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Dear Yeshiva Family:
In this week's parshah, the story of Yosef and his brothers reaches a gripping climax with the dramatic showdown between Yehudah and Yosef. For those seeking a story more riveting than any modern fiction, the Midrash's elaborations on this saga (which can be found in English in The Medrash Says) offers unparalleled depth and insight.
The Torah describes (45:1) how Yosef, unable to contain his emotions any longer, finally reveals his identity to his brothers[1]. Many commentators note that it appears that Yosef would have preferred to maintain his composure and prolong the situation if he could. They explain based on a Zohar that the tragic events of the Asarah Harugei Malchus (Ten Martyrs) during the Roman Empire—which we recall on Yom Kippur and Tisha B'Av—served as a rectification for the sin of selling Yosef. These commentators explain that had Yosef managed to hold back his emotions a little longer, the brothers might have achieved a complete atonement (kapparah) in that moment, potentially averting those future tragedies, as well as the long exile and the destruction of the Batei HaMikdash!
To appreciate the magnitude of this event, we must understand the greatness of the Shevatim (the twelve sons of Yaakov). These were individuals of unparalleled spiritual and emotional strength. Yosef himself, at just 17 years old, resisted relentless advances from Potiphar's wife in a land steeped in immorality, earning him the eternal title of Yosef HaTzaddik. How, then, can we fathom that someone with such extraordinary self-control could not restrain his emotions for just a few more moments if it meant sparing future generations such suffering?
A novel answer to explain why Yosef broke down I would like to suggest that the answer lies in the powerful blessing given by Yaakov Avinu in Parshas Mikeitz (43:14). Before the brothers returned to Mitzrayim, Yaakov prayed that "Hashem should grant you mercy in the eyes of this man [Yosef]." This heartfelt blessing of mercy, uttered by the spiritual giant Yaakov, was so potent that it overpowered Yosef's resolve. It was this blessing that caused Yosef to break down both in Parshas Mikeitz (43:30) and here in Parshas Vayigash.
With this understanding, we can propose an alternative explanation for Yosef's instruction to his brothers not to rush back to Yaakov (45:24). On a simple level, Yosef's warning was practical: they should avoid reckless haste in their excitement to reunite with their father (see the second explanation in Rashi). However, a deeper interpretation may suggest that Yosef was expressing regret for revealing his identity prematurely. By doing so, the brothers were denied the opportunity to complete their atonement fully, setting the stage for future suffering in Jewish history. Yosef may have been urging them to avoid a similar misstep with Yaakov. Since they were ahead of the clock and running early because Yosef revealed himself early, Yosef urged them to travel slowly back to Yaakov. By traveling at a measured pace, they would ensure that Yaakov completed the 22 years of atonement he required for the time he spent away from his own parents. As the Midrash explains, Yaakov's suffering corresponded to the 22 years he was absent from Yitzchak and Rivkah.
If this interpretation is correct, this would mark the second time that Yaakov's words, while well-intentioned, altered the course of history in ways that appear, from a human perspective, to have had unintended negative consequences. The first instance occurred in Parshas Vayeitzei (31:32), when Yaakov unwittingly cursed the individual who had stolen Lavan's idols. Tragically, Rashi explains, this curse led to Rochel's untimely death. Now, in Parshas Vayigash, Yaakov's blessing of mercy for the viceroy inadvertently hastened Yosef's emotional breakdown, preventing the brothers from achieving a complete atonement.
Being responsible for damage caused through supernatural means This brings up the intriguing topic of how responsible a person is for damages or death they cause to others through metaphysical means. While the entirety of Bava Kamma addresses payments and penalties for damages caused through natural, tangible means, what happens when the harm is inflicted through tefillah (prayer) or ayin hara (the evil eye)? For example, it is famously advised not to throw finger or toe nails on the ground for fear that a pregnant woman might walk over them, potentially causing harm to her fetus. But if someone disregards this and harm does occur, can they be held liable?
The Steipler Gaon (Kehillas Yaakov, B.K. 45) cites sources that hold a person responsible for throwing nails on the ground and causing damage to a pregnant woman's fetus. However, he also references a contemporary gadol who disagrees, arguing that liability only applies to damage caused through natural means, not through supernatural ones. The Steipler himself takes a nuanced position, suggesting that liability depends on whether the damage can be definitively traced back to the individual. If it can be verified with certainty that the harm was directly caused by their action, the Steipler contends that they would indeed be responsible.
