THE BAIS HAVAAD HALACHA JOURNAL: Volume 5775 Issue XXXVII Parshas Re'eh- Rosh Chodesh Holding the Puppet Masters of Terror Accountable Can a Fomenter and Financier of Terror be Held Halachically Liable for the Actions of its Proxies and Agents? Rabbi Yitzchak Grossman

Fox News recently reported that families of American victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism have filed a federal lawsuit to stop frozen assets to which they stake a claim from being released to Iran as part of the nuclear deal. The families claim that they are owed hundreds of millions of dollars in damages by Iran and will never receive compensation if the frozen funds are released. In this article we explore not the procedural aspects of such a request,1 but the underlying question of whether a fomenter and financier of terror can be held halachically liable for the actions of its proxies and agents. In modern Western law, an instigator or plotter can be held civilly and criminally liable under the general categories of aiding and abetting and participating in a conspiracy, as well as the more specific statute against providing material support to terrorists;2 in halachah, we have two possible theoretical frameworks to consider: agency (shlichus) and indirect causation (garmi).3 Shlichus Generally, the rule that “there is no agent for a sinful matter” forecloses both criminal and civil liability for a principal for the transgressive action of his agent. One who orders his agent to commit murder is therefore not criminally liable (under terrestrial law, although it is taken for granted that he will be held responsible by Heaven),4 and one who instigates and plans (but does not directly participate in) a burglary is therefore not civilly liable.5 Some authorities, however, assert a major exception to this principle in the case of an agent who has an established history (“muchzak be'kach”) of engaging in such activity. The Talmudic rationale for the inapplicability of agency to sinful behavior is: “the words of the Master and the words of the student, to whose words shall we listen?”,6 which these authorities apparently understand to mean that the principal can claim that he did not really believe that the agent would obey him.7 This does not apply in the case of an agent with a demonstrated disregard for the “words of the Master”.8 Others, however, strongly disagree, maintaining that the inapplicability of agency to sinful conduct is simply a Divine decree, and therefore absolute and independent of any expectations of the principal.9 It follows that one who incites a novice terrorist to perpetrate an act of terrorism would definitely not be liable under the theory of agency, whereas the liability of one who conspires with a veteran, professional terrorist would depend on the aforementioned dispute.