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Dear Yeshiva Family:
First and foremost, a tremendous thank you to everyone who joined us in celebrating the Yeshiva this past Tuesday night. It was a truly beautiful and b'kavodik affair, befitting both the institution and its esteemed honorees. To those who supported us from near and far, your dedication to the Yeshiva and its mission means so much. May Hashem continue to bless all of us with siyata dishmaya—divine assistance—in all that we do.
In this week's parsha, we reach the final chapters of Yosef's story and his reconciliation with his brothers. The brothers, worried that Yosef still harbored resentment for their past actions, approached him to ask for forgiveness. Yosef responds with remarkable clarity and reassurance, saying: "Fear not, for am I instead of Hashem? Although you intended me harm, Hashem intended it for the good, in order to accomplish, as it is clear this day, that a vast people be kept alive" (Bereishis 50:19–20).
The implication of Yosef's words is profound: there is no need to seek forgiveness for this crime because it was all part of Hashem's plan. The Ohr Hachayim explains that nothing truly bad came from their actions. While the brothers intended to harm Yosef—whether by killing him or selling him into slavery—the reality was that these actions were what actually caused Yosef's rise to power and ultimately saved the entire world. Anyone who knew the outcome would not hold resentment over how it unfolded.
The Ohr Hachayim compares this to someone who tries to give his friend a cup of poison but accidentally gives him a cup of wine instead. In such a case, says the Ohr Hachayim, since no harm occurred, even though the intent was improper, the would-be perpetrator does not need to do teshuva.
However, this raises a serious question. The Gemara (Nazir 23a) teaches that if someone intends to sin—for example, by eating non-kosher food—but unknowingly eats kosher food instead, he must still do teshuva. This is because the act, although technically free from actual sin, was driven by an intent to sin, and that intent itself is considered a transgression[1].
I once encountered a modern example of this halacha. A traveler in Europe, feeling hungry, decided to eat non-kosher food. He purchased an item without a hechsher and ate it, only to later feel guilty and ask me if he needed to do teshuva. Upon investigation, I discovered that the item was, in fact, kosher—simply unmarked, as is common in parts of Europe. Nonetheless, the halacha is clear: he must do teshuva because his intent to transgress makes the act itself a sin.
So how can the Ohr Hachayim suggest that Yosef's brothers had no need for teshuva?
The Sefer Pardes Yosef offers several fascinating approaches to resolve this question. He begins by citing the Beis Yitzchok (Y.D. 1:8:7), who makes an important distinction: the requirement to do teshuva for merely intending to sin applies only when the final action is either neutral or not inherently meaningful. However, if the eventual action results in a mitzvah, then one does not need to do teshuva for his sinful intentions.
Therefore, the Gemara in Nazir was discussing a case where someone was eating kosher food while intending to eat non-kosher, that would require teshuva because no mitzvah was fulfilled in the process. In contrast, Yosef's brothers' actions ultimately facilitated a great mitzvah—setting Yosef up for greatness and enabling him to save the entire region from famine. Since their actions resulted in a tremendous benefit, there was no need for teshuva[2]. This idea can also explain why Yehuda is not criticized for his encounter with Tamar in Parshas Vayeishev. Although it may have appeared inappropriate, the result was the fulfillment of the mitzvah of yibum—preserving the lineage of his deceased son—thereby transforming what seemed like a transgression into a virtuous act.
The Beis Yitzchok's principle also sheds light on a surprising ruling by the Levush (Y.D. 157:2). He addresses a case where a man became dangerously infatuated with another woman, to the point that his physical health was deteriorating. His wife asked if she could disguise herself as the other woman to alleviate his condition. The Levush ruled that it was permissible, as no sin was actually being committed—they were a married couple, and their actions remained within the bounds of halacha. The question arises: doesn't this violate the principle from the Gemara in Nazir that prohibits actions done with sinful intent? According to the Beis Yitzchok, this is not an issue because the act itself was a mitzvah—as all intimacy in marriage is—and therefore did not require teshuva.
However this interpretation of the rule does not seem to be accepted by all. For there is a fascinating application of the Gemara's principle found in a ruling by R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa 32:45). He addresses a situation where an emergency requires violating Shabbos, such as saving a life through Hatzalah. If both a Shabbos-observant Jew and a non-observant Jew are available to handle the situation, R' Shlomo Zalman rules that it is preferable for the Shabbos-observant Jew to perform the act. This is because the observant Jew understands that the violation is halachically permitted to save a life, and therefore does not intend to sin. Conversely, the non-observant Jew, unaware of the halachic permission, might violate Shabbos without the proper intention, effectively committing a prohibited 'thought' despite the life-saving result. According to the Beis Yitzchok's approach, however, this would not be problematic, as saving a life is a mitzvah.
The Bais Yitzchok's interpretation brings us to a more provocative question: is Haman from the Purim story receiving rewards in Gan Eden? The Gemara in Megillah teaches that the Jews' repentance during the Purim story was a direct result of the threat posed by Haman. His actions led to one of the greatest spiritual awakenings in Jewish history, as well as the establishment of a joyous Yom Tov. Following the logic of the Ohr HaChayim, if no ultimate harm came from Haman's intentions and his actions indirectly produced significant good, does that mean he is absolved of guilt?
A second explanation cited by the Pardes Yosef comes from the Kli Chemda (Vayechi 3), offering a fascinating distinction. He discusses a case where someone spreads a net to go fishing on Shabbos with the intent to violate Shabbos but instead ends up saving a drowning child with his net. The Kli Chemda differentiates between sins committed bein adam laMakom (between man and Hashem) and those bein adam lechaveiro (between man and his fellow).