An example of metaphysical damage is the story of Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai (Shabbos 33b), who, upon leaving the cave after 12 years of learning Torah, burned everything he saw with his intense gaze if it was not purely holy. Another example is Reb Yonasan Ben Uziel (Sukkah 28a), whose holiness was so great that any bird flying overhead would be consumed by fire. In such cases, it could be argued that their actions created a situation akin to a bor b'reshus harabim (a pit in public property). According to Halachic principles, if something is damaged by a bor, the one who created it bears responsibility, and so too, it could be argued, would these individuals if damage occurred due to their supernatural abilities.
Similarly, if someone places an ayin hara on another person and it results in harm, the question of liability hinges on whether it can be definitively proven that the harm was caused by the ayin hara. If such causation could be established, it is likely that the person would be held responsible for damages.
The Steipler extends this discussion to the case of someone who uses the name of Hashem to kill another person, as Moshe Rabbeinu did to the Egyptian in Parshas Shemos. He cites the above- mentioned opinion that one is not held accountable for actions performed through magical or metaphysical means. However, the Steipler disagrees, maintaining that if the act is guaranteed to cause harm—as in the case of using Hashem's name to kill—the individual would indeed be liable, provided the connection between their action and the damage is clear and indisputable.
The difference between the laws of Shabbos and the laws of damaging This contemporary Gadol tried to bring a proof from the fact that one can use magic to trap animals on Shabbos (Sanhedrin 101). Additionally, the Shelah addresses a question: How was it permitted for Moshe Rabbeinu to write 13 sifrei Torah on the day of his death if he died on Shabbos (See the Rosh in Pesachim 10:13)? The Shelah answers that it was accomplished through a miracle. From here, we see that engaging in miraculous or magical acts can sometimes be permitted and perhaps the Torah's rules and regulations do not apply to supernatural acts.
However, the Steipler counters that one cannot draw a proof from the Laws of Shabbos to other halachos because the laws of Shabbos are different. On Shabbos, actions performed through a shinui—an abnormal or unconventional manner—are not prohibited. This is because the Torah prohibits the acts of melacha on Shabbos, and therefore, if one performs the act in an abnormal manner it is not prohibited (on a Torah level). In contrast, the issue of murder or causing damage is fundamentally different because the Torah focuses on the result: causing harm to another person. For instance, if one kills another with their left hand, they are not exempt because it was done with a shinui. Shinui matters when the prohibition pertains to the method of the act, such as lighting a fire on Shabbos. Hashem prohibits the act of lighting, not the result of a fire burning. By contrast, prohibitions like murder and damage hinge on the outcome itself. Therefore, one cannot draw conclusions from the fact that melacha, or work, is permitted on Shabbos if it is done in an unconventional magical fashion, to other areas of Halacha.
Three categories of damages through tefillah The Steipler further delves into this topic by discussing several Gemaros which recount incidents where the Rabanan looked at someone, and the person subsequently died. He categorizes these cases into three distinct groups: 1. Amazement or Wonder[2]: In some instances, the Rabanan gazed at a person in amazement or wonder, which prompted Hashem to reexamine that individual. This divine scrutiny revealed deficiencies in the person's actions, leading to their death. In these cases, the Rabanan are not held responsible, as their gaze merely set off a chain of events involving Heavenly judgment. 2. Heavenly Agreement with Rabbinic Judgment[3]: In other cases, the Rabanan may have declared a person chayav missah (liable for death) without explicitly praying for their demise. Heaven concurred with the Rabanan's assessment, resulting in the person's death. Here too, the Rabanan bear no responsibility, as the actual outcome was decreed by Heaven. 3. Prayers for Death[4]: In the final category, the Rabanan specifically prayed for the person's death. While this act constitutes gerama (an indirect cause of harm), they did not directly perform the killing or damage and are not held responsible for the damage on this world[5].
