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Dear Yeshiva Family:
"He (Moshe Rabbeinu) went out the next day and behold, two Hebrew men were fighting. He said to the Rasha—the wicked one, 'Why would you strike your re'acha—your fellow?'" (Shemos 2:13)
Rashi, quoting a Gemara in Sanhedrin 58b, explains that the Torah does not phrase Moshe's question in the past tense—"Why have you hit?"—but rather in the future tense—"Why would you strike?" From this, the Gemara derives a principal, that even if a person has not yet struck another but merely raises their hand to hit, they are already labeled a Rasha, a wicked person.
This Gemara raises several thought-provoking questions. First, the verse describes the two men as fighting. If they were both engaged in striking one another, why is it such a problem for one to hit the other? Halacha teaches that one is prohibited from striking an adam kasher—a virtuous individual—but the same prohibition does not necessarily apply when the target is a Rasha. This principle is codified by the Rambam (Hilchos Chovel U'Mazik 5:1), where he explicitly states that it is forbidden to strike "a good person." Since the Gemara establishes that one who raises his hand to strike another is already considered a Rasha, what would be wrong with hitting such a person in this scenario? After all, both individuals involved in the fight could be considered wicked—why then should hitting one be problematic?
Rav Moshe Shternbuch, in his sefer Chochmah U'Mussar, offers an initial explanation. He suggests that the permission to strike a Rasha may only apply when the victim is a Rasha and the aggressor is not. However, in this case, where both parties are wicked, the dynamic changes. When both individuals are considered Reshaim, the heter (allowance) to strike does not apply. In essence, one wicked person is no better than the other, and therefore, the prohibition to hit remains in force.
Rav Shternbuch goes on to explain that this understanding clarifies the Torah's choice of wording in the verse. Moshe refers to one man striking the other as "your re'acha—your fellow." Normally, the term "re'acha" connotes a sense of connection or commonality, often implying righteousness or shared values. However, in this context, Moshe uses the term ironically, reflecting the reality that the two men were "fellows" in wickedness—both were Reshaim.
However, if this idea were to be true, it would present an incredible and far-reaching lesson. The notion that there is a distinct way we are to treat Reshaim has many potential implications. For example, the Torah commands, "V'ahavta l're'acha kamocha"—"Love your fellow as yourself." The Minchas Chinuch (243) clarifies that this mitzvah applies exclusively to one's fellow—re'acha—but excludes a Rasha.
If we were to apply the interpretation that a Rasha must treat a fellow Rasha differently, an astonishing conclusion emerges. It would mean that while a virtuous person is not obligated to love a Rasha, a Rasha himself would indeed be required to love another Rasha! In essence, the exclusion of re'acha from this mitzvah would only apply to a non-wicked person, whereas a Rasha would still be bound by V'ahavta l're'acha kamocha to love his "fellow"—another Rasha.
Such a conclusion, however, is an extraordinary chiddush—a novel interpretation—that is not explicitly recorded in the sources. The absence of this concept in halachic literature strongly suggests that it is too far-reaching to accept as a definitive principle. Thus, while intriguing, R' Moshe Shternbauch himself explains that this idea cannot be sustained as a valid approach.
To answer this question we must ask a second fundamental question. Why does the Gemara hold someone accountable for merely intending to strike another? The verse and the Gemara seem to indicate that raising one's hand to hit is sufficient to be labeled a Rasha, even though no physical act has yet occurred. This is puzzling, as we know that Hashem does not hold someone responsible for mere intentions where the act is not ultimately carried out, as stated in Kiddushin 39b. Why, then, is a person who merely raises his hand already categorized as a Rasha?
The answer to both questions may lie in a nuanced understanding of the term Rasha in this context. We are not suggesting that a person violates an aveirah (transgression) merely by raising his hand to hit. Rather, the action of raising one's hand reveals something fundamental about the person's character—it is an external manifestation of internal wickedness. In other words, while he may not have followed through with the act of hitting, the mere act of raising his hand to strike is, in itself, a meaningful action. It demonstrates where his heart is and highlights a flaw in his middos (character traits), labeling him as a Rasha.
This explanation answers the second question. The person is not being held accountable for the unfulfilled intent to strike; rather, the act of raising his hand is sufficient to define his character. The action itself—raising his hand—is a tangible indicator of his inner state, revealing a tendency toward violence and an inclination to harm. His wickedness is evident not in the unfulfilled act of hitting, but in the very decision to lift his hand to strike another person.
Similarly, the first question is also addressed through this perspective. Even if it may not technically be prohibited to strike a Rasha, that exemption applies only to the specific aveirah of hitting a fellow Jew. The absence of a prohibition in such a case absolves one from the sin itself but does not negate the act's implications regarding the person's character. Here, the Torah is not focusing on the sin of hitting but on the broader issue of personal conduct.
The act of hitting—or even raising a hand to hit—is not being judged purely as a violation of halacha but as an indicator of who the person is. Such behavior reflects a lack of self-control, a failure to elevate one's character, and an embrace of rishus (wickedness). Even if the act is not technically an aveirah, it is still morally and ethically wrong, and it is a clear sign of wickedness. Thus, the individual is deemed a Rasha not because of the specific sin of striking, but because the behavior itself demonstrates the traits of a wicked person. With this, we can answer a another question on this Gemara. The halacha states (Choshen Mishpat 34:2) that if someone violates an aveirah punishable by malkus (lashes), he is termed a Rasha and is disqualified from delivering testimony. This is because testimony from a Rasha is not accepted. However, the Rema (Choshen Mishpat 34:4) rules that someone who hits another person is disqualified from testifying only on a rabbinic level but not on a Torah level (mideoraisa).
