| Dear Yeshiva Family:
This week's Parshah introduces a number of mitzvos, among them the prohibition against cutting one's payos—the sidelocks or hair that grows on the temples.
What's intriguing is how this prohibition compares to similar restrictions elsewhere in halachah. For example, a nazir is forbidden to cut any hair on his body, and on Shabbos, cutting hair is one of the prohibited melachos (labors). In both of these cases, the halachah goes so far as to forbid even combing one's hair, due to the concern that it may inevitably lead to hair being pulled out.
This is rooted in the concept of "psik reisha"—a situation where an otherwise permitted action will inevitably cause a prohibited result, even if that outcome is unintended. A classic example is dragging a heavy bench across soft soil on Shabbos: even if the person doesn't intend to dig a groove, the act will unavoidably cause one, and is therefore forbidden. Similarly, combing one's hair on Shabbos is generally prohibited, since it will almost certainly result in hairs being pulled out.
In light of this, R' Akiva Eiger raises a powerful question (see Gilyon HaShas, Shavuos 2b and Teshuvos Chasam Sofer Yoreh De'ah 139–140): Why is combing one's payos not similarly forbidden? If doing so will inevitably pull out hairs from that area, shouldn't it fall under the same halachic principle of psik reisha?
Indeed, R' Akiva Eiger was stringent on this point and refrained from combing his payos. The Steipler Gaon as well is reported to have followed this practice for the same reason. This brings us to a practical question for the rest of us: How should we conduct ourselves in light of R' Akiva Eiger's concern[1]?
Rav Aharon Soloveitchik's Insight: Is Combing a Psik Reisha? Rav Aharon Soloveitchik zt"l—who served as Rosh HaYeshiva of our own Yeshiva many years ago—offers a brilliant and novel approach in his Sefer Perach Mateh Aharon, (Akum 12:6) based on the writings of his father, Rav Moshe Soloveitchik, and grandfather, Rav Chaim Brisker.
He begins with a halachah in the Rambam (Hilchos Nezirus 5:11–12), which states that if a nazir uses a depilatory cream to remove his hair, he does not receive malkus (lashes). While he has not transgressed the prohibition against shaving with a razor, he has still violated the aseh—the positive commandment—that a nazir must allow his hair to grow long.
The Lechem Mishneh raises a strong question: Why does the nazir not violate the lav (negative prohibition) as well? The Gemara seems to suggest that all forms of hair removal are forbidden, not only shaving with a razor.
In response, Rav Aharon cites Rav Chaim Brisker's distinction: The Gemara indeed includes many forms of hair removal—such as pulling or plucking—but only when the act involves a direct physical action. When one removes hair using a cream, the act is indirect—a grama, a causative action rather than an active one. Since no concrete ma'aseh (action) was performed, he does not transgress the lav of "do not pass a razor over your head," but he still fails to fulfill the aseh of "he shall let the hair of his head grow long."
Rav Aharon then turns to another halachah in the Rambam (Nazir 5:14), which states that it is forbidden for a nazir to comb his hair, because doing so will certainly lead to hairs being pulled out. However, even here, the Rambam says that the nazir does not receive malkus. This leads the Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 373) to ask: Why not? We normally treat a psik reisha—an inevitable result—as if the person intended the act. Shouldn't that make him liable?
Here Rav Aharon presents a deep insight in the name of his father, Rav Moshe: While it's true that after the entire process of combing, it is highly likely that some hairs will have been pulled out, each individual stroke of the comb cannot be said to definitively cause hair loss. In other words, the psik reisha only emerges from the cumulative act, not from any one action in isolation. He explains that halachah evaluates actions individually, and no single stroke qualifies as a psik reisha, and thus there is no transgression of the lav.
Nonetheless, Rav Aharon concludes, it remains forbidden—just as in the case of the depilatory cream—because even without a lav, one still violates the aseh of allowing the hair to grow. That's why the act is prohibited but does not carry the punishment of malkus.
One Act or Many? The Broader Applications of Psik Reisha This principle has broader halachic implications beyond the case of combing one's hair. A similar question arises in a more practical and relatable scenario: eating with severely chapped lips.
When one bites into food with dry, cracked lips, it may very likely cause some skin to peel off. Should this be prohibited on the grounds of psik reisha—that it will inevitably result in removing skin? Rav Aharon's approach offers a clear lens: If we evaluate the act as one continuous process—eating the whole sandwich, for example—then it might indeed be considered a psik reisha. However, if we analyze each individual bite separately, and no single bite guarantees the pulling off of skin, then it would not meet the halachic threshold of inevitability.
This very question—whether a broader activity is considered a single halachically significant act or a series of discrete actions—is addressed by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l in Minchas Shlomo (on Beitzah 22b) [2]. He explores whether an act composed of many small steps is judged collectively or individually. For example, if one walks through a field of tall grass, no single step will definitely uproot a blade of grass. Yet, based on probability, it is virtually certain that by the end of the walk, some grass will be pulled out. Do we view the entire walk as one continuous psik reisha, since the outcome is inevitable? Or do we analyze each step on its own, in which case no individual act guarantees the result?
A similar case arises when walking past a home with a motion-activated light. Although by the end of the walk the light will almost certainly turn on, it remains uncertain at which precise step the activation will occur. Is this considered a unified psik reisha, or do we treat each footstep as a separate act—each one individually uncertain, and therefore permissible?
Beyond Psik Reisha: The Role of Grama However, the answer we've developed so far is not yet complete. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 303:27) rules explicitly that it is forbidden to comb one's hair on Shabbos. If Rav Aharon's analysis is correct—that each stroke of the comb is not a psik reisha because no single motion guarantees hair will be pulled—then why is combing nevertheless prohibited?
