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Dear Yeshiva Family:
The Passuk states: "The river shall swarm with frogs, and they shall ascend and come into your house, and your bedroom, and your bed, and into the house of your servants, and of your people, and into your ovens and into your kneading bowls" (Shemos 7:28). Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah were three righteous individuals who lived during the Babylonian exile and served as noble figures in Nevuchadnezzar's court. They are best known for their unwavering commitment to their faith, even in the face of death. When commanded to bow down to an idol under the threat of being cast into a fiery furnace, they chose instead to sanctify Hashem's name by refusing to worship the idol.
The Gemara (Pesachim 53b) cites the Tanna, Todos, in explaining how these three men drew inspiration from our story of the frogs. Faced with the choice of worshipping idols or being cast into the furnace, they chose sanctification of God's name over idolatry. Todos asks: What led them to such a choice? They drew a kal v'chomer (a fortiori inference) from the plague of frogs in Mitzrayim (Egypt). Regarding the frogs, which are not commanded to sanctify God's name, it is written: "And the river shall swarm with frogs... and into their ovens." If the frogs, in fulfilling their divine mission to harass the Mitzriyim (Egyptians), willingly entered burning ovens, then all the more so we, who are commanded to sanctify Hashem's name, should deliver ourselves to the fiery furnace to fulfill this commandment.
This raises an important question: Why did Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah learn this principle from the frogs instead of drawing their inspiration from the well-known story of Avraham Avinu? Avraham was cast into the fire by Nimrod for refusing to worship idols, demonstrating unparalleled faith and devotion. His choice to sanctify Hashem's name under duress is a clear precedent. Why not rely on Avraham's example?
Moreover, the very idea of learning from the frogs is problematic. As the Ben Yehoyada points out, frogs do not possess bechira (free will). They act solely according to their divine programming, making it difficult to draw a meaningful lesson from their behavior. Additionally, the Maharsha raises another issue: Human beings are commanded to prioritize life through the mitzvah of v'chai bahem ("you shall live by them"), which generally prohibits self-sacrifice except in specific circumstances. Frogs, not being subject to this mitzvah, cannot serve as an ideal model for human decision-making where this is a factor.
The kal v'chomer derived from the frogs appears fraught with complications. Why did Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah bypass the straightforward and compelling example of Avraham Avinu in favor of this seemingly more difficult derivation?
To address this question, we must first explore a related issue. Rashi explains that Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah were faced with the choice of either staying alive by worshipping an idol—an act considered a capital crime—or being thrown into the fiery furnace. However, the Rishonim[1] raise several challenges to Rashi's interpretation. First, serving idols is one of the three cardinal sins for which one is obligated to give up their life rather than transgress (Sanhedrin 74a). Why, then, did they need additional encouragement or inspiration from the frogs? What unique lesson did the frogs teach that wasn't already clear from the basic halachic principle?
Second, as Tosafos points out, even for sins that are not among the three cardinal sins, if someone is forced to transgress the sin publicly where the intention is to destroy Judaism as was the case by Nevuchadnezzar, they are likewise required to give up their life. This concept, too, is already derived from other sources (Sanhedrin 74a). Why, then, was it necessary to learn from the frogs in this context?
To resolve these issues, the Rishonim propose several explanations:
- Rabbeinu Tam's Approach: According to Rabbeinu Tam, the situation of Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah did not involve actual idol worship. Nevuchadnezzar's statue was not intended to be worshipped as a deity but was rather a symbol of honor for the king. Thus, bowing to it did not fall under the category of idolatry, which would mandate martyrdom. Instead, the issue was one of chillul Hashem (desecration of God's name). In this case, the lesson from the frogs was crucial: it demonstrated that one is permitted to sacrifice their life in order to sanctify God's name (kiddush Hashem), even when the act does not technically fall under the prohibition of idolatry[2].
- The Ri's Explanation: The Ri offers a different perspective. Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah had the opportunity to escape, which would have allowed them to avoid the life-threatening situation entirely. Even if their situation did involve genuine idolatry, the obligation to give up one's life could have been avoided by fleeing. Nevertheless, they chose to remain and face martyrdom. This aspect could not be learned from the standard halachic obligation to give up one's life for idolatry. Instead, they derived their willingness to voluntarily embrace sacrifice from the frogs. Just as some frogs willingly entered the fire despite having other options (e.g., jumping into beds or other areas), they chose to remain and sanctify God's name, even when escape was possible.