Why wasn't Yaakov held responsible for his words Yet, this now raises the question how could Yaakov have caused the death of Rochel, and all the damage by forcing Yosef to reveal himself too early. It is true that the Steipler says that it is only a gerama, however there is a principle that gerama is chayav midinei shomayim, responsible to pay by heaven standards. Meaning, if someone causes a damage to his friend, Bais Din will not enforce payment, but they will say the person is technically responsible to pay for the damages, and in Heaven they view this person as responsible and Hashem will somehow exact a penalty. An example of such damage would be if one were to maliciously unplug a freezer of his neighbor, leading to the spoilage of its contents. Although not a direct act of damage, it is causative, and one is not held responsible in Bais Din, but is held responsible in the eyes of Hashem. If so, how can we explain how Yaakov could have violated an act of damaging, and even causing the death of Rochel Imeinu if it has the status of a gerama.
Indeed, the Ba'al Haturim understands the reason why Yaakov died much earlier than both Avraham and Yitzchok, even though all three Avos were slated to live until 180, was because he caused the death of Rochel. However, even this does not explain how Yaakov "paid" for his second utterance causing Yosef to break early, and also according to many authorities, the reason why Yaakov died earlier had nothing to do with the curse which killed Rochel, so we are back to our question.
Gerama Be'Oness – Causing damage inadvertently The answer may be based on a ruling from the Chazon Ish, (which also appears in the Meiri and other authorities), which states that even though one is responsible for damaging another person even if the damage was accidental (see Rambam - Chovel Umazik 6:1) nevertheless, in the realm of a person being responsible for a gerama, an act of damages where he does not inflict the damage first hand, but rather causes it to happen is only if he did it with intent to damage. In other words, if he was a oness, an accidental causer of damage, we do not hold him responsible, even bidei shomayim, even from a Heavenly lens!
The Chazon ish proves this from a Gemara in Bava Kamma which states that if someone bent over someone else's wheat stalks and a wind came and blew a neighbor's fire onto those bent stalks (which were only able to hit the stalks because they were bent over), that the bender is responsible bidei shomayim. The Gemara asks: what's so novel about this point? It seems to be a standard case of causal damages, to which the Gemara says that one would have thought he could claim he didn't know the wind would come. The Chazon Ish says we can see from here that if not for the fact that we don't accept the claim, it seems that the correct halachah is that if he could claim innocence he would indeed not even be held responsible min hashamayim, it is only because we tell him you should have expected it, that we say he is responsible.
Perhaps in this case, Yaakov could not be held responsible, either for Rochel's death, and certainly not for Yosef's early revelation, for there was no way he could have known or been expected to anticipate that Yosef was the viceroy. Therefore, even if we can say that someone who utters a tefilla and he knows it will be accepted does have to take responsibility for the damages that come out from there, since it is only categorize as a gerama, if the person had no intent to cause damage, he would not be held responsible!
Have an amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
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[1] The straightforward interpretation of the verse is that Yosef did not want the Egyptian attendants and soldiers present when he revealed himself to his brothers. However, an earlier verse in Parshas Mikeitz (43:30) suggests that Yosef was already struggling with his emotions. Many commentators, including the Sfas Emes, Yismach Moshe, and Shem Mishmuel, interpret this verse as reflecting Yosef's internal emotional battle, aligning with the approach presented here. Therefore, I am using this perspective as a foundation for our discussion. [2] See Bava Basra 14a, where the Rabanan gazed in amazement at Reb Acha Bar Yaakov in an extraordinary way, leading to his death. Similar accounts can be found in Chagiga 5b, Yevamos 106a, and Berachos 58b, among other sources. [3] For example, see Shabbos 34a, where Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai looked at Yehuda—the individual responsible for his ordeal of fleeing—and turned him into a "pile of bones." Additional examples include Berachos 58a, Yevamos 45, and Bava Basra 75. [4] See Berachos 56b, where Rava's life was severely impacted by a dream interpreter who, in retaliation for not being paid, caused him significant harm. Rava prayed that this individual be handed over to authorities who would show him no mercy, and his prayer was fulfilled. See also Nazir 57 and Shabbos 108 for further examples. [5] The Steipler differentiates between a prayer for death—which is gerama—and a curse or act of magic, which are deemed direct actions. Nevertheless, he posits that when it comes to upholding Torah values and defending its honor, it is possible that the Rabanan are justified in taking such measures. Thus, not only may they pray for the death of a perpetrator, but they may also curse or act directly to safeguard Torah and its scholars. This rationale underscores why even a simple prayer for someone's demise, though only gerama, could still be considered permissible under these circumstances.
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