Summarized by Aviad Brestel. Translated by David Strauss
Introduction
Ostensibly, the issues we are about to discuss are clear and straightforward. Why, then, will we address them? Because there is value in occasionally discussing matters upon which we all agree. This certainly applies to the relationship between the Divine command and the moral imperative. Here, religious Jews tend to feel drawn in a direction of frumkeit, called to "raise and glorify God's standing in our lives by elevating Him above morality" – but it is not so.
As a starting point for our discussion, let us note that no Torah authority has ever maintained that there is no objective ethical domain, that it does not obligate us, or that it is not part of our lives.
A striking example is the Rambam, who devoted several lines to the topic in his Guide for the Perplexed (III, 17) and negated this approach in the context of the Ash'ari school of theology in Islam. He rejects the approach immediately because it is impossible that the Bible would have devoted so much attention to matters of morality – in Yirmeyahu, in Iyov, and in other places – if they did not bear binding force. Not only the Rambam, but all Jewish scholars throughout the ages are united in this attitude towards morality; no one ever doubted it.
The Proofs for Morality
In recent generations, however, there have been those who have tried to challenge this assertion. One of the claims put forward is that the absence of any word in the Bible that bears the modern sense of the word "morality" proves the Bible does not recognize morality. This is a strange argument in itself, but since the challenge was raised, it seems we must respond to it and prove that the Jewish tradition does indeed recognize morality.
Let us begin with the Bible, where the appeal to Kayin stands out: "What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood cries to Me from the ground" (Bereishit 4:10). A moral claim is made here that not only precedes the giving of the Torah, but also precedes any commandment prohibiting murder. The issue is so obvious that there is no need to command about it.
Later, after the giving of the Torah, it might have been possible to mistakenly think that from now on there is no more morality independent of revelation and the Torah. In order to prevent this mistake, the Torah states: "And you shall do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord" (Devarim 6:18). The Ramban there emphasizes (similar to what he says about the verse, "You shall be holy," Vayikra 19:2) that one must act morally in all aspects of his behavior; since the Torah could not relate explicitly to each and every situation, it issued a general command:
This is a great principle, for it is impossible to mention in the Torah all aspects of man's conduct with his neighbors and friends, and all his various transactions, and the standards of all societies and countries. But after mentioning many of them… reverted to state in a general way that one should do what is good and right in all matters… [a person must seek to refine his behavior] until he is worthy of being called "good and upright" in all areas. (Ramban, commentary to Devarim 6:18)
Perhaps the word "musar" (morality) in its modern sense is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, but the "good and the right" is, and the intent is clear.
Not only in the Bible and its commentaries is a clear place given to morality. So too in the Gemara (Gittin 59b), when Abaye asks about a certain rule, "Is it [only a Rabbinic rule,] for the sake of peace? It derives from the Torah!" Rav Yosef answers him: "It does derive from the Torah, and it is for the sake of peace. The whole of the Torah is also for the sake of peace!"
The existence of morality is proven not only by the commands to act in a moral manner, but also by the very fact that God, who is the God of the world, is also the God of justice, and thus He is committed to morality. The basis for this is the statement of the patriarch Avraham: "Shall not the judge of all the earth act justly" (Bereishit 18:20). This statement assumes that there is justice, and that God is committed to it. In fact, there are many verses that express the same concept, such as: "A God of faithfulness and without iniquity; just and right is He" (Devarim 32:4), and "Righteous is the Lord" (Eikha 1:18). This is what led the Rishonim to raise the issue of "the righteous man who suffers"; the underlying premise of the question is, of course, that God is righteous and upright, or as the Rambam summarizes the manner: "There is absolutely no iniquity in Him" (Guide for the Perplexed III, 17).
This is why the literature on the subject of "the righteous who suffer and the wicked who prosper," which is indeed a weighty theological problem, is so extensive. Early on, Yirmeyahu asked: "Why does the way of the wicked prosper?" (Yirmeyahu 12:1), and the issue is discussed throughout the book of Iyov. From the Bible to the Rishonim – Rabbi Saadya Gaon, the Rambam, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi – and the Acharonim as well, the question has been addressed at length and has not yet been resolved. Why? Because there is a contradiction between the existing reality and the assumption, obvious to all, that God is just and righteous.
The Source of Moral Obligation
We will not address this great question of theology – If God is good and righteous, why is there evil in the world? – in this forum. But there is another philosophical question concerning the relationship between God and goodness, which Plato attributed to Socrates (Euthyphro's dilemma): Does God command the good because it is good, or is it good because God commanded it? He himself concluded that "the gods [plural, in his opinion] command the good because it is good" – but we, as monotheists, run into a problem.
On the one hand, we are exclusively committed to God alone; on the other hand, it is clear that morality is absolute regardless of the circumstances. Thus, one who behaves ethically because he is ethical, and in addition fulfills what God commands, lives his life with two commitments – which is idolatry. This did not bother Plato: he behaved ethically because he was ethical, and at the same time, he worshiped the Greek gods (who were not moral). But for us, there seems to be an acute problem.