These explanations also clarify why Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah did not draw directly from the example of Avraham Avinu. Unlike their situation, Avraham's test was a direct case of classic idolatry, where escape was not a factor. In contrast, the case of Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah involved nuances that made the precedent of Avraham insufficient. Therefore, they looked to the frogs for guidance.
From these explanations, we can derive an important principle: if one finds themselves in a situation where they know they will be forced to give up their life to avoid violating one of the three cardinal sins, and they have the option to escape, they are not obligated to flee. At least in cases where their sacrifice will result in a clear kiddush Hashem, staying and sanctifying God's name is a praiseworthy choice[3].
The question remains according to Rashi. If, as Rashi suggests, the situation was a case of classic avodah zara (idolatry) and there was no room for them to escape, why did Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah feel the need to derive their actions from the frogs rather than from the precedent of Avraham Avinu?
The Maharsha addresses the questions raised by the Rishonim regarding Rashi's interpretation. He explains that this Gemara follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael (Sanhedrin 74a), who holds that one is not always required to give up their life for idolatry. Additionally, the case here involved a scenario where fewer than three Jews were present, and therefore the act did not meet the criteria for being considered "public" (b'farhesya). Since it was not a public act of idolatry, there was no obligation to give up their lives. Nevertheless, Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah learned from the frogs that they were permitted to do so voluntarily.
However, this resolution brings us back to our original question with even greater intensity: Why did they choose to derive their actions from the frogs, rather than from the story of Avraham Avinu who also had these same circumstances?
Perhaps we can explain that there was an added dimension to the story of Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah. The pesukim in Daniel (3:22) describe how Nevuchadnezzar, enraged by their defiance, commanded that the furnace be heated seven times hotter than usual. The fire was so intense that the guards tasked with throwing them into the furnace were consumed by the flames upon approaching it. The next passuk states that Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah fell into the fire. This suggests that they were not physically forced into the furnace but instead jumped in willingly.
This introduces a crucial nuance. Typically, the discussion surrounding the three cardinal sins requiring martyrdom focuses on the obligation to allow oneself to be killed rather than violate these prohibitions. However, in this case, Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah took an additional step—they actively chose to jump into the fire. This proactive act of self-sacrifice could not have been derived from the example of Avraham Avinu, who was cast into the furnace against his will. Instead, it could only have been learned from the frogs during the Egyptian plagues, as they too voluntarily jumped into burning ovens[4].
This point hinges on the element of kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name) inherent in their actions. The frogs' willingness to jump into the ovens was part of their divine mission to execute the plagues upon the Egyptians, thereby creating a kiddush Hashem. From this, Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah learned that for the sake of a kiddush Hashem, one is permitted to take proactive steps, even to the point of self-sacrifice[5].
Their choice to leap into the fire likely created a far more powerful and memorable kiddush Hashem than if they had passively allowed themselves to be thrown in. This added dimension of willingly creating a striking and public sanctification of God's name was the lesson they drew from the frogs.
Therefore, even though the halacha requiring one to give up their life rather than violate the three cardinal sins—or, as Tosafos points out, even to violate other sins in a public manner—generally refers to allowing oneself to be killed, and not to one actively committing suicide[6], however, when such an act would result in a significant kiddush Hashem, it would be permitted, as seen in this case.
We can now address the Ben Yehoyada's and Maharsha's questions as well. The Ben Yehoyada resolves his own question by explaining that the lesson was not derived from the frogs' decision to jump into the fire. Rather, the lesson was drawn from the fact that the frogs were rewarded for their actions. Chazal makes it clear that the frogs who jumped into the furnaces were the only ones who did not die at the end of the plague. This demonstrates that even though their actions were not based on conscious choice—since frogs lack free will—they were nonetheless rewarded. This is based on the fact that Hashem rewards actions that result in a Kiddush Hashem, even if those actions are not a product of personal choice[7]. The reward for the frogs reveals that their actions constituted a bona fide Kiddush Hashem.
Now to answer the Maharsha, we can explain based on how we have explained Rashi and with the following understanding. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (74b) establishes that when one has the opportunity to create a Kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name), the mitzvah of v'chai bahem ("you shall live by them") no longer applies. However, the precise definition of a true Kiddush Hashem requires clarification. Perhaps this principle applies only in specific circumstances—namely, when the Kiddush Hashem fulfilling a mitzvah, such as when it comes from defying a direct command to violate a mitzvah or commit a sin. For instance, if a decree demands that a person perform a specific transgression or neglect a specific mitzvah publicly, with the intent to defy God, one is required to give up their life rather than comply. In such cases, Kiddush Hashem takes precedence over v'chai bahem and it is as if v'chai bahem does not exist!
