Fw: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva - Parshas Vayeishev– 5786

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Subject: Dvar Torah from the Rosh HaYeshiva - Parshas Vayeishev– 5786

Parshas Vayeishev – 5786

Dear Yeshiva Family: Reuven Throws Yosef in the Pit In this week's parashah, we read the dramatic moment when Yosef approaches his brothers and is suddenly ambushed. The brothers had reached the conclusion that Yosef was deserving of death, and they were preparing to carry out the sentence. Reuven, hoping to save Yosef from their hands, intervenes with an alternative plan (37:22): "Do not spill blood; throw him into this pit in the wilderness." The Gemara (Shabbos 22a) famously teaches that this "pit" was not empty at all, it was filled with snakes and scorpions. This leads to the obvious question: What exactly did Reuven accomplish? If the pit itself guaranteed Yosef's death — to the degree that the Gemara in Yevamos 121a permits a woman to remarry if her husband falls into such a pit even without confirming his death, then how was Reuven's plan any improvement over the original idea of killing him directly?[1] The Famous Ohr HaChaim About Hurting Another Person A well-known approach is offered by the Or HaChaim[2], who directly addresses this question. He explains that Reuven understood that Yosef was not truly deserving of death. And if a person is not deserving of death, then natural forces, such as animals, snakes, or scorpions which possess no free will (bechirah), cannot harm him. A creature that lacks bechirah cannot act independently of Hashem's will; it can only carry out the fate that Heaven decrees. Thus, if Hashem did not decree death upon Yosef, the animals would simply be incapable of killing him. Human beings, however, are different. A person endowed with bechirah has the terrifying capacity to override, so to speak, Hashem's "initial plan." Even if Hashem does not will that someone die, a murderer can still choose to kill. That is why Reuven felt an urgent need to remove Yosef from the hands of his brothers. As long as Yosef remained in the grasp of human beings, who possess bechirah. he was in genuine danger. But once he was placed into a pit, even a pit filled with snakes and scorpions, Reuven believed Yosef would actually be safer. Since Yosef was innocent, these animals, lacking bechirah, would be unable to harm him. The Many Meforshim Who Argue According to the Or HaChayim's novel insight, a human being who possesses bechirah (free will) can choose to harm another person even if such harm was not willed by Hashem. This seems, at first glance, to clash with several well-known sources that insist the opposite: no one can be injured unless Hashem directly wills it. Everything a person experiences, whether through natural causes or through another human being, is ultimately decreed by Hashem. This idea appears in the Chovos HaLevavos[3], in the teachings of the Vilna Gaon[4], and in many other classical works[5]. Many sources[6] try to minimize the gap between these two approaches, suggesting that the Or HaChayim and the Sefer HaChinuch are not truly in conflict. They argue that the Or HaChayim does not mean that a human being can cause pain outside of Hashem's will; rather, since a person possesses bechirah, he poses a greater danger, requiring far more zechuyos for protection. Just as someone who enters a dangerous environment needs extra merit to be safeguarded, encountering a human antagonist who actively chooses to harm similarly demands greater spiritual protection. According to this reading, the Or HaChayim is not saying that a person can inflict "new," non-decreed suffering. He is simply explaining that human free will creates a higher-risk situation than a passive animal, but ultimately, all pain still comes from Hashem's decree[7]. While this explanation softens the disagreement, it does not fully resolve it[8]. The Sefer HaChinuch seems to insist on a far more absolute principle. His explanation of the prohibition of taking revenge implies that no pain ever comes from another human being in any independent sense. Whatever harm one suffers was destined for him regardless of who delivered it. The offender may have misused his bechirah, but from the victim's perspective, the harm was entirely decreed in Heaven and was going to happen anyway. If any changes happened due to the bechirah of another, why should we not be able to be upset at the other person. Therefore, even after we reduce the gap, a real divide remains. The Or HaChayim appears to maintain that a human being can generate genuinely undeserved harm through the misuse of free will, whereas the Chinuch understands that all harm is predetermined and no human can alter another person's fate. A Question on the Ohr HaChaim Now that we have established that there is indeed a machlokes, we can take a