| Dear Yeshiva Family:
The Ir Miklat
In this week's parshah the Torah introduces us to the concept of arei miklat — the cities of refuge set aside for someone who kills unintentionally. If a person causes a death accidentally, the Torah mandates that he must flee immediately to one of these cities, where he is granted protection from the go'el hadam, the avenging relative of the deceased. However, if he does not arrive in time, or if he leaves the city before he is permitted to do so, the go'el hadam is allowed to take matters into his own hands and avenge the blood of his relative.
The Gemara (Makkos 11a) discusses if the killing of the accidental murderer outside the ir miklat is merely a reshus — a permitted act — or is it considered a mitzvah, an actual obligation placed upon the go'el hadam? And if it is a mitzvah, is that mitzvah incumbent only upon the blood relative, or might it extend to any qualified individual who encounters the killer outside the city? The Rambam (Rotzeach 5:10) rules that it is a Reshus, and not a mitzvah to kill the murderer and it is specific to the relative. (And yes — in case you've picked up on the theme — this is now the third week we're finding ourselves deeply immersed in sugyos of Rodef. Can you guess the topic we chose this summer for Yeshivas HaKayitz?)
Can the Accidental Murderer Defend Himself Against the Goel Hadam?
This raises an interesting question: Can the accidental killer defend himself and kill the go'el hadam who is pursuing him? If someone is being chased — even by someone acting within halachah — does he retain the right to save his own life?
This question brings us back to a discussion we addressed in Parshas Balak regarding Zimri and Pinchas. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (82a) states that had Zimri turned around and killed Pinchas in self-defense, he would not have been held accountable. Why? We explained that although Pinchas was acting lishmah and was halachically permitted to execute Zimri, his act was categorized as a reshus — a permissive act, not a halachic obligation.
The Mishneh LeMelech (Hilchos Rotzeach 1:15) draws a direct parallel to the go'el hadam, suggesting that since this role is also merely a reshus — a license to kill, not a mitzvah, then just as Zimri could have defended himself, so too the accidental killer would be permitted to turn around and kill the go'el hadam in order to save his life[1].
A similar analysis appears in the Afikei Yam (Vol. 2, siman 40) in his discussion of ba bamachteres — the case of a burglar who breaks into a home and may be killed by the homeowner. The Afikei Yam notes, following the view of Tosafos (Sanhedrin 73a s.v. Af), that the homeowner's right to kill the intruder is also not a mitzvah, but merely a reshus. Therefore, under that view, the intruder himself would theoretically be allowed to kill the homeowner in self-defense — because he is being pursued by someone with no halachic obligation to kill him.
The Status of a Walking Dead Man
However, a fundamental distinction can be drawn between the case of Zimri and the other scenarios discussed. Zimri was not someone upon whom a formal chiyuv misah was imposed. Pinchas acted with halachic permission, but only under a very narrow and exceptional category — kana'im pog'in bo, a zealous response allowed in the moment to prevent a profound chilul Hashem. It is a license, not a command. Beis Din would not have told Pinchas to act, and the Torah never imposed a formal status or halachic label upon Zimri. In that sense, there was no chalos sheim of a bar ketala — no status as one who is legally liable for death. A real Rodef on the other hand has a chalos shem rodef on him, which gives him the status of a dead man.
One way to bring out this distinction is by analyzing whether such a person would be liable for secondary damages. In Zimri's case, had he caused property damage during the incident, he would likely be held fully accountable[2]. Since there was no death penalty formally chal on him, there is no exemption from monetary payments, and no application of the principle of kam lei bid'rabba minei.
Contrast this with the case of a ba bamachteres. The Torah describes him as someone whom the homeowner is permitted to kill. But more than that, the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 72a) exempts him from damages he causes during the break-in — a halachah that applies only to someone considered a bar ketala, one upon whom a status of death liability has taken effect. This indicates that in such a case, a chalos sheim rodef has been applied: he is no longer just a person acting wrongly — he is halachically designated as someone who may be killed, and the Torah acknowledges that status with its legal consequences. In short: Zimri had no formal chalos, only a situational reshus for Pinchas to act. But a ba bamachteres and a rodef are given a halachic identity by the Torah itself — and that affects not just whether others can kill them, but whether they remain fully liable for other consequences of their actions.
