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Dear Yeshiva Family:
"Therefore, Bnei Yisrael are not to eat the displaced sinew on the ball of the thighbone to this day, because he struck the ball of Yaakov's thighbone on the displaced sinew." (Bereishis 32:33)
In this week's parshah, Yaakov struggles with the malach (angel) of Eisav. After an entire night of grappling, during which the malach was unable to defeat Yaakov, it struck Yaakov on the thigh, injuring his gid hanasheh—the sciatic nerve. As a result, it became a commandment that we are prohibited from eating the gid hanasheh.
The Gemara (Chullin 99b) discusses whether this nerve possesses any taste, with significant ramifications depending on the answer. The Rashba (Chullin 92b s.v. deha) raises an important question: if this issue hinges on whether the gid hanasheh has taste, why not resolve the debate empirically—by having at least a non-Jew taste it and provide an answer? The Rashba explains that the dispute is not about the nerve's empirically determined taste but whether the minimal flavor it offers is halachically classified as "taste" at all. Thus, the question is conceptual rather than practical. However, some authorities treat the discussion as concerning the nerve's empirically determined taste. (We have explored elsewhere how such phenomena—a seeming empirical debate within halachic discourse—can exist.)
Ramifications of the Taste Debate One key ramification is the status of meat cooked with the gid hanasheh still intact. If the gid has halachically defined taste, its presence would render the surrounding meat non-kosher. Conversely, if it lacks taste, it would not affect the rest of the meat.
Another major ramification concerns eating the gid hanasheh of a neveilah—an animal that died without proper shechitah (slaughter). A neveilah is entirely non-kosher, but the question arises: does this general prohibition extend to the gid hanasheh? If the gid is considered tasteless, it would be classified like the animal's bones, horns, or hooves—items that are not included in the prohibition of eating a neveilah. In such a case, eating the gid hanasheh would only violate the specific prohibition against eating the gid itself but not the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal. On the other hand, if the gid hanasheh has taste, it would fall under both prohibitions, as it would be considered part of the animal's edible flesh.
It is crucial to note that the Torah explicitly prohibits eating the gid hanasheh, so it is forbidden regardless of its taste. The ramifications discussed here concern only the additional prohibitions—such as eating a neveilah—which hinges on whether the gid is considered a "tasty" part of the animal.
The Rambam's Rulings and a Conundrum The Rambam (Ma'achalos Asuros 15:17) rules that the gid hanasheh has no taste. Yet in another ruling (ibid. 8:6), the Rambam states that eating the gid of a neveilah constitutes a violation of two prohibitions: the prohibition of eating the gid hanasheh and the prohibition of eating a neveilah. At first glance, this seems contradictory. If the gid has no taste, it should not fall under the general prohibition of eating a neveilah, just as bones and horns do not.
The complexity deepens further when considering other rulings by the Rambam. He states (ibid. 4:18) that eating any of the other tendons (giddin) of a neveilah does not violate the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal, because tendons lack taste. This appears consistent with the view that tasteless parts of the animal are excluded from the prohibition on neveilah, but deepens our question with the ruling that one violates two prohibitions by eating the gid hanasheh. Furthermore, the Rambam rules that eating the gid hanasheh of a species that is inherently non-kosher (not just a neveilah) does not violate any prohibition—not the prohibition of eating the gid hanasheh nor the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal!
How can these rulings be reconciled? This puzzle requires further exploration and raises profound questions about the interplay between halachic principles and the classifications of edible and inedible parts of an animal.
The Minchas Chinuch's incredible resolution The Minchas Chinuch (281:7) provides an extraordinary explanation to reconcile the seemingly contradictory rulings of the Rambam. He begins by addressing a broader question: Why is it that eating inedible parts of an animal—such as bones or sinews—does not typically result in violating prohibitions? After all, there is a halachic principle called achsheveih, which holds that a person can assign value to an otherwise valueless item. By choosing to eat such an item, one ostensibly declares it to be "food" in their mind, and it should then be treated as edible and subject to prohibitions.
To answer this, the Minchas Chinuch references another apparent contradiction in the Rambam. In Hilchos Shevuos (5:5), the Rambam rules that if someone swears to eat something and then eats an offensive or inedible item (e.g., something not normally consumed), he fulfills his oath. However, if someone swears not to eat something and later consumes the same inedible item, he does not violate his oath.
Resolving the Contradiction: The Lechem Mishnah's Insight The Lechem Mishnah provides a brilliant resolution: The determining factor is our assumption about the person's intent. Halachically, we presume that people generally want to do the right thing. When someone swears to eat and then consumes something offensive, we interpret their action as assigning value to that item, treating it as food to fulfill their oath. However, if the individual swears not to eat and then consumes the same offensive item, the act is not viewed as eating because we assume he did not intend to classify it as food. In this context, his act is seen as inconsistent with the intent of his oath, and he is not considered in violation.
Applying This Logic to the Minchas Chinuch's Question The Minchas Chinuch adopts this framework to explain why eating inedible or tasteless parts of an animal (like sinews or bones) does not automatically mean the person violates prohibitions. One might argue that by eating the item, the person assigns value to it as food and should therefore be liable. However, as the Lechem Mishnah demonstrated, two competing assumptions exist: 1. The act of eating suggests value. By consuming the item, the person appears to declare it as food in their mind. 2. The presumption of righteousness. We assume the person does not intend to violate halachah and therefore does not truly consider the inedible item as food in a halachic sense. The Lechem Mishnah demonstrated that the overriding presumption of righteousness prevents us from treating their act of eating as an indication that they classify the item as food.