We will start with a concise answer to this question, followed by further discussion of its implications. In essence, the answer is that God is one: God Himself is the good. God does not receive instructions from the good; rather, the good God is one, and He is the source of the instruction to be good.
Let me explain. The Rambam counts the recognition of God's unity as a mitzva. It may be that it was once a real challenge to understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the only God – in contrast, for example, to the dualism of light and darkness – and to attribute all natural forces to one source. But for us it is not a challenge – and thus is not the focus of the obligation – because it is no longer a practical matter, as there is almost nobody today who is really debating whether to believe in dualism. We have a different practical mitzva, because in our minds, the power of the King and the command that we identify as the moral imperative seem like two different things – such that one who is committed to both is, on the face of it, following two gods. It is precisely for this reason that we have a mitzva to see the unity in the two: the Lord is one.
There is, indeed, a difference in our ability to comprehend the two matters: we perceive the Divine moral command by way of the intellect (according to most Rishonim), the conscience; in contrast, we hear the voice of God at Sinai by way of the ear (and today in writing). In other words, I have two instruments through which I hear the voice of God, and the sounds are different. Precisely for this reason, there is a mitzva to recognize the unity of God.
As for the manner in which we perceive the voice of God in morality: though we are not prophets, the Rambam says it is the intellect that is the "image of God" with which we were created, and in fact he recognizes intuition as the first step on the way to prophecy. Indeed, in his opinion, the Torah itself was given in this manner, except that we did not receive it directly but via Moshe. It thus turns out that the same instruments allow man to hear both prophecy and the word of God that He is "a God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is He" (Devarim 32:4).
The Proper Motive for Moral Action
At this point, I wish to address several common mistakes and misunderstandings that are liable to arise from this point. The first one does not seem important, but it affects everyone at times: there is a psychological contrast – or to be precise, a tension – between doing things in submission to God's command, that is, to His will (such as getting up for minyan), and doing things not in submission but as part of an inner drive, like giving charity to a poor person who arouses one's compassion.
It is interesting to note that all those whom I have seen struggle with this issue were Chasidim, and they put forward the following argument: "If you give charity to a needy person and you do it out of compassion – it spoils the mitzva." To illustrate the matter, I once read of a Chasidic rebbe who was so bothered by this that he stopped giving charity for half a year, until "compassion" left him. It is related about another rebbe that he would always add a little to the amount he was initially motivated to give, so it would be "charity for its own sake" and not due to his compassion.
In contrast to their approach, we rely on the words of the Rambam (in chapter 6 of his Shemoneh Perakim), who distinguishes sharply between "received mitzvot" – whose underlying reasons are difficult to understand, and about which we can say: "I do indeed want to [transgress this matter], yet I must not, for my Father in heaven has forbidden it" (Sifra Kedoshim 4, 9) – and rational, moral mitzvot, concerning which it is not only wrong, but even forbidden to say this.[1]
The Seven Noachide Laws
We recently discussed the seven Noachide laws. In this context, let us consider the following passage in Midrash Shochar Tov:
"Of every tree of the garden" (Bereishit 2:16) – but not stolen property. "You shall freely eat" (ibid.) – but not a limb removed from a living animal. For all of these are rational mitzvot, which the generations would have observed on their own even if the Torah had not been given to Israel. (Pesikta Zutrata Bereishit 2)
So far, there is nothing very new here, but the midrash continues by drawing a connection to Avraham, who followed "the way of the Lord" (Bereishit 18:19).
And similarly it is stated regarding Avraham: "For I have known him, to the end that he will command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord to do righteousness and justice." (Pesikta Zutrata, ibid.)
There is something very novel here: morality and "the way of the Lord" are the same. That is to say, God "knew" Avraham, and as Rashi explains, this means that He chose him and loved him, "to the end that," that is, because He knew that "he will command his children and his household after him," "that they may keep the way of the Lord" – which the midrash identifies with morality. There is no talk here of "his two kidneys becoming like two Torah scrolls" or the like, as in other midrashim (for example, Bereishit Rabba 61, Tanchuma Vayigash, and Pesikta Zutrata 1) – which would imply a kind of prophecy of what will be written in the Torah – but rather a clear understanding that "the way of the Lord" is the same as morality.
On top of this, of course, stands the question of to what extent one should serve under compulsion and to what extent service should be more "natural." Here, too, the midrashic position is clear: Bereishit Rabba states (at the beginning of Parashat Lekh Lekha) that Avraham was chosen because: "You have loved righteousness, and hated wickedness; therefore, God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your fellows" (Tehillim 45:8) – that is to say, Avraham's love of righteousness was the cause of his election by God, and not the other way around. Later, the midrash explains why this verse was stated about Avraham – because of his defense of Sedom: "'You have loved righteousness and hated wickedness': 'You have loved' – to justify My creatures; 'and hated wickedness' – you refused to condemn them." One must not only act in accordance with morality, but also love morality – and therefore Avraham was chosen.