closer look at the Or HaChayim's position. The Or HaChayim maintains that a ba'al chai — an animal — has no bechirah, and for that very reason Reuven believed Yosef would be safer facing animals than facing human beings. But what does that actually mean? If an animal lacks bechirah, then it functions according to its instincts — it is "programmed," so to speak, to behave in certain predictable ways. Yet we have already cited the Gemara in Yevamos (121a) which states that if a man falls into a pit of snakes and scorpions, we assume with certainty that he has died and allow his wife to remarry. Clearly, these animals do kill, they afre programmed to kill and they kill with such consistency that halachah relies on their deadly instincts. So what, then, is gained by sending Yosef into a pit of snakes and scorpions simply because they lack bechirah? If anything, the Gemara indicates the opposite — that these creatures are almost guaranteed to attack. And if they cannot "choose" otherwise, their attack seems even more inevitable. How, then, does the Or HaChayim's argument make sense? What does it truly mean for an animal to lack bechirah, and in what way does that make it less dangerous — or less capable of inflicting undeserved harm — than a human being? Bechira By Animals To answer this question, we first need to clarify what it means that animals lack bechirah. After all, we observe that different dogs have different temperaments — some friendly, some calm, some quick to snap — and animals often appear to "choose" how they behave. But the Or HaChayim's premise is that, despite these differences, animals do not make genuine choices at all. Rather, each animal is programmed with an internal wiring that determines exactly how it will respond to any given set of stimuli. This means that if one could replicate precisely the same set of circumstances surrounding a particular animal — the same hunger level, temperature, smells, sounds, prior experiences, and every other subtle factor — the animal would react in exactly the same way every time. The reason animals appear unpredictable is not because they possess bechirah, but because their "circuit board" is incredibly sensitive. A slight change in environment, mood, or physical state can trigger a different programmed response. But if every variable were identical, the result would be identical. Human beings, by contrast, possess the capacity to choose. Even though people sometimes act impulsively or out of habit, a human being is fundamentally capable of making a moral decision — of choosing differently today than he did yesterday — and that is what the Torah defines as bechirah. Animals, however, are locked into their programming; they can only follow the patterns hardwired into them. They never truly choose. A Beautiful Explanation of the Ohr HaChaim understanding the Tzelem Elokim  There is a fascinating Gemara in Shabbos 151b that sheds light on this entire discussion. The Gemara teaches that, by nature, animals are instinctively afraid of human beings. A human stands on a higher spiritual plane, and therefore animals naturally sense his superiority and refrain from attacking. It is only when a person lowers himself through sin — when he uses his bechirah to diminish his spiritual stature and, so to speak, make himself no higher than an animal — that the animal perceives him as vulnerable and becomes capable of attacking. In other words, the animal's instinctive programming is to respect and fear a human who retains his Tzelem Elokim, and to attack only when that dignity has been compromised. With this, we can beautifully answer our question according to the Or HaChayim. An animal is programmed to respond to the spiritual reality of the human before it. For an ordinary person — who, like all of us, has the occasional aveirah — the natural programming of snakes and scorpions may very well dictate attack, and therefore the Gemara in Yevamos assumes that one who falls into such a pit has almost certainly died. But Yosef was no ordinary person. Yosef was a tzaddik, a person of exceptional purity. In the spiritual reality sensed by animals, he stood far above them. Their instinctive wiring would therefore restrain them from harming him. Thus, Reuven's reasoning becomes clear: although snakes and scorpions might attack a typical person, they were programmed not to attack a tzaddik like Yosef. Precisely because animals lack bechirah, they cannot choose to harm someone whom Heaven has not designated as vulnerable. This is why Reuven felt Yosef would be safer in the pit than in the hands of his brothers. What a beautiful pshat — a true illumination of the Or HaChayim's insight. Have an amazing Shabbos! