiles, the mitzvah to wear blue-dyed strings is a direct obligation upon the individual. As such, one might argue that the mitzvah must be fulfilled whenever possible, even in a case of doubt. The person is obligated to try to fulfill the mitzvah—even if the object he is using may not be valid.
In contrast, the bedikah is not a mitzvah in and of itself—it is a protective act designed to prevent the transgression of owning chametz. Perhaps one is only required to perform a bedikah if it is certain to help prevent the aveirah. If the bedikah will likely be ineffective, there may be no halachic requirement to perform it. Thus, the Beis HaLevi's distinction may still hold.
However, upon closer inspection, Tosafos may not be making a halachic claim at all. Rather, Tosafos could simply be asking from a practical standpoint: "What is the point of checking again, if the first search didn't help and the second likely won't either?" It's a question of utility, not obligation. If so, this undermines the supposed proof to the Beis HaLevi. Tosafos is not suggesting that an action of doubtful benefit is never required halachically—only that repeating the same action, with the same likely outcome, seems futile. Therefore, this Tosafos does not provide clear support for the Beis HaLevi's position.
Tosafos's Answer and the Maharsha Tosafos answers that according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, one must perform bittul—the verbal nullification of chametz, declaring it as dust and ownerless. The goal of bittul is to remove halachic ownership over any chametz that remains, thereby avoiding the Torah prohibition of bal yeira'eh u'bal yimatzei—that chametz may not be seen or found in one's possession over Pesach.
Tosafos then adds that Rabbi Meir would not require one to be stringent in this case if the entire obligation were only rabbinic in nature. It is only because the prohibition in question is from the Torah (de'oraisa) that such strictness is necessary. The Maharsha, in his commentary to this Tosafos, offers the following explanation: Rabbi Meir holds that once a person performs bittul, the prohibition of owning chametz is reduced to a rabbinic (derabanan) level. At that point, since it now only a derabanan prohibition, R' Meir would no longer demand the stringent approach. If, however, R' Meir would demand a stringent approach even on a derabanan level, then bittul would not help the situation and would not be required. Therefore, says the Maharsha, it must be that Rabbi Meir only demands such stringency in situations where the prohibition is still from the Torah, but not when it's already been downgraded to a rabbinic status.
A Support from the Maharsha At first glance, this seems to be a strong support for the position of the Beis HaLevi—and perhaps even takes it one step further. The Maharsha appears to be saying that even when there is an action that reduces a Torah violation to a rabbinic one, one is still not halachically obligated to do so if, in the end, a violation—albeit only rabbinic—remains. This would seem to go beyond the Beis HaLevi's original claim, which only addressed cases of doubtful fulfillment. The Maharsha seems to be applying the concept even to cases where a concrete reduction in the level of prohibition is available.
However, this reading of the Maharsha raises a serious difficulty. Many have asked on this Maharsha—including Rabbi Akiva Eiger—how can it be that one is not halachically required to take action to lower a Torah violation to a rabbinic one, especially when such an opportunity is readily available? Rabbi Akiva Eiger and other commentators find this extremely difficult to accept.
Answering R' Akiva Eiger's Question! But perhaps the answer lies in reframing the entire reading of the Maharsha. I would like to suggest a new interpretation, which both resolves Rabbi Akiva Eiger's question and explains why this Maharsha does not support the Beis HaLevi's ruling.
The key point is this: the Maharsha is not arguing that one is not halachically obligated to perform an act that reduces a Torah prohibition to a rabbinic one. Of course, from a halachic standpoint, one must do so—as Rabbi Akiva Eiger correctly points out. Rather, the Maharsha is explaining the intent of Tosafos's question and Tosafos's proposed answer.
Tosafos's original question, as we explained earlier, was not strictly a halachic one. It was a practical question: what is Rabbi Meir actually asking the person to do? If the individual already searched and found nothing, and a second search is unlikely to yield anything new, what good is it? What practical utility is there in repeating the same action? And what can be done to remedy the situation?
Tosafos answers that Rabbi Meir would require bittul. The Maharsha then clarifies: that answer only works if, after bittul, the individual is no longer even in violation on a rabbinic level. If a rabbinic-level prohibition still remains, then this cannot be what Rabbi Meir is requiring, because the utility of the action is still unclear. The Maharsha is not saying the person is not halachically obligated to do bittul—he is simply arguing that Tosafos's answer doesn't seem to resolve the practical problem Tosafos raised: "What is Rabbi Meir expecting the person to do now?"
In this way, the Maharsha does not contradict Rabbi Akiva Eiger's understanding of halachic obligation, nor does he support the Beis HaLevi's novel distinction regarding cases of uncertain fulfillment. The Maharsha is simply interpreting the flow of Tosafos: the challenge was practical, and so must be the solution.
To the best of my knowledge, this approach to the Maharsha and the reconciliation with Rabbi Akiva Eiger's objection has not been explicitly stated elsewhere. If that is indeed the case, it is a moment of real joy—a perfect ending to the month of Adar and segue into the month of Geulah, Nissan!
Have an amazing Shabbos Kodesh!! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu
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[1] I write "purportedly" because there are those who question whether the Beis HaLevi actually said this including Rav Avraham Yehoshua Soloveitchik, shlita (see Chitzei Giborim Vol. 3, p. 72). However, the idea is cited explicitly in print in Teshuvos V'Hanhagos (1:26) as well as in several other seforim. A notable response to this sevara can be found in the sefer Mishmeres Mitzvah, which is devoted entirely to refuting this line of reasoning, drawing from a breathtaking range of sources. Many other seforim also grapple with this sevara and its implications in various forms. | 
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