The reason given is that hitting another person does not incur malkus, and only someone deserving of malkus is disqualified mideoraisa. This leads to a perplexing question: if the source of disqualification stems from being termed a Rasha, and in this case, the individual is indeed called a Rasha, why is he not disqualified from testifying mideoraisa?
Based on our explanation, this question is resolved beautifully. The disqualification from testimony applies only to a sinner who is termed a Rasha due to their sinful actions, not merely someone labeled a Rasha because of their flawed character or bad middos. While raising one's hand to strike another is indeed a demonstration of poor character, it does not constitute an aveirah in the strict sense. Therefore, someone with such a designation remains fit to testify mideoraisa, as they have not committed a disqualifying sin.
This distinction clarifies why hitting someone, although reprehensible and indicative of wicked traits, does not render one disqualified from testifying on a Torah level. The term Rasha in this context reflects a judgment on the person's character, not a halachic status of being a sinner whose actions invalidate their testimony.
In fact, there are numerous examples in the Gemara of individuals termed Reshaim despite not committing overt sins. While a detailed analysis of each case is beyond the scope of this article, a few examples highlight this principle:
- The Gemara in Berachos (6b) declares that someone who prays behind a shul while a minyan is in progress, without entering, is called a Rasha.
- The Gemara in Taanis (7b) states that a person who is excessively brazen is considered a Rasha.
- The Gemara in Nedarim (22a) teaches that someone who makes an oath—even if they fulfill it—is called a Rasha.
- The Gemara in Nedarim (59a) describes a person who steals a cake from a poor individual chasing after it as a Rasha.
In none of these cases is there any mention of disqualifying such individuals from testifying. This supports our assertion that the designation of Rasha in these contexts does not imply the commission of a formal sin but rather reflects a deficiency in character or behavior. Only someone who commits a specific aveirah that earns them the halachic status of a Rasha is disqualified from testimony. When the Gemara uses the term Rasha in these cases, it does not refer to sinfulness in the technical sense but rather serves as an indication of flawed middos.
In fact, we can take this chiddush (novel insight) even further. We now understand that there are two distinct categories of a Rasha—each with its own implications in halacha.
- The Official Status of a Rasha: This refers to a formal din (legal status) conferred upon a person who has been tried and convicted in a Beis Din for a crime punishable by malkus (lashes). This status makes him halachically classified as a Rasha.
- The Label of a Rasha: This is not a legal status but a descriptive term reflecting the person's character or behavior. It is a moral judgment, indicating that the person is wicked due to their bad middos (character traits) or actions.
This distinction has several halachic ramifications.
We are explaining that the halacha that a Rasha is disqualified from giving testimony applies exclusively to someone with the official status of a Rasha, which requires conviction in a Beis Din. This disqualification is tied to their liability for malkus and stems from the punishment imposed by the court, not merely from their behavior or character[1].
With this we can understand a fascinating ruling from the Tumim (87:27): If someone knows privately that they committed an offense deserving of malkus but has not been tried or convicted in a Beis Din, they are still permitted—and even obligated—to testify. Why? Because the disqualification of testimony depends on the formal status of being a Rasha in the eyes of the court, not on personal guilt or moral failings. Without an official court ruling, their testimony remains valid!
Similarly, the Pri Megadim (Pesicha Kolleles 3:10) rules that even if someone sincerely performs teshuva (repentance) after being convicted and while awaiting their punishment, they are still disqualified from testifying. This is because their official status as a Rasha, which stems from the Beis Din's ruling, remains intact until their punishment has been carried out. Teshuva can rectify their spiritual state, but it does not erase their halachic classification until justice is served.
The second category, the moral label of a Rasha, reflects a person's character and actions rather than a formal halachic status. Someone who exhibits bad middos, such as raising a hand to strike or behaving with arrogance, may be labeled a Rasha, but this designation does not carry the same halachic implications.
The Gemara in Kiddushin (49b) illustrates this point: If a man marries a woman on the condition that he is a tzaddik gamur (completely righteous), we must be concerned for the possibility that the marriage is valid—even if the man is known to be a Rasha. Why? Because the possibility exists that he performed teshuva in his heart. The Minchas Chinuch (364:1) adds that even if he has not yet verbalized his repentance through vidui, a necessary requirement for teshuva to be accepted, the mere internal desire to change suffices to remove the label of Rasha from a moral perspective. This is because this label is merely a reflection of what is going on in the person's heart, not an official status.
Thus, a person with the moral label of Rasha can shed that designation through genuine repentance and a commitment to improve, even without the formal process of punishment or even formal repentance.
Using this distinction, we can now return to our first question and give a second answer. We saw that the Halacha permits striking a Rasha, but perhaps this leniency applies only to the first category—a person who has been tried and convicted by a Beis Din and carries the official status of a Rasha. Such an individual, awaiting their punishment, is outside the protections typically afforded to an adam kasher (virtuous person).
In contrast, someone labeled a Rasha merely due to their bad middos, such as the two individuals fighting in the narrative of Moshe Rabbeinu, does not fall into this category. Although they exhibit wicked traits, they lack the formal status of a Rasha conferred by a Beis Din. As such, they are still considered an adam kasher, and it remains forbidden to strike them under any circumstances. While bad character can earn someone the title of Rasha, the full halachic implications of that term depend on formal conviction in a court of law.
Have an amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah moshe.revah@htc.edu
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[1] I subsequently discovered a similar line of reasoning in the sefer Chavatzeles HaSharon, which cites numerous sources to support this chiddush. I have incorporated the upcoming marei mekomos (references) from this sefer to further reinforce the ideas discussed. | 
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