But what happens when there is no direct command to violate a mitzvah? The Kiddush Hashem is just a result of a nice action. In such situations, it could be argued that the act being performed is not inherently a Kiddush Hashem. If someone chooses death in these circumstances, it might even result in a Chillul Hashem (desecration of God's name) rather than a Kiddush Hashem. Consequently, the mitzvah of v'chai bahem would apply, and one would be obligated to preserve their life.
This is precisely the lesson that Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah derived from the frogs. A Kiddush Hashem does not have to stem from fulfilling a commandment or resisting a decree. The rewarding of the frogs demonstrated that even without being commanded, their actions—jumping into the fire as part of the divine plague—resulted in a practical Kiddush Hashem. Through their actions, the Egyptians were punished, and the divine plan was fulfilled. From the fact that they were rewarded, we learn that even without an explicit mitzvah being performed, a practical Kiddush Hashem is still considered a true Kiddush Hashem and we can then apply the rule that a kiddush Hashem overrides the principle of v'chai bahem.
Without the example of the frogs, one might have thought that dying in such circumstances, without a direct commandment, would constitute a Chillul Hashem rather than a Kiddush Hashem. The reward of the frogs teach us otherwise: that this was a genuine Kiddush Hashem, and once we know that even when there is no formal obligation it is labeled a kiddush Hashem we know that the occurrence of a genuine Kiddush Hashem is sufficient to override the mitzvah of v'chai bahem[8].
This understanding now answers the Maharsha's question about why we can learn from the frogs, despite the fact that they are not commanded in v'chai bahem. The answer is that when a Kiddush Hashem is at stake, the mitzvah of v'chai bahem no longer applies—not for humans and not even, in principle, for frogs. The lesson the frogs demonstrated was only that even an unofficial or practical Kiddush Hashem is valid. From there, Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah—though not explicitly commanded—learned to create a profound Kiddush Hashem by voluntarily jumping into the fire. Since their actions resulted in a genuine Kiddush Hashem, the mitzvah of v'chai bahem did not apply to them either and they were in effect equal to the frogs.
Have an amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
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[1] Tosfos, Tosfos Harosh, Rabbeinu Dovid among many others. [2] There is a machlokes (disagreement) regarding whether one is permitted to give up their life in cases where they are being forced to violate mitzvos that do not fall under the three cardinal sins. Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 27b) holds that it is permitted, whereas the Rambam (Yesodei HaTorah 5:4) rules that it is strictly prohibited. The Vilna Gaon (Yoreh De'ah 157:3) cites a proof in support of Tosafos' opinion from this incident. However, in this case, where the act involved a kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name), it might align even with the Rambam's view, as the circumstances are unique. [3] See Shvus Yaakov (2:106), who holds that it is only permitted to remain in the situation if it will result in a kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name). In contrast, the Mayim Chayim (Pesachim 53b) maintains that it is permitted in all situations to remain, regardless of whether a kiddush Hashem will result. [4] I subsequently saw this answer in the Maharam Shif in Pesachim! Baruch Shekivanti! [5] Rabbeinu Dovid presents an entirely opposite understanding. He explains that Chananya, Mishael, and Azariah were permitted to take their own lives before being thrown into the fire because one may commit suicide if they fear torture (see the upcoming footnote). However, despite this allowance, they chose not to take their own lives and instead faced the fiery furnace. [6] There is, however, a story recorded where 400 children chose to jump into the sea to avoid being used for immoral purposes. Tosafos explains that their fear was not of being killed outright but of being tortured if they refused to comply. There may be room for leniency in cases of suicide when the alternative involves prolonged torture to compel sin, but such situations are beyond the scope of this discussion. However, if a person is merely faced with the threat of death, they are not permitted to commit suicide in anticipation of being executed. However, what happens in a situation where someone believes they would be unable to withstand the pressure at the critical moment? Additionally, if a person is threatened with having their children forcibly converted, may they kill the child to prevent this? This question is discussed in the Bedek Habayis (Y.D. 157:1), which cites a dispute on the matter. Similarly, one might wonder about a scenario where a person anticipates being unable to resist a sin involving immorality—should they take their own life rather than transgress? Practically speaking, the answer would be no in such cases. All these cases are not similar to our case under discussion, for here there was no reason for them to kill themselves early if not for the added dimension of Kiddush Hashem, which they could only have learned from the frogs. [7] See also the Sefer Hearos from R' Elyashiv on Pesachim 53b. [8] A similar line of reasoning, however answering the question differently, can be found in the Sefer Nehorai from 5766 on page 694 from R' Moshe Slomowitz. | 
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