To this, Rav Aharon introduces a novel yesod (foundation): While the action may not qualify as a psik reisha, it is still considered a form of grama—a causative act. Even if each individual motion does not directly violate the melachah of removing hair, the overall effect is a causation that we hold responsible for halachically[3]. And grama is also forbidden on Shabbos[4].
With this, we now have a satisfying resolution to Rav Akiva Eiger's question. Why is a nazir forbidden to comb his hair? Not because he transgresses the lav of shaving, but because he undermines the aseh of allowing his hair to grow.
Why is it forbidden to comb on Shabbos? Not due to psik reisha, for each action is viewed independently, and no one stroke guarantees hair loss. But nonetheless, it is still considered grama, and causative actions are prohibited on Shabbos.
However, outside the context of Shabbos, such as in the case of payos, we do not prohibit grama. Since combing the payos is not a psik reisha, and grama is not intrinsically forbidden in this context, it is permitted according to many authorities—thus resolving the dilemma raised by Rav Akiva Eiger.
A Deeper Look: How Grama Differs from Psik Reisha While Rav Aharon's approach seems to offer a fascinating resolution, the underlying chiddush still requires further understanding. If we're permitted to analyze each individual action separately to avoid labeling the act as a psik reisha, then why are we suddenly required to view the entire series of actions as a unified whole when classifying it as grama? What is the conceptual distinction that allows for this shift?
Perhaps the answer lies in a more nuanced understanding of causality. It may be that since the earlier actions lay the groundwork for the eventual outcome, we are halachically permitted—perhaps even required—to retroactively view all the actions as part of a single, unified process. Take the case of combing: the hair may not be pulled out during the initial strokes, but those strokes begin to loosen and dislodge the hair. The final stroke removes it only because the earlier ones paved the way. Thus, while no individual motion qualifies as a psik reisha, the fact that the initial actions set up the conditions for what follows allows us to treat the entire process as a single act of causation—these actions will cause a hair to fall out, a classic case of grama. In this sense, it is the accumulation of small, seemingly independent motions that combine to produce a halachically significant result.
If this interpretation is correct, it fundamentally distinguishes Rav Aharon's approach from the case discussed by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. Rav Shlomo Zalman considered a person walking through a field of tall grass. By the end of the walk, it is statistically likely that some blades will have been uprooted. However, each step occurs on different ground, without repeated contact with the same blade of grass. Similarly, when someone passes a motion-activated sensor without knowing exactly when it will trigger, there is no sustained or targeted interaction with the mechanism.
In such cases, one may argue that there is neither psik reisha nor grama, because there is no ongoing engagement with a specific object. In contrast, combing involves continuous interaction with the same hairs—again and again. Each brushstroke builds on the previous ones, ultimately causing the result. That cumulative buildup creates a direct halachic causation, elevating the act to the status of grama.
However, upon deeper reflection, it becomes clear that this idea is far more profound—and may shed light on numerous sugyos related to the concept of grama. It may be that the reason we categorize the combing case as a grama is because, unlike psik reisha, grama is not defined by analyzing the action, but rather by examining the result. In a case of psik reisha, the focus is on whether this specific action inevitably causes a prohibited melachah. As Rav Aharon explained, when we evaluate each individual brushstroke independently, none of them alone guarantees the result, and thus it does not meet the threshold of psik reisha.
Grama, however, is fundamentally different. It does not require a direct or immediate act. Rather, we evaluate the end result—did a prohibited outcome occur, and was it caused by the person's actions, even indirectly? In this case, a hair was pulled out, and although no single act definitively caused it, the cumulative process was initiated and carried out by the individual. That result, which is ultimately attributable to his behavior, is what defines it as grama. Regarding grama there is no need to isolate a particular act; the halachic liability arises from the outcome itself. If this interpretation is correct, then Rav Shlomo Zalman's earlier cases—walking through tall grass or passing a motion sensor—may indeed fall under the category of grama, even if they are not considered a psik reishah.
Once again, the Torah of Reb Aharon Soloveitchik Zatzal is in the yeshiva!!
Have an amazing Shabbos! Rabbi Moshe Revah Rosh HaYeshiva, HTC - Beis HaMidrash LaTorah mrevah2@touro.edu
____________________________________
[1] The Chasam Sofer, in the aforementioned responsa, suggests that there may be room to be lenient. He offers several nuanced explanations for why this case may differ from others involving psik reisha, and why combing the payos might not necessarily be prohibited. [2] See also Nishmas Shabbos (337:266) who learns that we do not join up all the actions together, but the Sefer Machzeh Eliyahu (44) learns that we do. [3] I subsequently found this chiddush—that an act repeated many times may not be classified as a psik reisha, yet can still be considered a gerama—explicitly articulated by Rav Shmuel Aharon Yudelevich. In his sefer on Bava Kamma, he explains why someone who squats in another's home is liable for "blackening the walls." Although there is no single moment at which we can identify a direct act of damage, the cumulative effect of his presence causes deterioration. Therefore, he is held responsible not as a mazik through direct action, but as a gorem—one who causes the damage indirectly through a series of actions. Fascinatingly, Rav Yudelevich applies this very concept in his sefer on Electricity in Halacha as well, using it to analyze the cumulative nature of indirect causation in contemporary melachos. [4] This idea is rooted in multiple sources, including Shabbos 120b and the Mordechai ad loc., where we see clearly that indirect causation—when done with intention—is still prohibited on Shabbos at least miderabanan, even if the action is not a classic psik reisha. | 
No comments:
Post a Comment