And so too, it would seem that in the case of the go'el hadam, there is likely a chalos sheim bar ketala on the accidental killer once he leaves the ir miklat. Although his initial act was unintentional and did not warrant capital punishment from Beis Din, the Torah explicitly permits — and possibly obligates — the go'el hadam to kill him if he is found outside the city. This is not merely a private license to avenge; it reflects a halachic reclassification of the individual. By stepping outside the boundaries of refuge, he enters a new status — one that bears legal consequences beyond the personal right of the avenger. Just as with the rodef or ba bamachteres, the exemption from liability and the permissibility to kill flow not only from the act, but from the identity assigned by the Torah to the person in that moment. The fact that there may be no liability for damages — or no right to resist — follows from this formal status of being someone whom the Torah defines as deserving of death.
A Support for the Idea of a Formal Status of a Rodef
As further support for this idea — that the Torah places a formal status upon a rodef — we can point to an discussion in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 73a). The Gemara discusses the source to permit killing a rodef. The Gemara attempts to learn it from a kal va'chomer from the case of a would-be rapist, which has an explicit source. If the Torah allows the killing of someone who is attempting to violate a woman, then surely it should allow the killing of someone trying to commit murder. Yet the Gemara rejects this approach, stating that one cannot derive punishments from a kal va'chomer. At first glance, this is puzzling. Killing a rodef isn't a punishment — it's an act of saving a victim. Why would this be considered a onesh, a punitive measure, such that it would be subject to the rule that ain onshin min hadin (punishments can't be derived through kal va'chomer)?
The answer, however, is that killing a rodef is not merely an act of rescue. It is also a legal designation — a chalos sheim bar ketala. The rodef is treated as someone who, at that moment, is deserving of death, not merely because of the threat he poses, but because the Torah assigns him a legal status as such. Yes, it is an act of salvation, but it is also an act of justice — and that's why a verse is needed. It's not simply practical self-defense; it's the halachic execution of someone upon whom the Torah has placed a death designation.
Killing a Rodef on Shabbos
We can apply this concept of a chalos din rodef to illuminate another fascinating Gemara — one that leads to a remarkable machlokes Rishonim and is sure to bring a smile to the face of any serious learner. The case deals with a scenario of attempted murder or assault that takes place on Shabbos. Would it be permissible to kill the rodef in such a case, even though doing so entails a clear violation of Shabbos?
The Gemara in Sanhedrin (72b), in the context of ba bamachteres, rules that it is indeed permitted. As we discussed last week, Rashi explains that the Torah had to clarify this point in order to teach us that killing a rodef is not considered a punishment, but rather an act of pikuach nefesh — a lifesaving intervention. Were it classified as a punishment, it would be forbidden, since punishments are not carried out on Shabbos. Killing is a full-fledged melachah, and under ordinary circumstances would be a serious Shabbos violation. The chidush is that in the case of rodef, it is not classified as a judicial punishment, but as a halachically sanctioned rescue.
According to this, Rashi holds that it is permitted to kill a rodef on Shabbos only because it constitutes saving a life. From here we can infer a major implication: in the case of an attempted rape, where the victim's life is not directly endangered, Rashi would hold that it is forbidden to kill the perpetrator on Shabbos — even though during the week the Torah permits such an act.
This leads to a powerful question: how can it be that the Torah allows us to kill a would-be rapist — seemingly violating the prohibition of retzichah — yet forbids us to do so on Shabbos? Isn't this inconsistent?
The answer lies in our yesod: although one is permitted to kill the would-be rapist, this is not considered a violation of murder. The perpetrator, in halachic terms, is already considered a bar ketala — a "dead man walking," stripped of his protections and no longer classified as a full legal life in that moment. However, Shabbos introduces a different concern: not the prohibition of retzichah, but the prohibition of killing any living creature, even an insect. While the Torah suspends the issur retzichah in the case of a rodef, it does not suspend the melachah of killing on Shabbos unless a life is at stake. Thus, even though the act may not constitute murder, it still constitutes a Shabbos violation — and unless it is a case of pikuach nefesh, it remains prohibited.
Therefore, in a case of attempted murder, where there is a direct threat to life, the killing of the rodef is permitted even on Shabbos. But in the case of attempted rape, where the Torah allows lethal force during the week to prevent a grave sin, the act does not override Shabbos — because it does not qualify as a lifesaving act[3].
The Position of Rabbeinu Yonah on Killing an Attempted Rapist on Shabbos
However, Rabbeinu Yonah explicitly rules that it is permitted to kill the would-be rapist even on Shabbos. How can this be? What exactly is the root of the machlokes between Rashi and Rabbeinu Yonah?