The Kli Chemda argues that the principle from the Gemara in Nazir—that intent to sin requires teshuva even if the sin itself doesn't materialize—applies only to bein adam laMakom. In these cases, Hashem, who knows the inner thoughts of a person, addresses the sinful intent itself. However, in bein adam lechaveiro matters, where only external actions are visible to other people, judgment is limited to the final outcome. If the end result is positive, the improper intent does not render the action sinful because sins between man and his friend focus solely on deeds, not thoughts.
Therefore, the Ohr Hachayim's interpretation, according to the Kli Chemda, applies strictly to bein adam lechaveiro. Yosef's brothers, despite their wrongful intentions, ultimately achieved a great outcome—Yosef's rise to power and the salvation of the region. Since the result was entirely good, the brothers' initial sinful intent is not judged negatively like the Gemara in Nazir which deals with Bein Adam LaMakom sins.
While this approach is highly innovative, the Kli Chemda himself acknowledges its novelty and later reconsiders it (Devarim 22:25–26:11:5). There are also significant questions raised against this view.
One challenge comes from Tosfos in Kiddushin. They discuss a case where a father, wishing to test his son's middos, provokes him until the son reacts with anger and speaks disrespectfully to his father. The father internally forgives his son, thus nullifying any actual sin of kibbud av ve'eim (honoring one's parents). However, Tosfos argues that the son remains culpable because he believed he was sinning. This ruling directly invokes the principle from the Gemara in Nazir: even if no actual sin occurs, the intention to sin is problematic[3].
This case, involving kibbud av ve'eim, clearly falls under the category of bein adam lechaveiro. Yet, Tosfos applies the rule from Nazir here, seemingly contradicting the Kli Chemda's assertion that improper intent in bein adam lechaveiro matters is not judged harshly if the final act is positive.
Another challenge arises from the Chofetz Chaim. He explains that one may ask for negative information about a person during a shidduch (matchmaking) inquiry because it serves a constructive purpose (to'eles). However, the Chofetz Chaim cautions that the person being asked must be informed that this is for a shidduch. Otherwise, if they unknowingly share negative information without realizing it is to'eles, they may think they are engaging in lashon hara for no constructive purpose.
The Chofetz Chaim warns that even if the act is technically a mitzvah—helping with a shidduch—if the person sharing the information thinks they are committing lashon hara, they are in violation of the principle in the Gemara in Nazir. This again undermines the Kli Chemda's distinction, as lashon hara is a bein adam lechaveiro issue, yet the person's improper intent is considered significant.
While the Kli Chemda's differentiation between bein adam laMakom and bein adam lechaveiro is thought-provoking, these challenges highlight significant limitations in its application. Both Tosfos and the Chofetz Chaim indicate that improper intent can carry halachic weight even in bein adam lechaveiro cases, underscoring the principle that intentions play a critical role in assessing one's actions.
The Pardes Yosef himself provides an amazing answer to this question, highlighting a fundamental distinction between the story of Yosef and the case in the Gemara in Nazir. The Nazir case addresses a person who harbors bad intentions but unintentionally does not ending up sinning in his deed. The reason such a person is punished is rooted in the nature of their intent: the very thought of acting against Hashem—such as eating what they believe is non-kosher food—is inherently sinful. The act, combined with the rebellious intent, renders them culpable even if the outcome was not a transgression.
In contrast, the story of Yosef's brothers, as explained by the Ohr Hachayim, is entirely different. The brothers did not harbor rebellious intentions against Hashem. On the contrary, they believed they were acting in accordance with His will. Their decision to sell Yosef stemmed from their conviction that they were doing the right thing. True, their assessment was flawed, but it was a mistake grounded in their understanding of divine justice, not a deliberate act of rebellion.
As the Ohr Hachayim explains earlier in Parshas Vayeishev (37:20), the brothers convened a Bais Din and, in Hashem's name, ruled that Yosef was deserving of the death penalty. While the reasons for their judgment are complex and debated by the commentators—well beyond the scope of this discussion—their actions were rooted in what they believed was a halachically justified decision.
Thus, from two perspectives, the brothers were not deserving of punishment. First, the outcome of their actions was entirely positive—Yosef's rise to power and the ultimate salvation of many lives. It was, as the Ohr Hachayim describes, like giving a cup of wine instead of a cup of poison. Second, their intent was never to defy Hashem but rather to fulfill what they mistakenly believed to be His will.
This nuanced understanding underscores the brilliance of the Ohr Hachayim's interpretation: the brothers were judged not merely on the outcome but on the purity of their intentions. They acted out of sincerity and a mistaken sense of justice, and in the grand scheme of divine providence, their actions led to immense good. What a way to enter into Shabbos!! Truly remarkable!
Have an amazing Shabbos Kodesh!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
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[1] Even though there is a sugya in Kiddushin that states Hashem does not punish for bad intentions alone, this applies only when no action is attached to the intent—for example, when someone plans to commit a sin but does not act on it. However, in a case where an action is performed with improper intent, one is indeed held accountable. [2] Although the brothers technically committed an aveirah -a sin, by selling Yosef, halachically, one who sells his brother may not be considered liable for such an act (see Minchas Chinuch 36:11). As for the sources that indicate the brothers were indeed held accountable—which poses a broader question on the Ohr HaChayim's explanation—we must conclude that the Torah holds tzadikim to a higher standard. [3] A similar case would be when someone wants to bait a suspected thief by leaving money in plain sight, allowing the person to take it. While it might not constitute lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block) regarding stealing—since the baiter does not care about the money—it would still be problematic because the thief believes they are committing theft. | 
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