| Dear Yeshiva Family:
Bitul Lechatchilah? A Surprising Exception in the Laws of Nazir
In this week's parshah, we are introduced to the korbanos of the Nazir[1]. Upon completing his term of nezirus, the Nazir is required to bring several offerings. One of them includes a cooked portion of meat that is divided between two recipients: part is given to the Kohen — specifically the zeroa besheilah (the cooked foreleg) — and part is eaten by the Nazir himself.
Remarkably, the Torah instructs that both portions — the one intended for the Nazir and the one meant for the Kohen — are to be cooked together in the same pot (see Chullin 98b). Naturally, this means that the flavor of the Kohen's portion will mix into the Nazir's. Yet the Torah permits this process — even though the zeroa besheilah is assur (forbidden) for the Nazir to eat.
The reason it is permitted is because of bitul b'shishim — the principle that a forbidden substance becomes halachically nullified when it is less than one-sixtieth of the total mixture. Since the Nazir's portion vastly outweighs the Kohen's, any flavor absorbed is nullified.
Still, the Gemara points out that this is a significant chiddush — in fact, that's the Gemara's own word — because this case involves bitul lechatchilah, a form of intentional nullification that is ordinarily forbidden. As a rule, bitul is only permitted bedieved — after the fact. For example, if a small amount of milk accidentally spills into a meat cholent and is less than 1/60th, the milk is batel and the cholent may still be eaten. But to add milk intentionally and rely on bitul to permit it would be entirely prohibited.
Yet here, the Torah itself commands that the forbidden and permitted portions be cooked together, knowing full well that bitul will occur. This is what makes it a chiddush — a halachic novelty that applies only here, and cannot be generalized to other areas. However, the sefer Ravcha Milsa[2] raises a compelling question: why is this case considered such a novelty? We already find elsewhere that if a person's intention is not to cause bitul, then even if it occurs, the act may still be permitted. One classic example is brought in the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 84:13), which discusses someone heating honey to purify it. During the process, small remnants of bees may dissolve into the honey. Despite that, halacha permits the heating. Why? Because the individual's intent is not to nullify the bee parts — it's simply to purify the honey. Since the bitul is a byproduct, not the goal, it is allowed.
A contemporary example often cited is the well-known heter for a strawberry smoothie. Strawberries may contain minuscule insects, which are forbidden. Yet, many poskim permit one to blend the strawberries and pulverize the insects beyond recognition. Here too, the leniency stems from the fact that the person is not trying to nullify the bugs — he's just trying to make a smoothie.
If so, one would expect the Nazir's offering to follow this same principle. The Nazir certainly has no intent to nullify the Kohen's portion. He is merely following the Torah's command to cook the offerings together. Based on this rule that bitul shelo b'kavanah — unintentional nullification — is permitted, why then does the Gemara treat this case as a unique chiddush?
An Approach: Why the Nazir's Cooking Is a True Chiddush
Perhaps we can attempt to explain why the Gemara still treats the case of the Nazir as a chiddush, even though his intention is not to nullify the issur. Let us begin by stepping back and asking a broader question: Why is it prohibited in the first place to deliberately nullify an issur? For example, can't someone grind up non-kosher insects and mix them into a cake, for who say I will ever eat the cake? What is the prohibition to nullify issur?
The answer seems to lie in the intent and purpose behind the action. The prohibition of bitul issur lechatchilah is not simply about technical ratios — it reflects the underlying attitude toward the issur. By deliberately nullifying a forbidden item in order to consume it, a person is actively working to override the Torah's boundaries. It's a mindset of using halachic mechanisms to enable what the Torah forbade — and that, in itself, is assur. Whether this prohibition is a gezeirah d'oraysa (a Torah safeguard), a halacha leMoshe miSinai (an oral law tradition), or a takanah derabanan (rabbinic decree), the point remains the same: if your goal is to consume the issur, and you're taking steps to nullify it in order to do so, that is inherently problematic. The act of bitul becomes part of the aveirah.
This helps us understand why the poskim are lenient when bitul is not the person's kavanah. If one is not trying to nullify the issur — if it's incidental to another action, like heating honey or blending strawberries — then there is no prohibition. Since the entire issur is rooted in intentionality, when that intent is absent, so is the issur. However, this framework may not apply in the case of the Nazir's korban. Why not? Because here, the requirement to eat the food is not just a preference — it's a chiyuv, a halachic obligation. The Nazir is commanded to eat from his portion of the korban. Therefore, even if his conscious intention is not to nullify the forbidden part, we already know — objectively — that he will be eating it. His action is directed toward a result that includes consumption of the mixture, and that outcome is built into the process from the outset.
In other words: in a regular food case, the issur of bitul lechatchilah hinges on personal intent. If I have no intention to eat the forbidden substance, and I'm not nullifying it in order to do so, the prohibition doesn't apply. But in the case of a korban, where eating is mandated, the act of cooking automatically leads to consumption. The person's subjective intent is irrelevant — we already know the outcome.
This is why the Gemara treats this case as a chiddush. Despite the fact that the Nazir may not be thinking about nullifying the forbidden part, the Torah is commanding him to cook a mixture that will inevitably be eaten — including the flavor of the issur. That is a form of bitul lechatchilah not based on subjective kavanah, but on the objective structure of the mitzvah itself. And that is precisely what makes this halacha so unusual, and why it cannot be extended to other areas of halacha.
Thank you Hashem for this Chiddush!!!
Have an amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Moshe.revah@htc.edu
[1] A person who voluntarily accepts upon himself a period of heightened holiness, refraining from wine, contact with impurity, and cutting his hair. [2] On Chullin 98b (Tos. Harosh nt. 106). | 
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