Whose Life are We Saving
To understand this machlokes between Rashi and Rabbeinu Yonah, let us return to the language of the Mishnah. The Mishnah states: "These are the people we are allowed to save, even at the expense of their lives." What exactly are we "saving"? Rashi explains that we are saving the would-be sinner from transgression — sparing him from eternal spiritual ruin. The goal is not to punish him after the fact, but to prevent him from committing the sin in the first place. In this view, killing the perpetrator is, paradoxically, an act of spiritual rescue — saving his neshamah before the sin is sealed[4].
However, Rabbeinu Yonah interprets the Mishnah differently. He holds that we are not saving the sinner — we are saving the potential victim[5]. The Yad Dovid offers a brilliant insight, explaining that these two machlokesin — whether we kill to save the sinner or the victim, and whether this is permitted on Shabbos — are directly interconnected.
Melacha She'eina Tzericha Legufa – Saving On Shabbos
To understand this, we need to recall the halachic principle of melachah she'eina tzricha legufah. On Shabbos, a person is only liable for a melachah if the action is done with intent for the melachah itself — for the constructive outcome it was performed for in the Mishkan. If one performs the act for a different purpose, the classic example being digging a pit not because one needs the pit, but because one needs the dirt, it becomes a melachah she'eina tzricha legufah. Whether one is liable in such cases is itself a well-known machlokes in Maseches Shabbos.
Now, let's apply this to our sugya: Why are we killing the rodef? What is the purpose of the act? According to Rashi, the act of killing is not to save the victim, but to save the rodef himself — to prevent him from sinning. In that case, the act of killing is being done for the sake of the act of killing itself — to stop him from sinning through his death. This would render it a melachah she'tzricha legufah, and therefore, a full Torah violation of Shabbos. As such, it would be forbidden to kill the rodef in that scenario on Shabbos, even though it would be permitted during the week.
Rabbeinu Yonah, however, avoids this issue entirely. According to his view, the act of killing the rodef is not done for the sake of the rodef at all — it is done to save the victim. The focus is not on the death of the perpetrator, but on the preservation of another life. In halachic terms, this would classify the act as a melachah she'eina tzricha legufah — since the killing is merely a means to an end, and not the objective itself. And according to the opinion that one is not liable for melachah she'eina tzricha legufah, such an act would not constitute a Torah-level violation of Shabbos.
Thus, Rabbeinu Yonah can maintain that it is permitted to kill even a would-be rapist on Shabbos — because although as we explained the din rodef does not allow one to violate the Shabbos, however since the act is not classified as a punishment nor as a melachah she'tzricha legufah, it is permitted.
Wow!
Have an amazing Shabbos!
Rabbi Moshe Revah Moshe.revah@htc.edu
[1] It would follow that this all hinges on whether the act of the go'el hadam is merely permitted, or whether it rises to the level of a mitzvah. If it is indeed a mitzvah — an actual obligation to avenge the blood — then the killer has no right to resist. To kill in self-defense would then be unjustified, as he would be actively thwarting someone who is fulfilling a Torah command. [2] This is the view of the Ohr Sameach (Rotzeach 1:13). However, see R' Akiva Eiger (Kesuvos 29a. Tosfos Ve'Al Hakusis) who states that even by Boel Aramis there is a heter of Kam Lei Beraba mineih. [3] One can discuss the ruling of if Pinchas would have been permitted to kill Zimri on Shabbos, since his act was not about saving a life, but rather preventing chilul Hashem. His killing was based on the limited reshus of kana'im pog'in bo, which does not override Shabbos. Or one can posit that since the Torah overrides murder to prevent the Chilul Hashem it certainly would override Shabbos, as we explained in our question. [4] A striking proof for Rashi's interpretation can be found in the end of the Mishnah, which states that we do not kill someone to prevent the desecration of Shabbos or the worship of avodah zarah. In these cases, there is no physical victim — and yet the Mishnah still uses the term "ein matzilin osan", "we do not save them." This implies that the term "saving" refers not to rescuing a victim, but to saving the perpetrator from sin. [5] His proof comes from the language used in the Gemara when discussing the case of a would-be rapist: the Gemara says "Lehatzila" - to save her. According to Rabbeinu Yonah, the Torah's license to kill is entirely about protecting the innocent, not saving the guilty. | 
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