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva Mrevah2@touro.edu [1] Many mefarshim grapple with this issue, but Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt"l offers an amazing solution. The Torah subtly shifts the spelling of the word bor (pit). When Reuven first proposes his idea (37:22) — "hashlichu oso el ha'bor hazeh" — the word bor is spelled with a vav, indicating an ordinary pit. Reuven understood he was suggesting a temporary holding place from which Yosef could later be retrieved. But a few pesukim later (37:24), when the brothers actually cast Yosef inside, the Torah spells bor without a vav. Rav Chaim notes that this missing letter hints that the pit was not fully deep because it was occupied by snakes and scorpions. According to Rav Chaim, this textual shift reveals a simple truth: Reuven and the Brothers had no idea the pit contained dangerous creatures. Reuven's intention was purely to protect Yosef. Only after Yosef was thrown in did a miracle occur — the snakes and scorpions fled — and from that point onward the Torah returns to spelling bor with a vav, reflecting that the pit had become a regular, empty pit once again. With this, Rav Chaim neatly resolves the entire problem: Reuven was not trading one form of certain death for another. He believed he was creating an avenue for Yosef's survival. See also the Ramban on the Parshah who also explains that the Brothers did not know. R' Chaim's Chiddush is the diyuk in the passuk that he made. [2] This approach is also in the Zohar (Vayieshev 185a) and the Netziv in Haemek Davar (37:13). See also the Metzudos and the Alshich in Sefer Daniel 6:17-18 who explains the Pesukim there like the Ohr HaChaim. Rashi however takes a different approach seemingly disagreeing with the Ohr HaChaim.  See the Alshich on Shmuel 1:16:1. This approach is also indicated in Rabbeinu Chananel in Chagigah 4b and 5a. See also Rabbeinu Yonah on Mishlei 17:12. This approach is also indicated in the Maharal in the hakdam of the Ohr Chadash (See Heara 537 of the Hartman edition.) [3] See Shaar HaBitachon 4. See also the Ramban in Parshas Lech Lecha (15:14), and Rabbeinu Bechaya in Shemos 21:13.  R' Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz Ma'amarim (pg. 47). See also the Gemara in Chullin 7b which seems to indicate that through magic one can go against Hashem, but perhaps this is specifically regarding magic, and not through conventional means. See also Rashi in Parshas VaYechi 15:19 [4] See the Sefer Toldos Hatzadik R' Zundel MiSalant who quotes the Vilna Gaon like this. [5] How, then, do these sources understand the role of bechirah? Their approach is that when a person is deserving of suffering, even something as small as a bruise, Hashem orchestrates events in such a way that he encounters someone who is being tested with the choice to inflict that harm. If the second person fails his test and chooses to act hurtfully, then he becomes the tool through which the predetermined injury is delivered. If he resists his impulse and passes the test, then the injury will reach its intended recipient through some other means, a stumble, an accident, or another natural occurrence. The suffering was decreed; the only question is who would choose to be the agent. This understanding is famously articulated by the Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 241), who uses it to explain the Torah's prohibition against taking revenge. Since any pain a person suffers was destined for him regardless of who delivered it, there is no place for resentment or retaliation. The offender may have misused his free will and will be judged for that choice, but from the victim's perspective, nothing the offender did actually changed his fate. He merely played a role in carrying out what was already coming. [6] See the Sefer Lekach Dovid from R' Dovid Cohen Shlita among others. See also the Sefer Sifsei Chayim (Emunah and Hashgacha 1 pgs 369-414) who has an entire section on this topic attempting to explain the Ohr Hachayim. [7] In a related vein, the Divrei Yoel in Parshas Eikev offers a fascinating explanation of how a human being can present a spiritual challenge even more dangerous than the yetzer hara. The yetzer hara operates within limits, whereas a person, endowed with bechirah, can exert far greater influence and pose far greater danger. While the full discussion is beyond our scope, the conceptual parallel to the Or HaChayim's insight is striking. [8] The aforementioned Netziv explains that certainly even if we accept the Or HaChayim's approach, it is obvious that Hashem can intervene miraculously, as He did when He turned Yaakov's neck to stone while Esav was biting him. Such cases are exceptional and do not undermine the Or HaChayim's primary point: that a human being's bechirah can create harm that was not predetermined under ordinary circumstances. HTC  Hebrew Theological College is a member of Touro University and a partner with the Jewish United Fund in serving our community

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