The Key Caveat: Context of the Act The Minchas Chinuch adds an important qualification: This presumption of righteousness applies only if the individual is not actively violating a halachah through his act of eating. If the act itself constitutes a violation—for example, eating the gid hanasheh, which the Torah explicitly forbids—then we no longer assume the individual is acting in good faith. In such cases, the only assumption left is our first assumption, that their act of eating inherently demonstrates that they regard the item as food, rendering them culpable.
A Supporting Analogy from the Radvaz The Minchas Chinuch bolsters his argument with an analogy from the Radvaz (1:351). The Radvaz discusses the halachic presumption that a man would not engage in relations with a woman without intending to marry her. (The application of this far-reaching principal is beyond the scope of this article). However, this presumption applies only if the woman is not a niddah. If she is a niddah, the presumption falls away because the man's willingness to transgress a Torah prohibition undermines our assumption of his general righteousness. Similarly, when someone eats the gid hanasheh, the fact that he is already violating a Torah prohibition negates any presumption of good intent. His act of eating the gid hanasheh demonstrates that he regards it as food, and he is thus liable for both prohibitions: 1. Eating the gid hanasheh. 2. Eating part of a non-kosher animal.
Reconciling the Rambam's Rulings Using this principle, we can resolve the Rambam's rulings: When someone eats the sinews or tendons of a non-kosher animal (other than the gid hanasheh), we assume the act, even in the fellow's mind, is not truly an act of eating because these parts are inedible. The presumption of righteousness shields them from being deemed culpable for violating prohibitions.
However, if the person eats the gid hanasheh, he is already violating a Torah prohibition. In this case, his action is interpreted as assigning value to the gid as food, and he is liable for both the prohibition of eating the gid hanasheh and the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal.
If someone eats the gid hanasheh of a species that is inherently non-kosher (not just a neveilah), there is no prohibition of gid hanasheh for that species. Thus, he is not violating a Torah prohibition and we revert to the presumption of righteousness and do not view the act as assigning value to the gid as food.
This intricate interplay of assumptions—balancing the presumption of righteousness against the context of the act—provides an elegant resolution to the contradictions in the Rambam's rulings. It also underscores the depth of halachic analysis, where even seemingly contradictory rulings can reveal profound insights into human behavior and Torah law.
It emerges that if someone mistakenly eats the gid hanasheh of a neveilah, he would not need to do teshuvah (repentance) for the sin of consuming non-kosher food. This is because his unintentional act allows us to revert to the assumption of his innocent intent. In such a case, we do not interpret his action as a deliberate effort to classify the gid hanasheh as "food" in a halachic sense, nor as an act of knowingly eating non-kosher. Thus, his mistake does not carry the same weight of culpability as a deliberate violation would.
Many meforshim[1] (commentators) have raised questions about the Minchas Chinuch's explanation. If it is true that the Torah does not prohibit eating inedible parts of an animal, such as bones, how can the concept of achsheveih—where one assigns value to something—be sufficient to transform an inherently inedible item into food? How can one's subjective intent redefine bones or sinews, which are not naturally classified as food, into something halachically significant?
To address this, we can suggest that the Minchas Chinuch understood the matter differently. The exemption from liability for eating nerves or sinews is not because they are inherently non-food items, as one might assume for bones or hooves, but rather because the act of eating them is not halachically recognized as an "act of eating" due to their lack of taste. However, through intentional action—when someone consciously decides to eat these items and thus assigns them value— he elevates the act to one that qualifies as eating in a halachic sense. The key lies in the individual's deliberate intent, which transforms what would otherwise be a neutral or insignificant act into one with halachic ramifications[2].
May this profound insight from the Minchas Chinuch enrich your understanding and inspire an uplifting and meaningful Shabbos!
Wishing you and your family an amazing Shabbos!!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
[1] See Rav Shach in Avi Ezri (beginning of Avos Hatumah), among many others, who challenge the Minchas Chinuch's explanation. They grapple with the idea of using achsheveih to transform something inherently non-food, such as bones or sinews, into a halachically significant act of eating. Their critique revolves around whether subjective intent can truly redefine the halachic classification of an item that the Torah itself does not treat as food and many sources are marshalled to the challenge.
[2] Another compelling proof that the Rambam considers the bones and sinews of a neveilah to be part of the animal—but not ordinarily subject to a halachic act of eating—can be drawn from the Rambam's ruling (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 4:3). He states that if one consumes a kezayis (the minimal volume required for halachic liability) of a bird that was not properly slaughtered (neveilah), he violates the prohibition even if that kezayis is comprised of a combination of meat, bones, and sinews. This ruling reveals an important nuance: while bones and sinews are not typically considered food, they are still classified as integral parts of the animal itself.
The prohibition here hinges on their inclusion in the total measure of a kezayis. If one consumes these components alongside edible meat, they combine to meet the halachic threshold for liability. The rationale is that the bones and sinews are not excluded from the animal's prohibition; they are simply not naturally subject to an act of eating due to their inedibility. However, if someone is already eating them incidentally, such as when consuming meat attached to them, they can be "upgraded" and counted toward the required volume. This supports our defense of the Minchas Chinuch, that the inedible sinews of an animal are not in the category of a non-food, rather they are usually not part of any prohibition because they are not subject to the laws of eating! | 
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