Morality and God's Command
We will continue with another common mistake. There are people who know I am right, who admit that there exists an objective morality and that God is one and therefore it is He who obligates morality, but who nevertheless argue that we are not capable in practice of understanding on our own what is moral and what is not – especially in extreme cases, such as the wiping out of Amalek: "Human morality I can understand, but Divine morality I cannot understand, and therefore it must be drawn from the Torah."
This is not true. First, it is impossible to be moral without obeying the moral imperative – as we said about charity – and therefore it is clear that it must be possible for us to understand, with our own faculties, what is moral and what is not. Second, the Bible is replete with examples where it is clear that a person is supposed to develop his moral position on his own: Avraham argues with God about Sedom; before that, it is expected of Kayin that he be moral and not murder his brother Hevel; and according to the Ramban, there is even a special command to be moral, stemming from the verse: "And you shall do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord" (Devarim 6:18). It must therefore be possible to understand God, who speaks in our hearts by way of our intellect.
There is a more subtle formulation of this mistake. There are those who accept everything above, but who still argue as follows: "I can understand the moral principles, but the application is too complicated for me. If someone comes to me asking for money which he will waste on alcohol, perhaps it is preferable to give the money to his wife to buy food – but perhaps he will then beat her – and for this reason it is preferable simply not to give, and perhaps it is even appropriate not to give them anything, so that they should suffer a little and thus wake up to repair themselves – just as God brings evil into the world so that we should repent." In short, there are those who claim that it is very complicated to apply lofty moral principles in the real world, and therefore in practice one should not act according to morality. How then should one act? They would say that this is precisely why the Torah was given to us – in order to define for us (at least in terms of the rational mitzvot; according to Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon, also the received mitzvot) the criteria for morality in practice.
But this too is incorrect, because we know there are moral actions that are detached from commandments. The most prominent example of this is also from Avraham, who often did not act on the basis of a heavenly commandment but on his own initiative. In this context, the rescue of Lot is especially notable: "And when Avram heard that his brother was taken captive, he led forth his trained men" (Bereishit 14:14). From the word vayarek, "he led forth," Chazal understood (Bereishit Rabba 63) that the members of Avraham's household were afraid to go out to rescue Lot, and Avraham "emptied" himself (horik) and told them that whether or not they agree, he will go out and rescue his brother, and thus sanctify the name of heaven.
What this proves is that morality is a sanctification of God's name – even without a commandment. Some will try to argue that we cannot learn from Avraham because he was a very decisive person and it was clear to him what the right moral act was, while we are constantly in doubt. But this is also not true: Avraham as well lacked self-confidence, which is why God made a point of telling him explicitly: "Do not be afraid, Avram" (Bereishit 15:1). Chazal offer four different midrashic expositions in Bereishit Rabba to explain why Avraham was afraid, but what is common to all of them is that Avraham is described as mitpached, or as we would say today, he was filled with anxiety. Thus, it is evident that even though Avraham was actually much more modest and hesitant than most of us today, in the case of a moral dilemma, the moral obligation also includes coming to a quick decision without hesitation – and this is in our hands as it was in his.
Serving God without Morality
We will quickly review what we have already seen: 1. There is morality; 2. God is moral; 3. Morality can be understood by way of the human intellect; and 4. We must do what we have decided should be done – after, of course, making a genuine and supreme effort to determine what it is that should be done.
If the above is correct, that there is morality and there is the will of God, and we say that they are one, because God is one, this has a surprising consequence: It turns out that Jews who obey only the moral imperative do in fact serve, obey, accept, and commit themselves to God (even if not consciously, and this too is a novel idea) – but to half of God, as it were. And this is also true in the other direction: If there are Jews who are committed to God's command as it was given in the Torah, in prophecy, and through the Sages, and that is it – they too, as it were, serve only half of God.
There are many Jews in these two groups. The first group is generally of less interest to us in this context, but many Jews belong to the second group. Whether it is in order to steal from the tax authorities, for example, because there is no verse that forbids such behavior, or whether they do what is right and what is good, not because that is the moral thing to do, but only because of the Divine command – they are serving "half of God," as it were.
Conclusion
"'We have a little sister [achot]' (Shir Ha-shirim 8:8) – this is Avraham, who joined [icha] mankind together" (Bereishit Rabba 39). Our morality is the foundation of the service of God in this world, and the foundation of the kingdom of God, and through it, we will come to the day that God will be one and His name will be one.
[This shiur was delivered by Harav Ezra Bick at the Yemei Iyun Chanuka 5781.]
(Edited by Sarah Rudolph)
[1] At the same time – it does happen sometimes that preference is given to one needy person over another, not because he is in greater need but because he arouses greater compassion, and this is indeed problematic.
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